The relevant and reliable language theory:developing a language measure of trust for online groups by Nicholson, Steven
THE RELEVANT AND RELIABLE LANGUAGE THEORY: DEVELOPING A 




STEVEN NICHOLSON  
BSc (Hons), MSc 




A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF LANCASTER UNIVERSITY 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
  ii 
Declaration 
I declare that the thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially 




  iii 
Abstract 
This thesis investigated the link between trust and language in online dyadic, 
online group, and virtual community interactions.  The first two empirical studies 
revealed that positive emotion is reliably linked to trust, that is to say that dyads and 
groups that produce more positive emotion words show greater trust.  In addition, by 
priming group members to believe their group was either high or low in 
trustworthiness, the second empirical study revealed that group members produce 
more positive emotion words as a consequence of greater trust.  
A third study revealed an additional important language phenomena to trust, 
this was a type of linguistic mimicry known as linguistic style matching (LSM).  The 
study guided groups through established phases of group development (relational, 
task, and task resolution), findings revealed that LSM in the early, relational phase, 
predicted trust.  Further analysis of the relationship between phase of development, 
positive emotion words and LSM revealed that when LSM was low in the relational 
phase, positive emotion once again became a cue used to trust in subsequent task 
phases. 
The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory was proposed to explain the 
phase of group development dependent effects of LSM and positive emotion on trust. 
In short, the theory states that language must be relevant, i.e. the group is still 
undecided regarding trust judgements and still seeks trust relevant information, and 
reliable, i.e. in a given context, the language must be considered a genuine trust 
signal, and not one that appears ‘faked’ by ‘opportunists’. Based on the novel theory, 
it was hypothesised in a forth study that disrupting LSM in an early relational phase, 
and positive emotion in a subsequent task phase (contexts where LSM and positive 
emotion were proposed to be most relevant and reliable to trust), would have the most 
  iv 
detrimental effect on trust.  A confederate implementing these disruptions, relative to 
a comparable control, supported the theory; with groups who were subject to the 
‘strong’ disruption producing lower trust behaviour than the control group. 
A final study extended finding to real world online interactions in a virtual 
community focused on discussing credit card fraud, i.e. a criminal online group.  The 
discussions were relational, rather than task focused, thus The Relevant and Reliable 
Language Theory predicted that LSM would be the most important language variable 
related to trust.  The theory was supported as LSM, but not positive emotion, ebbed 
and flowed in line with predicted levels of trust.   
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1. Chapter 1: An Introduction to Trust, Trust Online, and Trust Measurement   
This thesis will study the link between language and trust in online group 
interactions.  Computer text analysis will be a central tool in studying this link.  
Computer text analysis has been used to relate to other latent constructs, such as 
deception (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2007) this thesis will be the first 
to explore its utility in relating to trust.  A series of empirical studies will simulate 
group interactions using student participants.  Finally, the language measure derived 
from these simulations will be utilized and its robustness tested by applying it to real 
world online criminal discussions. 
1.1. What is Trust? 
This Chapter seeks to answer a number of questions that are important to our 
understanding of what trust is and how it could be measured in remote groups. The 
questions addressed by this review include: what is trust?; what behaviours lead to 
and result from trust?; what are the benefits and problems of trust?; how does trust 
function online?; what methods have been used to measure trust?; and, how might 
language be a reliable indicator of trust? With regard to applications, the questions are 
designed to connect with operational and investigative concerns. For example, the 
question ‘What are the benefits, and what are the problems of trust?’ has potential 
value for teams that are thinking of using or manipulating trust as part of a disruption 
effort.  
1.1.1. The Meaning of Trust 
In line with classic attitude theory (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977), most researchers 
argue that trust comprises two main components of beliefs and intentions (Bigley & 
Pearce, 1998; Hosmer, 1995; Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
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Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998; Zand, 1972). These components have 
increasingly converged in researchers’ conceptualisations of trust, and they are 
reflected in the often-cited definition provided by Rousseau et al. (1998), who 
propose that:  
“Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of another” (p. 395)  
“Positive expectations” reflect a person’s (i.e., trustor’s) beliefs about another 
party (i.e., trustee), and “the intention to accept vulnerability” refers to their 
willingness to rely on that party.  Inherent within this definition is the fact that trust is 
an underlying psychological condition of intention, which gives rise to a set of 
behaviours that may be regarded as risky (Rousseau et al., 1998). The risk that exists 
with trust is created by the fact that trust begins where rational prediction ends, and 
where another’s behaviours cannot be predicted with certainty. Further, because it 
exists in situations that call for reliance on another party to achieve some goal, to trust 
another makes a person vulnerable to another’s insincere behaviours. Risk, 
interdependence and vulnerability, are the cornerstones of trust.    
Deutsch (1958) illustrates how risk, interdependence and vulnerability define 
situations of trust using a parent and baby-sitter example. In this situation, a parent is 
reliant on a baby-sitter to care for their child in order for them to complete some task. 
The parent is in a vulnerable position because they must rely on the baby-sitter but 
they cannot predict the baby-sitter’s behaviour nor monitor his or her actions. The 
parent’s decision to rely on the baby-sitter is based on their beliefs that the baby-sitter 
has positive intentions and is qualified for this role. If the baby-sitter does not live up 
to the parent’s expectations (i.e., their trust beliefs), then the consequence for the 
parent (e.g., neglect of the baby) far outweighs the benefits of trust being fulfilled 
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(completion of some other task). The fact that the consequences from broken trust 
outweigh the benefits when trust is fulfilled makes the decision to trust a risky one.  
1.1.2. Trust Components 
Two main components of trust have been identified that relate to beliefs and 
intentions. The belief that another person is trustworthy informs intentions to rely on 
that person in a risky situation, which in turn predicts actual behaviour. In most 
situations, trust beliefs and in turn trust intentions, are informed through experiences 
with the other person. However, where this does not exist (i.e., in a novel situation), a 
person’s trust in another may depend on their general predisposition to trust others. 
This view of trust as an intention, which is influenced by beliefs and dispositions, and 
in turn influence trust behaviours, marks the dominant theoretical model of trust 
(Mayer et al., 1995; McKnight & Chervany, 2001).  
Trust beliefs. Trust beliefs are the extent to which one believes, with feelings 
of relative security, that the other person has characteristics beneficial to oneself 
(McKnight & Chervany, 2001).  The belief that another person is trustworthy 
constitutes believing that they are both willing and able to act in the trustor’s interests 
(McLain & Hackman, 1999).  Another person’s trustworthiness is indicated by their 
personal qualities, with as many as ten different qualities being implicated in the 
formation of trust beliefs (Butler, 1991; Lee & Turban, 2001; Peters, Covello, & 
McCallum, 1997). These qualities typically collapse into three main categories that 
reflect a person’s ability, benevolence and integrity (Lewicki et al., 2006; Mayer et 
al., 1995). In isolation the beliefs formed about another in relation to each category 
may differentially influence behaviour. However, together they represent a trustor’s 
beliefs regarding another person’s trustworthiness.  
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A person’s level of ability is inferred from the knowledge and skills that they 
are assumed to hold for a specific task, along with the interpersonal skills and general 
wisdom needed to succeed at the task (Gabarro, 1978).  Perceived ability has been 
identified by a number of studies as leading to trust (Cook & Wall, 1980; Deutsch, 
1960; Jones, James, & Bruni, 1975; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). It is captured through 
qualities such as ability, competence, knowledge, qualifications and experience (e.g., 
Butler, 1991; Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Kee & Knox, 1970; Lieberman, 1981).  
Benevolence is the extent to which the trustee is believed to want to do good 
for the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive (Jones, James & Bruni, 1975; 
Mayer et al., 1995).  The positive orientation of the trustee toward the trustor, often 
manifested as being helpful when one is not required to be helpful, is the essence of 
the benevolence characteristic. Numerous studies have examined similar constructs to 
benevolence as qualities leading to trust.  These include altruism, loyalty and care 
(Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Frost, Simpson, & Maughan, 1978; McAllister, 1995).  
Finally, integrity relates to the extent to which a trustee is believed to adhere 
to a set of sound moral and ethical principles, which the trustor finds acceptable 
(Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al. 1995). Adherence is central to the concept of 
integrity.  For example, for an individual to be perceived as having integrity, he or she 
must follow a set of personal principles consistently (personal integrity) and follow a 
set of principles in which the trustee judges acceptable (moral integrity) (McFall, 
1987).  Hence perceptions of fairness, justice, consistency and promise fulfilment all 
affect the degree to which another is judged to have integrity (Butler & Cantrell, 
1984; Butler, 1991; Colquitt et al., 2007; Gabarro, 1986).  
Trust intentions. Trust intentions, like trust beliefs, are a central component of 
trust.  They have been identified as the most proximal predictor of trust behaviour and 
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the most proximal outcome of trust beliefs (Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995).  
Trust intentions have often been conceptualised as synonymous with trust beliefs and 
trust behaviour due to their proximity.  However, Mayer et al. (1995) suggested they 
exist independent of the other components. That is to say that, trust intentions do not 
assume vulnerability, as is the case with trust behaviour when an explicit act of trust 
occurs. Nor are trust intentions explicitly perceptions of another’s trustworthiness 
(trust beliefs).  That is to say that, a positive belief about a trustee’s ability, 
benevolence, and integrity does not automatically translate into a trust intention, if, 
for example, risk in the situation is too high.  Thus, trust intentions are conceptually 
separate to beliefs.  
Trust intentions may be subdivided into a willingness to disclose (disclosure 
trust intentions) and a willingness to rely (reliance trust intentions) (Gillespie, 2003).  
Their existence as distinct, but related constructs, has been provided at both a 
theoretical and empirical level (Conchie, Taylor & Donald, 2012; Gillespie, 2003). 
Furthermore, it has been proposed, and empirically shown, that reliance trust 
intentions are more closely related to ability trustworthiness beliefs, while disclosure 
trust intentions are more closely related to integrity and benevolence trustworthiness 
beliefs (Conchie et al., 2012; Gilespie, 2003).  Taken together, trust intentions operate 
as a distinct trust component that is informed by trust beliefs, and in turn, inform trust 
behaviours. 
Trust behavior. Trust behaviour refers to actions that reflect a person’s 
voluntary dependency on another in a risky situation (McKnight & Chervany, 2001).  
This behaviour is an observable choice a person makes by accepting risk and 
becoming vulnerable to the actions of another. For example behaviours include 
cooperation, information sharing, informal agreement, reducing controls, accepting 
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influence, granting autonomy, and transacting business (McKnight & Chervany, 
2001). Crucially, these behaviours might only be described as trust behaviour when 
they occur under risky conditions; in essence, when the trustor does not control the 
actions of the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995).  
Trust propensity. In addition to trust beliefs, intentions and behaviour, which 
are largely shaped through experiences that a trustor has with a potential trustee (i.e., 
situational factors), some researchers have examined trust propensity (Rotter, 1980).  
Trust propensity refers to a general belief regarding the trustworthiness or 
untrustworthiness of a broad spectrum of people and situations. It has been shown to 
shape behaviours in novel situations in which two parties are unfamiliar with each 
other (Rotter, 1971). However, within established relationships or contexts, research 
shows trust beliefs based upon the other party’s actual behaviour and perceived 
intentions are a stronger determinant of behaviour than their trust propensity (Becker, 
1996; Lewicki et al., 2006; Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996; Robert, Dennis & 
Hung, 2009).  Nevertheless, trust propensity has frequently been cited as a key 
determiner of trust, especially in the early stages of novel contexts.  Hence, it is 
necessary whilst studying trust from a situational perspective to control for possible 
dispositional factors influencing trust.  
How do models help to answer the question of what is trust? Trust has been 
studied by a multitude of disciplines and has often focused on either trust beliefs, 
intentions, or behaviour.  Like the story of the six blind men, who each described the 
elephant based on the portion of the elephant’s body they touched, each approach has 
applied its own lens to one part of the trust elephant’s anatomy, resulting in narrow 
conceptualisations which do not capture what trust is in its entirety.  However, the 
challenge of explaining what trust is has been met through modelling its components, 
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situational and dispositional antecedents and outcomes.  An understanding of trust in 
this sense has emerged as the most comprehensive means to answer the question 
“What is trust?” and the most promising grounds to continue to build our 
understanding of trust. 
1.2. What behaviours lead to, and result from, trust? 
Trust develops over time as one accumulates trust relevant knowledge about 
another person through experiences with them (Holmes, 1991; Lewicki & Bunker, 
1995).  Through this history of interaction, the trustor develops a general expectancy 
about the other person’s trustworthiness, and whether they can be relied upon in 
uncertain situations (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). To inform these expectations, a 
trustor uses the trustee’s past and present behaviours to guide their decisions (Alge, 
Wiethoff, & Klein, 2003).  Behaviours most relevant to trust formation are those that 
signal information about a person’s ability, benevolence and integrity. As mentioned 
earlier, ability may be indicated through behaviours that illustrate knowledge of the 
specific job; benevolence is indicated through demonstrations of interest in the 
trustor, such as trying to protect the trustor from the ramifications of mistakes; and 
Integrity is demonstrated through honourable behaviour, consistent action, and an 
alignment between these actions and spoken word. It follows that knowledge of a 
person’s behaviours, in respect to their trustworthiness, is a key process by which 
trust is formed.   
The behaviours that result from trust are distinct from those that lead to trust 
in so far as they are either of a different nature, or are enacted by the trustor rather 
than the trustee. Specific behaviours that result from trust, as shown by meta-analyses, 
include increased task performance, citizenship behaviour, open communication, 
information sharing, and reduced counterproductive behaviour and conflict (Colquitt 
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et al., 2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). One empirical difficulty with modelling some 
behaviours as resulting from trust is that they are also likely to garner trust, as they 
often demonstrate ability, benevolence or integrity (Mayer et al., 1995).  This has led 
to confusion regarding the degree to which one can separate behaviours leading to 
trust from those resulting from it.  Arguably, this confusion has largely resulted from 
the methodological limitations of existing research, which can be overcome through 
careful experimental design or by considering trust over time. 
In their meta-analysis, Dirks and Ferrin (2001, 2002) classified behaviours as 
either antecedents or consequences of trust on the basis of how they were theoretically 
positioned in the existing literature. The limitation in this approach is that much 
previous research is cross-sectional, i.e. data collected at one specific time, which has 
made modelling behaviours that lead to trust, through to distinct behaviours which 
result from trust, difficult (Lewis & Wigert, 2012).  For example, studies on peer trust 
have positioned trust beliefs as leading to information sharing behaviour. However, 
one-time measures are unable to determine if in fact information sharing behaviours 
led to trust beliefs, or that trust beliefs led to information sharing behavior (McKnight, 
Cummings, & Chervany, 1995).  Simply put, cross-sectional research designs are 
unable to disentangle behaviours leading to trust from those that result from trust. 
By contrast to cross-sectional designs, longitudinal designs establish temporal 
information for behaviours, so those leading to trust and those resulting from it are 
evident in their ordering.   For example, Crisp and Jarvenpaa (2013) considered trust 
beliefs and team performance in global virtual teams across eight weeks.  The 
research demonstrated early trust beliefs, formed on early ‘friendly’ and ‘considerate’ 
behaviour, related to subsequent overall higher quality and efficient team performance 
behaviours.  Similarly, over a 3-week design, Wilson, Straus, and McEvily (2006) 
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demonstrated considerate language behaviour to relate to affective trust, which in turn 
led to more cooperative behaviours.  Those studies that have considered trust 
longitudinally provide evidence for the distinction between behaviours leading to trust 
from those resulting from trust.    
Another way to disentangle behaviours that lead to trust from those that result 
from trust is through experimental manipulation. Zand (1972) primed executive 
decision-making groups to expect either trustworthy or untrustworthy behaviour.  
They showed separable outcomes of trust such as lesser controlling behaviour, 
acceptance of influence and greater information sharing among those that expected 
trustworthy behaviours.  Similarly, Robert, Alan, and Yu‑Ting (2009) used vignettes 
to detail past behaviours of future group members.  Members’ behaviour was either 
characteristic of high ability, benevolence or integrity.  Participant’s knowledge of 
members’ past behaviour reliably informed their trust beliefs and subsequent 
intentions.  By forming actual groups a similar process was modelled by McCarter 
and Sheremeta (2013).   They found that replacing two team members with 
newcomers had a detrimental effect on trust.  However, this effect was mitigated if 
“old-timers” received information about positive past behaviours of newcomers, 
while the opposite was observed if negative past behavior information was 
distributed.  Hence, through careful experimental control of either precursors or 
consequences, behaviours leading to trust are shown to be distinct from behaviours 
that result from trust.   
1.3. What are the benefits and problems of trust? 
Up until this point, the Chapter has modelled trust in relation to trust 
propensity, trust beliefs, trust intentions and trust behaviours, and sought to 
distinguish between antecedent and consequential behaviours.  However, research 
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interest in trust has not been driven by a quest solely for conceptual clarity.  Kramer 
(1999) observed that interest in trust over the previous 20 years had been fuelled, at 
least in part, by accumulating evidence that trust has a number of important benefits.  
Much activity in trust research has emerged from the organizational literature where 
early organizational scholars professed trust to be an important hallmark of effective 
organizations (e.g., Argyris, 1962; Likert, 1967; McGregor, 1967).  Such claims have 
arguably led to a bias towards benefits and a neglect of potential problems of trust 
(Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998).  Both benefits and problems of trust are 
reviewed in this section. 
The benefits of trust have been listed with great specificity.  Trust directly 
predicts sharing confidences and providing timely information in buyer-seller 
relationships (Smith & Barclay, 1997). It has also been shown to have a positive 
relationship on group performance.  Trust in leaders amongst NCAA basketball teams 
predicted team success (Dirks & Ferrin, 2000), while priming groups with high 
trustworthiness perceptions of other group members elicited greater creative problem 
solving skills (Klimoski & Karol, 1976).  Benefits of trust have also been 
demonstrated at an attitudinal and perceptual level.  These include job satisfaction and 
employee’s perceptions of accuracy of information (Benton, Gelber, Kelley, & 
Liebling, 1969; Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974), and goal/decision acceptance (Dirks & 
Ferrin, 2001). 
Despite this positive evidence, trust does not always result in benefits.  A 
review by Dirks and Ferrin (2001) revealed numerous studies where high trust and 
low trust interactions were characterised by equal degrees of information sharing and 
task performance.  It is noteworthy that contemporary theories of workplace 
behaviour scarcely mention trust as a determinant of beneficial behaviours.  Micro 
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theorists cite goals, needs or incentives (Kanfer, 1990) while macro theorists cite 
roles, rules and norms as beneficial workplace determiners (Perrow, 1986).  
Therefore, it follows that these constructs might produce the basis for benefit, while 
trust acts as the vehicle through which the benefit is realised only in risky situations.  
For example, a motivational construct may provide the drive for cooperation and 
under low risk circumstances will be sufficient to produce a benefit.  However, under 
high-risk circumstances, trust helps facilitate the occurrence of benefit because trust 
mitigates the risk that one party may not reciprocate cooperation.  The benefits of 
trust are not inherent in every context; it is only in situations of risk where trust 
benefits an interaction. 
Benefits of trust have been exemplified in demonstrations of how trust can 
allow the trustor to cooperate, put oneself at risk to the other party, and perceive the 
other party's actions in a positive light.  It is important to recognise, however, that the 
same behaviours, which result from high levels of trust and are considered beneficial, 
might also be considered a problem of trust. A significant potential downside of trust 
exists in providing a greater “opportunity for malfeasance” (e.g., Granovetter, 1985).  
The traditional view of trust has seen trust as good and distrust as bad.  However, 
excessive trust, or trust without suspicion, can be dangerous. This perspective is now 
reviewed.   
Problems of excessive trust have been exemplified in dyadic and group 
interactions.  Erdem (2003) examined teams and found that as well as trust relating to 
positive aspects of group behaviour, namely synergetic “team think”, it also positively 
correlated with numerous negative group behaviours.  For example, team members 
were protective of shared knowledge against outsiders, which was thought to lead to 
groups becoming introverted.  Hence groups suffered from the damaging effects of 
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information being unable to flow in and out of the group.  One consequence of this is 
that group decisions are based on less information and so are relatively poor (Manz, 
Neck, Mancuso, & Manz, 1997).  At a dyadic level, Benton, Gelber, Kelley and 
Liebling (1969) found that participants, despite being taken advantage of 25% of the 
time by a partner, continued to allow the partner to systematically take advantage of 
them if high trust was established.  Such examples illustrate the potential problem of 
trust. 
The benefits of trust have drawn on a large amount of research efforts to 
harness said benefits (Kramer, 1999).  Arguably this has led to neglect of certain 
intuitive truths regarding the benefits and problems of trust.  That is to say, benefits 
will only emerge under certain contextual conditions, namely risk and 
interdependence. The problems of trust are somewhat subjective.  In the examples of 
trust problems given in this section, trust can be seen as benefiting or hindering 
interaction depending upon one’s perspective.  For example, high trust within dyadic 
relationships is highly beneficial to a party wishing to take advantage of another.  
While, problems of trust are inevitable where malfeasance exists or, additionally, 
from an outsider perspective when a group must be disrupted. 
1.4. How does trust function online? 
Trust has been studied in numerous online settings.  These include trust in 
online purchasing, trust in recommendation agents, virtual health care settings and 
online groups (Robert, Denis, & Hung, 2009).  Similar to the study of trust in face-to-
face settings, the focus of trust in online settings has often been to model antecedents 
and outcomes.  Trust online has also been juxtaposed to trust in face-to-face settings 
with regard to communication restrictions imposed by the medium.  In the following 
section, research in how trust functions online is reviewed.  
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1.4.1. Face-to-face medium versus computer mediated communication  
Trust between people online, including members of online groups (also 
referred to as online teams and virtual teams), has been researched in contexts where 
the predominant communication medium is email and instant message chat (Rusman, 
Van Bruggen, Sloep, Valcke, & Koper, 2010); commonly known as computer 
mediated communication (CMC).  Compared to face-to-face communication, CMC 
differs in numerous ways, relevant to trust. CMC makes impression formation about 
another person difficult, as less information about the other person is available 
(Hancock & Dunham, 2001). Difficulties and delays in impression formation in CMC 
may be attributed to the lack of reputational information (e.g., fewer word of mouth or 
social characteristics information) (Riegelsberger, Sasse, & McCarthy, 2005). 
Furthermore, in CMC the same signs and signals important to relationship formation, 
such as nonverbal communication, are not available.  There is also less time and 
opportunity for informal communication, which is known to facilitate trust (Rusman 
et al., 2010).  In sum, in CMC there is reduced social information (Walther et al., 
2005), and hence less information to form trust beliefs. Conventional wisdom has 
suggested it is difficult to trust online.   
A more optimistic view of trust online comes from anthropological evidence.  
Studies in online relationship formation has found evidence of people claiming to 
“click” and trust more with people online than they could with people face-to-face 
(Henderson & Gilding, 2004).  There are also examples of groups forming strong trust 
that is predictive of group resilience to failings in online gaming (Chen, 2009).   
Empirically, studies have also suggested mechanisms as to how trust might 
function online.  Reduced social information has been said to lead to equal status 
effects and greater information sharing (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991; Kiesler, 
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Zubrow, Moses, & Geller, 1985; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986). 
There are also demonstrations of hyper interpersonal acts and task-orientated 
communication proximal to trust in online settings (Straus, 1997; Walther, 1996). In 
line with these findings, researchers have suggested that rather than trust formation 
being unattainable through CMC, it is simply delayed (Walther, Bunz, & Bazarova, 
2005).  In conclusion, despite early pessimism that interpersonal trust would not 
emerge in online settings, research efforts have found evidence that online settings are 
in fact fertile ground for trust. 
1.4.2. Existing models of trust 
Evidence of trust in online settings has led researchers to consider how 
existing models of trust, developed mainly for offline interactions, generalise to 
online settings.  Such research has extended the relevance of each component of trust 
discussed earlier; highlighting the importance of trust propensity, trust beliefs, trust 
intentions and trust behaviours.  The generalisation of existing models of trust, 
namely Mayer et al.’s (1995) model, to online settings would suggest we do not need 
to rethink our model of trust when considering trust online.  Barriers to trust outlined 
above are in fact in line with Mayer et al.’s (1995) formulation of the relationship 
between trust and risk; where trust is more difficult to establish due to greater risk in 
online settings.  As we attempt to build upon the existing prominent model of trust, a 
language measure of trust, it is important that we understand how this dominant 
model is suitable to online interactions, and be aware of the nuances of scaling this 
model up to an online domain. 
Trust propensity. Trust propensity has been positioned as an antecedent of 
trust, which becomes less important as members of online interactions acquire 
knowledge of other member’s trustworthiness characteristics (McKnight & Chervany, 
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1998).  However, prior to knowledge of trustee’s characteristics, trust propensity is an 
important determiner of trust (Mayer et al., 1995).  Given the restricted channels of 
communication in CMC, and the proposition that impression formation takes longer 
to establish in CMC, trust propensity might play a more important role in trust 
development in online groups.  Indeed, Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) found that trust 
propensity was a significant predictor of trust in early online meetings but became a 
less important predictor of trust at subsequent meetings.  Robert et al. (2009) found a 
similar effect online but further noted that early dispositions to trust, to an extent, 
coloured trust beliefs for the duration of meetings.  The role of trust propensity as a 
more important predictor of trust only prior to trustworthiness information also 
applies to interpersonal trust online.  Hence it is important to control for the effects of 
this dispositional state on trust formation when seeking to understand other, more 
situational, influences. 
Trust beliefs and trust intentions. Attempts to integrate theoretical models of 
trust to online interactions have generalised the importance of trust beliefs and trust 
intentions found in offline interactions.  Hung et al. (2004) positioned ability, 
benevolence and integrity beliefs as the best predictors of trust intentions online.  
These beliefs are superseded in early stages of a relationship by trust propensity, rule-, 
category- and role- based judgements (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996).  Once 
trustworthiness knowledge is acquired about another through interactions, these latter 
“peripheral” routes to trust give way to “central” routes as members’ personal 
attributes are assessed (Hung et al., 2004).  Continuous interaction allows members of 
an online interaction to gain personal knowledge of others and continually reassess 
their trustworthiness attributes (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999).  Hence, trust online, as 
offline, changes as the perceived amount of trustworthiness in members change. 
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 The importance of trustworthiness characteristics may vary as a group or 
dyad moves through its life cycle (Hung et al., 2004).  When time pressures are 
salient, members may focus more on task goals than on relational development 
(Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Mayerson et al., 1996).  At these stages, therefore, perceived 
integrity and ability are more important than perceived benevolence.  In sum, trust 
online is influenced by deliberate assessment of members’ ability, benevolence and 
integrity, but also by the relative importance of each to specific stages of the group or 
dyad’s life cycle. 
Trust behavior. Research predominantly shows that among online group 
members and online dyads, trust predicts behavioural outcomes.  For example, 
Mitchell and Zigur’s review (2007) of 42 empirical studies of online trust revealed 
that trust has been shown to predict socio emotional outputs such as cohesiveness, 
commitment and team performance, as well as task outputs such as communication, 
knowledge transfer, project scripting, task performance, and transactive memory.  
However, there have been instances of trust not emerging as a strong predictor of 
behavioural outcomes online despite emerging in equivalent face-to-face conditions 
(Bos, Olson, Gergle, & Olson, 2002; Hancock & Dunham, 2001; Riegelsberger, 
Sasse, & McCarthy, 2005; Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 2006).  For example, studies 
have shown that zero-order teams (i.e., those with little knowledge of each other), 
exhibit higher trust and exchange more information in face-to-face interactions than 
online (Alge et al., 2003).   
The differences between online and face-to-face findings have been explained 
in relation to the moderating role of risk (Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 2006).  Mayer 
et al.’s (1995) conceptualisation of risk and its relationship to trust behaviours, where 
as risk increases more trust is required in order for trust behavior (or ‘risk taking in 
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the relationship’) to occur, could explain instances of behavioural trust outcomes not 
emerging in online interactions.  There is a compelling case that in online interactions 
there is greater ‘risk’ due to monitoring behaviours becoming more difficult and the 
time lag between exchanges leading to uncertainty, expecting the worst, and a 
“behavioural invisibility” (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).  Online, there is generally a 
slower transfer of trustworthiness information, which equates to trust decisions made 
on less information and therefore greater risk (Bos et al., 2002).  However, it follows 
that with time, risk is reduced and trust behaviour should emerge parallel to how it 
would in face-to-face groups with equal risk.  Evidence for this position is found in 
studies where online groups are given more time to converse.  For example, Wilson et 
al. (2006) found that trust did not predict a group’s trust behaviour in early stages of 
development, but after three meetings trust and trust behaviour was equivalent to that 
found in face-to-face groups.  The role of risk in relation to trust behaviour operates in 
online interaction in much the same way as in face-to-face interaction.   
Despite early pessimism in the literature, that trust could not emerge in online 
interactions, trust has become a central component to the fluidity of online dyads and 
groups.  Models of trust devised in relation to face-to-face interaction transfer well to 
online interactions.  As a result, trust components such as trust beliefs and intentions, 
and their varying salience across stages of interaction, remain useful concepts in our 
exploration of online trust.  Furthermore, the role of trust propensity remains a 
personality construct that must be controlled for whilst trust behaviours remain a 
measurable outcome of trust.  Risk would appear to be a noteworthy difference 
between face-to-face and online interaction.  Yet, given how risk can be mitigated by 
time in online interactions, the differences between risk online and risk in face-to-face 
interactions are a matter of degree rather than kind. 
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1.5. What methods have been used to measure trust? 
The dominant approach to measuring trust has been via self-report 
questionnaire surveys.  This approach to measuring latent constructs, commonly 
known as the psychometric approach, typically takes the form of a multi-item survey 
that includes a variety of questions intended to capture different trust components 
(McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011).  Broadly, such measures will ask to what extent 
people trust a specific other or group.  This approach treats trust as a psychological 
state and so measures trust as individual level phenomena (Rousseau et al., 1999).  
Trust has been considered as a multi-faceted concept in this review, therefore 
measures that tap different components of trust (beliefs and intentions), as well as 
trust outcomes and trust propensity are reviewed.  Finally, a divergence from the 
dominant psychometric approach is reviewed in the form of behavioural measures of 
trust, where trust outcomes are operationalized as trust decisions in experimental 
economic games (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995).  This completes a review of the 
instruments available for measuring trust, which are the platform for a new language 
measure. 
1.5.1. Trust propensity measures 
Measures have been devised to assess the propensity to trust others in general, 
or ones disposition to trust.  Like other measures of personality traits, questionnaires 
and survey items are used to measure trust propensity. Typical trust propensity items 
include positively and negatively scored items such as ‘I believe people are basically 
moral’ and ‘I am wary of others’ (Mayer et al., 1999). Given the possibility that an 
individual’s trust propensities will influence trust in online contexts, trust propensity 
survey items form a useful control measure for exploration of situational online trust 
in the present thesis. 
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1.5.2. Trust beliefs and trust intention measures 
Trust toward another person or group has been measured via items designed to 
assess one’s trust beliefs and intentions.  A review by McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) 
revealed that questionnaire items to measure trust beliefs and intentions have become 
extremely fragmented.  Their review identified 38 different dimensions of trust, with 
little replication and validation of many of these.  To accommodate for this, McEvily 
and Tortoriello (2011) highlighted five noteworthy measures of trust that were 
developed with a great deal of rigour and were the most highly replicable.  The five 
measures are those developed by McAllister (1995), Currall and Judge (1995), 
Cummings and Bromiley (1996), Mayer and Davis (1999), and Gillespie (2003). Of 
the five, Mayer and Davis’ (1999) measure was found to have been replicated the 
most (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011).  
Mayer and Davis’ measure, as one might expect, captures perceptions about 
trust beliefs.  That is to say that, beliefs about a trustee’s ability (e.g., my co-worker 
would be highly qualified in their field), benevolence (e.g., my co-worker would not 
knowingly do anything to hurt anyone) and integrity (e.g., my co-worker is guided by 
sound principles). Furthermore, the measure is the only one to capture two theoretical 
models of trust beliefs.  That is to say that, the measure naturally captures the three 
trustworthiness factors of Mayer et al.’s (1995) model.  However, ability and 
benevolence/integrity beliefs often converge, respectively, onto cognitive and 
affective trust beliefs of McAllister’s (1995) model (McKnight & Chervany, 2001).  
Trust intention measures are also proposed in Mayer et al.’s (1995) inventory.  Items 
in Mayer et al. (1995) relate to ones willingness to rely on another (e.g., I would be 
comfortable giving my manager a task or problem which was critical to me, even if I 
could not monitor their actions).  For these reasons, Mayer and Davis’ (1995) measure 
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of trust beliefs and intentions is proposed as the most complete psychometric measure 
of trust. 
1.5.3. Trust behaviour measures 
Research efforts have operationalized trust outcomes in social experiments, 
this is important to establishing a new language measure of trust as it offers 
standardized means to assess how varying language impacts trust with regard to 
observable trust behaviour.  Thus offering an additional measure to comparing 
language to psychometrically reported trust.  The first to propose that trust could be 
operationized in such a way was Deutsch (1958) in a series of prisoner dilemma style 
games.  These experiments suggested that trust behaviour could be observed as 
cooperative moves in a risky situation.  For example, in prisoner dilemma games two 
players play a game with monetary reward.  The outcome with the highest pay off is 
for one party to defect while the other cooperates, next is cooperation by both players, 
followed by joint defect.  Typically, in repeat games, cooperative behaviour is 
accepted as an observable manifestation of trust (Axelrod, 1984).    
An alternative to prisoner dilemma style games has been proposed by Berg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), and relates to ‘trust games’. In the standard trust 
game, participants are divided into two groups: Senders and Recipients. Each Sender 
is anonymously paired with a Recipient. Senders are then given a sum of money and 
must decide how much of this money, if any, to transfer to the Recipient. The 
experimenter triples the amount of money transferred. The Recipient must then decide 
how much of the money, if any, to return to the Sender. The amount of money sent is 
interpreted as a measure of the Sender's trust in the Recipient, while the amount 




Trust games are asynchronous (one party is the trustee while the other is the 
trustor) while prisoner dilemma style games are synchronous (each party is the trustee 
and trustor at the same time).  As measures of trust outcomes this leads to two 
noteworthy advantages of the trust game over prisoner dilemma style games.  First, 
the synchrony in prisoner dilemma style games limits their ecological validity.  We 
rarely have to reach a trust decision at exactly the same time without knowing the 
other’s decision (Riegelsberger et al, 2003).  The trust game more closely replicates 
many everyday trust situations, where a trustee acts to fulfil or defect on the trust 
invested by the trustor.  Second, using the trust game, behaviours leading to trust can 
be more precisely modelled.  In the trust game the behaviour of the trustee and trustor 
that lead to trust can be explored separately.  This feature is important to the thesis as 
it allows for the relationship between language and trust of respective parties to be 
analysed independently.   
Importantly, performance on the trust game has been shown to associate with 
some of the psychometric measures of trust components described above.  For 
example, decisions on the trust game have been shown to be mediated by perceived 
trustworthiness (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005) and trust intention (Brülhart & 
Usunier, 2012), and trust has been supported as the dominant factor in motivating 
behaviour even when compared to factors such as altruism (Brülhart & Jean-Claude 
Usunier, 2012).  Interestingly, the trust game measure of trust behaviour and 
psychometric measures of trust have rarely been used in combination; despite offering 
a comprehensive means to assess trust propensity, trust beliefs, trust intentions and 
trust behaviour.  Furthermore, such a combination of measures has yet to be used to 
assess trust in online interactions.  As a platform for developing a novel language 
measure of trust, a combination of psychometric and behavioural trust measures, in 
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the form of instruments proposed in this section, is proposed for this thesis as the 
most holistic and robust means to assess trust. 
1.6. How might language be a reliable indicator of trust? 
1.6.1. The relationship between language and latent constructs. 
Individuals differ in the words they use and it is reasonable to expect that this 
variation would reflect psychological differences (Fast & Funder, 2008). For example, 
in Hancock et al. (2007), word quantity, prounoun use, emotion words, and cognitive 
processes words, are shown to be language indicators of deceptive discourse. In this 
way, language can be used to indicate many latent constructs; this idea is the premise 
for identifying a language indicator of trust. 
Developments in automated text analysis have offered a new instrument to 
measure language.  Using automated text analysis, research has shown the value of 
language as a measure of various latent social factors such as personality (Pennebaker 
& King, 1999) and deceit (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2007). Using 
programs such as linguistic inquiry and word count (LIWC), language use can be 
compared to a catalogue of word dictionaries to determine the proportion of a 
speakers language use characterised by specific word categories.  This produces a 
language profile for a speaker.  The said language profile can be correlated with 
constructs of interest. For example, analyses have demonstrated that the proportion of 
a speaker’s language characterised by specific word categories reveal personality 
traits such as extraversion (e.g., positively related to social processes and positive 
emotion words) conscientiousness (e.g., positively related to achievement words and 
negatively to anger and negations) and emotional stability (e.g., positively related to 
articles and negatively to anger and anxiety words) (Yee, Harris, Jabon, & Bailenson, 
2010).  This example illustrates how by correlating a speaker’s language profile with 
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established measures for the construct of interest, the language that reflects the 
construct is revealed.   
 Analysing language in this way has also been conducted to reveal language 
indicators of dyad and group dynamics.  This involves assessing the degree to which 
speakers’ language profiles are coordinated.  A new measure called linguistic style 
matching (LSM) has been used to assess the degree to which people subtly match 
each other’s speaking or writing style.  This produces a measure of synchrony across 
various linguistic categories, matching on a subgroup of ‘style’ words (as opposed to 
‘content’ words) have been shown to correlate with latent social constructs such as 
rapport (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007) and group cohesiveness (Gonzales, Hancock, & 
Pennebaker, 2010).  The suggestion with LSM is that if language style use provides 
insight into how an individual is perceiving the world and if people are matched in 
their linguistic styles, then a measure of LSM could indicate when individuals are, or 
are not, experience harmony in the way they are perceiving and experiencing a 
situation (Niederhoff & Pennebaker, 2002). 
 The key to LSM is it’s exclusive focus on function words, over content words. 
Unlike content words, sometimes referred to as the ‘what’ of discourse, function 
words communicate the grammatical structure of language and can be referred to as 
the ‘how’ of discourse. They are typically short (usually 1-4 letters) and produced 
quickly in speech (100-300 milliseconds) (Ireland et al. 2010). In LSM research the 9 
most common categories of function words are adverbs, articles, auxiliary verbs, 
conjunctions, indefinite pronouns, negations, personal pronouns, prepositions, and 
quantifiers.  
 Function words are interesting to the study of latent constructs in social 
interaction for various reasons.  First, function words have an incredibly high 
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frequency in everyday speech.  Function words make up around 55% of all the words 
we speak, hear, and read in our everyday lives (Campbell & Pennebaker, 2003). This 
is despite the fact that only about 0.05% of all the words in the English vocabulary are 
function words (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007).  Second, function words can be 
considered strictly ‘social’ words. That is to say that they are independent of both the 
context and content of communication. Content words such as ‘table’, ‘blue’ or 
‘walking’ produce very clear pictures in the speakers mind. In contrast, trying to 
imagine words such as ‘because’ or ‘really’ is impossible (Richardson, Taylor, 
Snook, Conchie, & Bennell, 2014). Therefore these words have been considered as 
like the cement holding content words together (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). 
Third, function words can be measured across different domains unbiased by the 
context of the interaction.  For example, they are unbiased by whether the interaction 
is relational or task focused.  Meaning that people can talk about identical topics in 
psychologically different ways.  
 Linguistic style matching has been linked to consciously reported constructs 
such as emotional state and connections with others (Gonzales, Hancock, & 
Pennebaker, 2010; Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Scissors, Gill, & Gergle, 
2008), however the extent to which individuals are conscious of the language 
processes underlying these social outcomes is debated. Broader behavioural mimicry 
research tends to support the automatic production of mimicry and suggests that, in 
social interaction, behavioural mimicry is the default response (Chartrand & Lakin, 
2012). Mimicry is such an innate behaviour that it appears even when individuals are 
under extreme cognitive load (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). 
In addition, one leading theory of mimicry, Interaction Alignment Theory 
(IAT) stresses the importance of the unconscious nature of alignment (Garrod & 
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Pickering, 2009). Alignment happens automatically and is idiosyncratic in nature. 
Alignment occurs for many different languages categories covering semantic 
expression, syntactic expression and lexical expression. IAT draws our attention to 
the importance of the success of communication. Alignment can be used to create a 
shared understanding of the situation leading to communicative success (Richardson, 
2013). IAT states mimicry is simply a priming process that helps communication 
become more automatic, ego less conscious. 
There is evidence for LSM similarly being an unconscious mimicry process. 
Research shows that function words are typically ‘skimmed over’ in reading tasks, 
whilst content words require more effort to produce and comprehend (Ireland & 
Pennebaker, 2010). For this reason, LSM theory and research has tended to view 
function words as being difficult or impossible to consciously control (Niederhoff & 
Pennebaker, 2002). 
On the other hand, some researchers have suggested mimicry processes can 
sometimes become conscious. According to Lakin and Chartrand (2013) mimicry can 
occur either automatically, without conscious awareness, or through a deliberate 
intent to imitate. Communication accommodation theory (CAT) (Giles & Coupland, 
1991) suggests that, while mimicry is typically unconscious, when a conversation is 
not going well, or when interactants dislike or are threatened by each other, 
divergence can be consciously used to create social distance through refusal to 
accommodate on linguistic behaviours (Richardson, 2013). In addition, CAT states 
that when a discrepancy occurs between speaker’s expectations regarding 
accommodation and what actually happens, or when speakers are engaged in a novel 
situation (Langer, Blank & Chanowitz, 1978), our verbal and non-verbal behaviours 
enter more conscious awareness.  
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An interesting area of research that relates to this debate comes from 
experiments were a confederate has been used to encourage or discourage mimicry.  
For example Swaab, Maddux and Sinaceur (2011) asked individuals to match a 
targets language style and found an increase in mimicry, suggesting an individual can 
bring linguistic mimicry under conscious control. A more recent study, specific to the 
mimicry metric LSM, was novel in training a confederate to mimic on specifically 
function words, evidencing raised LSM relative to a control condition (Richardson, 
2013). Such theories and experiments support the argument that mimicry, and 
specifically LSM, can become a conscious process in some circumstances. 
In conclusion it appears mimicry, including LSM, is typically an unconscious 
phenomena.  However, such processes might become more conscious in novel 
situations, when conversations negatively deviate from expectations, or when 
individuals are instructions to attend to features of language in experimental settings. 
1.6.2. Using language to measure trust. 
Using various combinations of the methods detailed above, language analysis 
has proved a useful measure of constructs where trust may have been implicit.  For 
example, in online speed dating one’s willingness to request a second date was 
positively predicted by LSM (Ireland, Slatcher, Eastwick, Scissors, Finkel, & 
Pennebaker, 2011). While Ireland et al. (2011) interpreted greater LSM and a 
willingness to meet partners again as relating to rapport and mutual understanding, it 
is plausible that LSM may have also been tapping a trust component, especially given 
that affective trust has been associated with relationship initiation (Bryant & Conger, 
2002).  Similarly, the usefulness of LSM as a measure of team performance, in online 
and offline groups, may have related to a trust component within or subsuming 
cohesiveness.  Given the frequency at which trust is shown to be a predictor of team 
  
27 
performance (Dirk & Ferrin, 2001) it follows that LSM measures of team 
performance might tap a trust component.  In each study above, trust was not 
experimentally isolated; however, given the covariance between the constructs 
reviewed and trust, we might expect similar results when trust is the primary construct 
of interest.   
Some studies have used qualitative measures of language and drawn links to 
trust itself.  For example, Donohue and Druckman (2009) reviewed public and private 
rhetoric from the Oslo peace accords: relating rhetoric to developments in the conflict, 
and so too trust.  Rhetorical devices such as forward framing (addressing underlying, 
similarities, acknowledgements, and awareness of underlying reasons for conflict) 
was related to developments in trust while rhetorical devices such as backward 
framing (addressing previous wrong doings and justice) was related to impasses in 
negotiation.  In a study by Donohue, Pugh, and Sabrie (2014) the authors discuss 
crisis negotiations with groups of Samali pirates. Interviews with two Somali pirates 
revealed insights into trust in the negotiation process, whereby the pirates report 
mistrusting not only the negotiator, but so too one another.  It was said that by 
minimizing overt signs of threat in the communication style of the negotiator, this 
paradox could be resolved.   
Similarly, in experimental online groups, Jarvenpaa, Knoll and Leidner (1998) 
used a post hoc content analysis and showed that high trusting group’s language was 
characterised by optimism while low trusting group’s language was characterised by 
pessimism. Hence, in real world and experimental contexts where language was 
studied using a qualitative method, there is evidence for a relationship between 
communication style and trust. 
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Rarely, but with the following few exceptions, automated text analysis has 
been used to directly investigate the relationship between language and trust.   For 
example, an analysis of real-world historical interactions indicated higher levels of 
LSM on word categories such as prepositions, past tense, verbs, social, and insight 
during times of trust and cooperation between speakers during the Watergate scandal 
(Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002).  Similarly, analyses of hostage negotiations have 
revealed that successful negotiations, which establish trust between negotiator and 
hostage taker, were characterised by higher levels of turn by turn matching on word 
categories such as articles, prepositions, causation, present tense and insight (Taylor 
& Thomas, 2008).  Due to the retrospective nature of these analyses, explicit 
measures of trust during interactions were unavailable.  Nevertheless, this research 
demonstrates that where trust is theorised to be a central construct, language is a 
reliable indicator of trust. 
The present review found only one example where automated language 
analysis was used and an explicit measure of trust was taken under experimental 
conditions.  This was in an experiment conducted by Scissors, Gill, Geraghty, and 
Gergle (2009) where participants completed a repeat round version of the prisoner 
dilemma game in pairs.  Hence, an explicit measure of trust behaviour was utilised.  
Analysis revealed matching on content word categories such as positive emotion, 
leisure and occupation, as well as on style words such as past, present and future 
tense, related to trusting behaviour as measured by cooperative moves.  Arguably, in 
this study, trust might have been measured more precisely (i.e., by using 
psychometric and behavioural trust measures that are more ecologically valid), such 
as those discussed in this review.  In addition, language measures might have utilized 
the validated LSM metric.  Instead, the authors devised a novel matching metric, 
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albeit similar to LSM.  In conclusion, language matching is again demonstrated as a 
measure of a behaviour that holds, at least, a component of trust. 
To date, no research has isolated trust through comprehensive measures and 
correlated such measures with an individual or group’s language use.  This review has 
found that there are adequate valid and reliable psychometric and behavioural 
measures of trust.  Furthermore, it has found automated text analysis to be a valid and 
reliable measure of latent constructs, many of which potentially subsumed by trust.  
Hence there is evidence that a language measure of trust is not only highly desirable 
but also within our reach.   
1.7. Conclusion 
We have seen that trust is a multifaceted construct.  A dominant model of trust 
exists in Mayer et al.’s (1995) beliefs, intentions, and trust behaviour model, which 
also acknowledges the role of trust propensity. There is evidence to suggest that this 
model extends to online domains, despite some nuances. Thus, the model is a suitable 
starting point in establishing our novel language measure of trust and is represented in 
Figure 1.1.  The benefits and problems of trust indicate that from an operational 
perspective, dangerous groups with high trust constitute a threat which are more likely 
to act, and more difficult to disrupt.  Hence, the utility of establishing a reliable, 
remote measure of trust is clear. This review has concluded by discussing the existing 
measures of trust, and the ways in which computer text analysis has been used to 
measure psychological and group constructs, some close to trust itself.  As well as 




Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of Mayer et al.’s (1995) trust model. 
Now, the following working model is proposed as the starting point to empirically 
test and quantify a novel language measure of trust. 
Trust beliefs, intentions, and behaviour, whilst somewhat moderated by trust 
propensity, are situation derived through interactional history.  These constructs can 
be measured using questionnaires and ‘trust games’.  The situational cues that trust 
components are based on, in an online domain, will largely be the trustee’s (i.e. the 
party to be trusted) language use. Therefore, by quantifying the language of a trustee 
using computer text analysis, the situational basis of a trustor’s (the party who trusts) 
trust will be revealed.  This language will predict the trustor’s beliefs, intentions, and 
trust behaviour.  It is proposed that measuring language at the dyadic and group level 
will offer a second indicator of trust, i.e. the LSM between speakers will also inform 
trustor’s beliefs, intentions and trust behaviour.  Once these language behaviours that 
relate to trust are established, these will be further specified to the varying contexts 
where they might more or less so be related to trust, e.g. does LSM relate to trust in 
some, but not other, contexts. Finally, these language indicators will be validated in, 




2. Chapter 2: Language Basis of Trust in Online Dyadic Interactions 
The study presented in this Chapter takes the first step to understand the 
relationship between language and trust in online groups. It does this by considering 
this relationship at the dyadic level, from which we may identify individual and 
collective language behaviour that relates to trust, to then be tested at the group level. 
Computer text analysis was used to measure language correlates of trust.  Hypotheses 
were made regarding which language categories would predict trust. Results from 40 
dyads indicated that positive emotion words, personal pronouns, perceptual and 
cognitive processes words were related to trust components.  
2.1. Trust, trustworthiness, and propensity to trust 
When an interaction history exists between two individuals, trust is often 
defined as ‘situational’ in nature, and is based on the actions of the specific other. 
These actions signal something about the other person’s trustworthiness, and group 
into qualities indicative of ability, integrity and benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995; 
Poon, 2013; Yakovleva, Reilly, & Werko, 2010). Once trust begins to develop 
(through beliefs regarding another’s trustworthiness), the person is said to engage in 
behaviours indicative of this trust. These behaviours reflect a person’s increased 
vulnerability to another as they carry a cost to the person if trust is breached. For 
example, a person who trusts another may disclose sensitive information, share novel 
ideas with others, or rely on others to fulfill their role in achieving a collective goal 
without monitoring their actions. As a construct, then, trust is indicated by beliefs 
regarding another person’s trustworthiness, the person’s own intentions to engage in 
risky behaviour, and their actual behaviour. The question that remains is, how the 
language of others contributes to these different components.   
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2.1.1. Emotion words  
A number of qualitative studies have focused on the relationship between 
language and trust (Crisp & Jarvenpaa, 2013; Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 2006). 
These have shown the importance of affective language, i.e. language of positive or 
negative valance, in trust development. Wilson et al. (2006) tested communication 
styles in computer mediated communication (CMC) groups, and found that high 
counts of inflammatory remarks and antagonistic language were related to lower trust 
beliefs towards group members. Similarly, studies have reported that high trust CMC 
groups demonstrate elevated enthusiasm, agreement and general positivity in 
communication (Crisp & Jarvenpaa, 2013; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999). These latter 
communication styles are indicative of support and predictability, and it is believed 
that it is this that leads to elevated trust (Gibson & Manuel, 2003). Drawing on this 
research, it was predicted that:   
H1: Trust in another will be positively predicted by positive affect language 
(e.g., positive emotion words) and negatively predicted by negative affect 
language (e.g., negative emotion words). 
2.1.2. Cognitive process words  
Other than emotion word use, no direct evidence exists for a link between any 
other word category and trust (owing to the lack of research in this area). However, 
research looking at what may be considered trustworthy behaviour suggests other 
possible links. Research shows that a confident demeanor communicates honesty, 
whilst an uncertain, tense and nervous demeanor communicates dishonesty (van 
Swol, Braun, & Kolb, 2013). Given that honesty (a quality indicative of integrity) is a 
strong determinant of trust (Lind, 2001; Moorman & Grover, 2009), it follows that 
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language which communicates an honest or dishonest demeanor will influence 
perceptions of trustworthiness.   
One indication of a person’s level of honesty is the use of cognitive processes 
words.  Cognitive processes words include tentativeness (e.g., maybe, perhaps), 
exclusion (e.g., but, without) and discrepancy words (e.g., could, would) (van Swol et 
al., 2013), amongst other subcategories. Cognitive processes words relate to cognitive 
complex thinking, and in some circumstances, dishonesty. For example, research 
shows that cognitive processes words are used when a person is considering 
alternative scenarios (Junghaenel, Smyth, & Santner, 2008), being deceptive (ten 
Brinke & Porter, 2010) or describing imagined rather than experienced events (Masip, 
Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005). Given the link between actual (and perceived) 
dishonest behavior and cognitively complex language, it was predicted that:  
H2: Cognitive processes words (e.g., but, could, perhaps) negatively predict 
trust. 
2.1.3. Personal pronouns 
Personal pronoun use has been related to numerous social phenomena. 
Elevated personal pronoun use has been shown to demonstrate the inclusion of others 
in one’s focus, which may suggest an awareness of other’s needs (Pennebaker, 2012).  
This was exemplified in Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker’s (2004) study which found that 
the use of plural pronouns increased in the weeks following the September 11 attacks 
as people developed a heightened community focus to deal with the crisis. In sum, 
personal pronoun use may be considered a powerful tool in focusing communication 
on the relational aspects of an interaction. This is important given that a focus on 
relational needs of others has been considered a positive mechanism to build trust. For 
instance, Rempel, Holmes and Zanna (1985) described a deep level of trust, built on 
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an emotional investment of caring for others, which forms the foundation of a strong 
relationship and affective attachment.  Therefore it was predicted that: 
H3: Personal pronouns (e.g., I, we, you) positively predict trust.  
2.1.4. Perceptual process words 
A final language category that may predict trust is perceptual processes word 
use. Perceptual words relate to an individual’s processing of environmental cues (e.g., 
feel, hear, see) (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007). Studies report that a lack of 
perceptual cues in CMC, such as a lack of non-verbal communication or a shared 
environment, can lead to greater feelings of risk, and consequently reduce one’s 
willingness to trust (Walther, Bunz, & Bazarova, 2005).  However, priming 
perceptual information, such as by allowing short face-to-face meetings or 
communication in a public location, has been shown to foster trust (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1999; Swaab, Kern, Diermeier, & Medvec, 2009). It follows that individuals 
who can substitute the lack of perceptual cues in CMC interactions with elevated 
perceptual word use may be able to produce a similar priming effect eliciting a higher 
trust. It was predicted that: 
H4: Perceptual process words (e.g., see, hear, feel) positively predict trust.     
2.1.5. Linguistic style matching 
As well as language communicating potential trustworthiness information 
about an individual, language might play a role in trust formation at the level of 
synchrony between two interlocutors.  Mimicry in face-to-face interactions, on such 
domains as facial expressions and posture, typically increase liking, rapport, and trust 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).  Therefore it would be reasonable to expect that, in the 
absence of non-verbal mimicry, language mimicry would serve a similar function to 
build trust in online interactions.  Indeed, this is exactly what Swaab, Maddux and 
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Sinaceur (2011) concluded from their study which found that when individuals where 
instructed to mimic partners in online interactions, they were able to build a greater 
foundation of mutual trust and facilitate greater joint outcomes.  Dominant theories of 
communication accommodation, such as communication accommodation theory 
(Giles & Ogay, 2006), state that one function of language accommodation is to 
establish trust.  Although the mechanisms as to how language mimicry builds trust are 
unclear, there is extant research to suggest that this is the case. 
What is remarkable about research into the relationship between language 
mimicry and positive social outcomes is that it appears to occur, or can at least be 
reliably measured, not at the level of absolute word matching but at the level of 
matching in function words (Taylor, Dando, Ormerod, Ball, Jenkins, Sandham, & 
Menacere, 2013).  Hence, LSM was the metric used to assess the relationship between 
mimicry and trust.  
H5: LSM positively predicts trust. 
Figure 2.1 shows a summary of the conceptual model tested in the present 
study.  The lower half of the figure represents Mayer's (1995) original trust model, 
and was not retested in the present study. Key causal paths from language variables 
(represented in the upper half of the figure) to each node of Mayer et al.’s (1995) 
situational trust variables were tested. Trust propensity is modeled to affect trust prior 
to participant’s interaction in the study. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
The sample comprised 80 participants from two Universities located in the 
North-West of England.  Participants were 17 males and 60 females (M age = 20.75 




Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of a conceptual model linking the language of an 
interactional partner to an individual’s trust beliefs, trust intentions and trust 
behaviour. 
language.  Participants took part in the study in return for course credits. Participants 
were randomly allocated to pairs to give a total of 40 dyads. Of these, one dyad was 
removed as they reported knowledge of the aim of the study prior to participating. 
This left a total of 39 dyads for use in the final analysis. 
2.2.2. Materials 
The survival game. Dyads were tasked with completing the survival game 
(Brett & Thomson, 2008).  The survival game is an interdependent task that requires 
players to imagine a scenario in which they have survived a plane crash. They are 
instructed to imagine that they are the only two survivors, and are given written 
details about their surroundings (e.g., temperature, terrain, points of interest) and a list 
of twelve items that might be used to aid their survival.  The task objective is for 
dyads to agree and submit a list of items in rank order of importance for survival, as 
well as stating a use for each item.   
Pre-experiment measure. Trust propensity was measured using five items 
taken from Costa and McCrea’s 1992 scale (α = .68).  McEvily and Tortoriello’s 
(2011) recent review of trust measures notes three popular measures of trust 
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propensity (Rotter, 1967; Costa & McCrea 1992; Yamagishi, 1986). The Costa 
and McCrea measure was chosen because it was the most recently devised; 
also, the measure had previously been used in group contexts (Kichuk & Wiesner, 
1997). 
An example item is ‘I believe that people are basically moral.’ To minimise 
participants guessing the true nature of the study, trust propensity items were 
embedded with 10 self-report measures of extraversion and conscientiousness; taken 
from the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999). Responses to all items were made on a 5-point scale 
that ranged from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). 
Behavioural trust.  The extent to which participants displayed trusting 
behaviours towards their partner was measured using an adapted version of the Trust 
Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The game requires one person (the sender) 
to send up to ten points to the person they have been interacting with (the receiver), 
with the belief that this number will be tripled before reaching the receiver. The 
receiver then decides how much of the tripled amount they wish to send back to the 
sender. A high number of points allocated is indicative of high levels of trust, as this 
potentially leads the sender with very few points. Participants believed that the points 
used were those earned previously in the survival game, hence participants were 
incentivised to maximise points as to increase their chances in the raffle. In the 
present study, the trust game was adapted such that both members of the dyad were 
lead to believe that they had been randomly selected as the sender and that their 
dyadic partner was the receiver.  Hence, a measure of trust behaviour (i.e., the number 




Post-experiment measure. Trust beliefs and trust intentions were measured by 
using items from Mayer and Davis’ (1999) trust scales. Items were adapted to the 
experimental context, for example Mayer and Davis’ (1999) item; “top management 
has a strong sense of justice” was adapted to “the person I interacted with has a strong 
sense of justice.”  Six items measured beliefs about the other’s ability (α = .78; ‘The 
person I interacted with is skilled’), 5 items measured beliefs about the other’s 
benevolence (α = .80; ‘The person I interacted with is concerned with others 
welfare’), 6 items measured beliefs about the other’s integrity (α = .71; ‘The person I 
interacted with sticks to their word’), and 4 items measured trust intentions (α = .67; 
‘I would feel comfortable giving the other person complete responsibility’). 
Responses were made on a 5-point scale that ranged from “strongly disagree” (1) to 
“strongly agree” (5).  
 
2.2.3. Design 
Independent variables were taken at the individual and dyad level. At the 
individual level, independent variables were the use of personal pronouns, positive 
emotion, negative emotion, cognitive processes, and perceptual processes words as 
measured by LIWC. At the dyad level, the independent variable was LSM scores for 
each dyad. Participants propensity to trust was a control variable. The dependent 
variables were trust beliefs (ability, integrity and benevolence), trust intentions, and 
trust behaviour.  
2.2.4. Procedure 
Two participants attended each testing session and were each instructed to go 
to a different testing room to meet with the experimenter (this was to ensure 
participants never met face to face).  On arrival, participants were asked if they had 
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signed up individually or with someone they knew, to ensure no friends or 
acquaintances had signed up to the same timeslot.  All participants stated that they 
had signed up individually.  
Participants were prepped for the task.  Participants were instructed that they 
would be interacting online with another participant to complete a survival game and 
a short decision-making task, after which they would be asked to complete a short 
questionnaire on their experience. After giving their consent to take part, participants 
completed the pre-interaction questionnaire and were then provided with instructions 
for the survival game. Each participant received their own paper response sheet with 
three columns listing the items, their rank number and use. 
Participants were informed that there was a correct order to each item’s 
importance, and that survival experts have established a use for each item. Their goal, 
as a dyad, was to rank as many items as possible in the ‘correct’ order.  Participants 
were informed that points were awarded for each item correctly ranked with the 
correct use, and that points would be transferred into raffle tokens and entered into a 
prize draw for the chance to win a £10 voucher.  The point structure was as follows; 
five points allocated for the most important item correctly ranked, five points for the 
least important item correctly ranked, and one point each for the remaining items if 
ranked in the correct order.  The task was made interdependent by informing 
participants that points were only awarded for items ranked in the same, correct, order 
by both members of the dyad.  Participants submitted their own list independently and 
relied on the other participant submitting the same order.  
Participants had 17 minutes to complete the survival game.  They did so using 
the open source instant message program ‘Yahoo! Messenger.’  This program allowed 
instant text messages to be exchanged in real time.  Video and audio messaging was 
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disabled as the study was interested only in text-based online interactions.  The 
experimenter informed participants when to begin the game, when 5 minutes 
remained, and when the game had ended.  
After the 17 minutes, the conference chat window was disabled so that 
participants could no longer communicate with one another.  The experimenter 
collected the paper response sheets from each of the participants. They were then 
informed, in a private chat window with the experimenter, that the order they 
proposed had collectively earned them 10 raffle tokens for the prize draw. In reality, 
as there was no correct solution to the survival game, every dyad received 10 raffle 
tokens irrespective of participants’ responses.  
Each participant was given instructions to complete the trust game as the 
‘sender’ using the 10 raffle tokens that they had been awarded.  The participant 
communicated how many points they wished to send via a private chat window with 
the experimenter. They were then asked to complete the post-interaction 
questionnaire, while they believed that the other person was being informed of their 
choice and deciding how many tokens to return. Once both participants had 
completed the post-interaction questionnaire, they were informed that the experiment 
had ended and were debriefed about the deception and nature of the study.  Each 
participant was given the same chance to win in the prize draw regardless of how 
many tokens they stated they wanted to transfer to the other person. 
2.2.5. Analysis 
The language used by participants during the survival game was analysed 
using the automated text analysis program Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC, Pennebaker et al., 2007).  LIWC searches for over 2,300 words or word stems 
within a text file.  The search words are categorised into over 70 linguistic 
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dictionaries, which capture language at a basic linguistic and psychological level. A 
person’s linguistic profile contains one score per linguistic dictionary. In the current 
study, transcripts of each dyad’s online interaction were split into two single text files; 
one for each dyad member.  The output from linguistic dictionaries positive emotion, 
negative emotion, pronoun, cognitive processes and perceptual processes words were 
recorded per text file.   
LSM scores were calculated using the procedure described by Ireland, 
Slatcher, Eastwick, Scissors, Finkel and Pennebaker (2011). LIWC output within the 
dictionaries of nine main categories of function words (adverbs, articles, auxiliary 
verbs, conjunctions, indefinite pronouns, negations, personal pronouns, prepositions, 
and quantifiers) were compared between dyad members.  The degree to which the 
proportion of one dyad member’s function word use matched the other member’s 
function word use was calculated per category using the formula (the category 
‘articles’ is used for illustration): 
 
       LSMarticle = 1 – [(│articleA – articleB│)/(articleA + articleB + 0.0001)] 
 
ArticleA is the proportion of a dyad member’s discourse that was articles, 
while articleB is the proportion of the other member’s discourse that was articles.  
The denominator, 0.0001, is added to prevent division by zero in empty sets.  The 
nine category-level LSM scores are averaged to produce a composite LSM score of 
overall matching in each dyad.  The LSM score is bounded between 0 and 1; where 
higher numbers represent greater style matching between speakers. Language used at 
both the individual level and dyad level (i.e., LSM) were analysed in separate 
hierarchical linear regression models to identify predictors of each set of trust beliefs 
(ability, integrity and benevolence), trust intentions and trust behaviour. Trust 
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propensity was entered at step 1 in each model, language variables were entered at 
step 2.  
2.3. Results 
Table 2.1 shows the means and standard deviations of trust and language 
variables. Of the language categories analysed cognitive mechanism words and 
personal pronouns were used most frequently.  Negative emotion word production 
was sparse; on average participants used less than one negative emotion word during 
the task. 
Hypotheses 1 though 4 predicted that higher trust would be positively 
associated with personal pronouns, positive emotion words and perceptual processes 
words use, and negatively associated with negative emotion words and cognitive 
processes words.  
Table 2.2 shows the regression coefficients for the mean change in trust 
variables predicted by individual level word categories. The results of regression 
analyses, as shown in Table 2.2, offer partial support for these predictions.  Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, positive emotion words positively predicted beliefs about the 
other’s integrity (β = .25) and the person’s own trust behaviour (β = .24). However, 
negative emotion words did not significantly reduce trust on any of the measures. 
Consistent with Hypotheses 2, cognitive processes words negatively predicted beliefs 
about the other’s benevolence (β = -.37).  Consistent with hypothesis 3 personal 
pronoun use positively predicted beliefs about the other’s benevolence (β = .35). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, perception process words positively predicted trust 
behaviour (β = .26). In addition to these main effects, the results show that beliefs 
about the other’s integrity was also predicted by a person’s own propensity to trust (β 
= .24).  
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Table 2.1 Means and standard deviation for trust and language measures. 
 M SD 
Trust Propensity 17.16 2.96 
Ability Beliefs 21.97 2.62 
Integrity Beliefs 22.34 2.63 
Benevolence Beliefs 18.73 2.48 
Trust Intention 13.66 2.74 
Trust Behaviour 7.01 3.18 
Positive Emotion 5.54 1.68 
Negative Emotion 0.91 0.73 
Personal Pronoun 6.43 1.96 
Cognitive processes 18.57 3.46 
Perceptual Processes 3.57 1.31 
LSM 0.81 0.06 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that higher trust would be expressed towards those 
who had experienced a greater level of LSM during their interaction. Table 2.3 shows 
the regression coefficents for the mean change in trust variables predicted by LSM. 
This analysis showed that LSM was not a significant predictor of trust on any of the 
measures. 
2.4. Discussion 
The current study examined the use of language as a possible determinant of 
trust in dyads working on an online joint game. The results showed that a person’s 
beliefs and behaviour indicative of trust towards another were related to the word 















Step 1      
    Trust Propensity 0.15 .30** 0.11 0.19 0.09 
Step 2      
    Trust Propensity 0.20 .24* 0.11 0.19 -0.01 
    Positive Emotion 0.06 .25* 0.11 0.15 .24* 
    Negative Emotion 0.14 -0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.17 
    Personal Pronoun 0.17 0.11 .35** 0.05 -0.01 
    Cognitive processes -0.15 -0.17 -.37** 0.19 -0.12 
    Perceptual Processes -0.06 0.03 -0.11 0.16 .26* 
                   Adjusted R2 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.03 0.13 
Note. Parameter estimates are standardized coefficients. *p<.05 **p<.01 (one-tailed) 
 











Stage 1      
    Trust Propensity 0.15 .30** 0.11 0.19 0.09 
Stage 2      
    Trust Propensity  0.16 .30* 0.11 0.19 0.09 
     LSM -0.09 0.02 -0.1 0.06 -0.01 
                     Adjusted R2 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Note. Parameter estimates are standardized coefficients. *p<.05 **p<.01 (one-tailed) 
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frequency by which a person used positive emotion words (but not negative emotion 
words), personal pronouns, cognitive processes words and perceptual processes words 
was related to how much they were trusted.  
These observations are consistent with a number of hypotheses described 
earlier.  As predicted by H1, individuals who interacted with someone using more 
positive emotion words reported higher integrity beliefs and demonstrated greater 
trust behaviour.  This is consistent with past research that has demonstrated that 
‘positivity’ in communication style relates to trust (Crisp & Jarvenpaa, 2013; Wilson 
et al. 2006) when analysed qualitatively, and extends the observation to quantitative 
analysis where language is measured at the individual word level. 
The observation that negative emotion words were not associated with trust, 
however, is inconsistent with some previous research that suggested that increased 
negative emotion word use lead to reduced ratings of warmth and ability by an 
interactional partner (Berry et al., 1997). The lack of effect of negative emotion in the 
present findings may have been due to the context of the interaction. Whilst all 
language variables were normally distributed, the frequency of negative emotion 
words was lower than any other linguistic category, which may have reduced the 
ability to detect an effect for this language category. This is somewhat supported by 
the fact that words that occurred with the highest frequency also emerged as the 
strongest predictor of trust. If true, we might expect the inverse effect of negative 
emotion words in interactions where the overall rate of negative emotion word 
production is higher and therefore more salient. Alternatively, negative emotion could 
simply be a variable less useful for a measure of trust when considered at the 
individual word level. That is to say that, negative affect might relate to trust 
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passively (e.g. through sarcasm or lack of engagement) and hence does not emerge at 
the explicit individual word level. 
As predicted by H3, individuals who interacted with someone using more 
personal pronouns reported higher benevolence beliefs.  This is consistent with past 
research that demonstrated that elevated use of personal pronouns reflected increased 
concern for the social dynamics within the interaction (Pennebaker, Mehl & 
Neiderhoffer, 2003). Hence the present findings indicate that this relationship 
between pronoun use and engagement in social dynamics might translate into greater 
benevolence trustworthiness beliefs in online interactions. 
As predicted by H2, cognitive process words negatively related to trust.  This 
was in line with research that shows cognitive complex language to relate to deceptive 
(and thus less trustworthy) speech (see earlier discussion).  However, cognitive 
processes words negatively related to benevolence trustworthiness beliefs, as opposed 
to integrity trustworthiness beliefs which presumably would be most effected by 
language which communicates dishonesty.  That said, given the context of the 
interaction, where there was no incentive to be deceptive, cognitive complex language 
alternatively might have communicated a greater task focus.  Cognitive processes 
words have previously been linked to task focus (Junghaenel, Smyth, & Santner, 
2008) – and so in line with the finding that an increase in focus on social dynamics 
related to greater benevolence beliefs (H3), an increase in focus on the task dynamics 
might relate to lesser benevolence beliefs. 
As predicted by H4, individuals who interacted with someone using more 
perceptual processes words demonstrated greater trust behaviour.  This is consistent 
with past research which has suggested that priming perceptual information can 
substitute the lack of perceptual cues online and garner trust (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 
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1999; Swaab, Kern, Diermeier, & Medvec, 2009).  As with the support for H1, this 
findings extends the finding by demonstrating that a substitute for perceptual cues 
may be created at the individual word level. 
The observation that LSM was not related to trust was unexpected.  Counter to 
H5 and past research, LSM did not relate to any of the trust measures. LSM has 
frequently been related to social dynamics such as cooperation, cohesion and 
performance, which are constructs associated with trust (Gonzales, Hancock, & 
Pennebaker, 2010; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002; Swaab et al., 2011). The 
relationship between LSM and trust might be more likely to emerge in online group, 
rather than dyadic, interactions. In dyadic interactions, where individual’s need only 
attend to a single interactional partner’s utterances, individual content words can 
easily be processed, and trust judgements appear to emerge based on what people are 
communicating, rather than how they are communicating. In the absence of the latter, 
we may expect to see an absence of effect for LSM as this is processed unconsciously 
(Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002). It follows that in an online group context, where 
attending to multiple speakers places higher demands on cognitive processing, LSM 
might emerge as a more salient cue to trust, because the explicit processing of 
consciously interpreted content words becomes more difficult.  
The data suggests that whilst individuals communicate online, their use of 
individual word categories are utilized by interactional partners to inform trust beliefs 
and behaviour. Mayer’s et al.’s (1995) model of trust suggested that when partners 
have little interactional history, their preexisting propensity to trust will play a more 
dominant role. Only once individuals have gleaned enough information from social 
histories or interactional history, will individuals base trust judgements on situational 
information, as opposed to an internal disposition.  It is therefore striking that each 
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language category was related to trust judgements, suggesting that situational cues to 
trust (i.e. the language of an interactional partner) played at least as important role in 
individuals trust judgements as their own trust dispositions, which predicted integrity 
trust beliefs only. 
It has been debated how much time is required for individuals to shift from 
forming trust based on dispositions, to situational factors in online domains (Wilson et 
al., 2006). Wilson et al. (2006) suggested that the shift is comparable to face-to-face 
interaction, however will take longer to emerge.  The present findings imply that 
when language is examined closely, using computer text analysis, this shift might not 
need time to develop at all, and that individuals process trustworthiness relevant 
information immediately. 
From an operative perspective, investigators are challenged with determining 
which online interactions translate into actualized dangerous or criminal behaviour.  
The present study addresses this challenge by nominating specific categories of 
language, measured by computer text analysis, which relate to trust behaviour, or risk 
taking in the relationship. Trust behaviour was predicted by positive emotion words 
and perceptual processes words. Hence, the measure shows promise not just to predict 
parties trust intentions, as they ebb and flow within an interaction, but also the 
outcome of an interaction.  
2.4.1. Limitations and future research 
Whilst the role of language in shaping trust was tested in the present study, the 
role of trust shaping language was unexplored. This is noteworthy given the 
possibility of a reciprocal relationship whereby language behaviour increases trust, 
and in turn, trust increases the language behaviour that facilitates trust. Indeed, Zand 
(1972) was able to show that by priming trust, communication in small work teams 
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could be significantly altered (as judged by trained observers). Future research might 
similarly manipulate trust, to observe the effects on language as measured by 
computer text analysis.  Thus offering a means to further validate the present measure. 
The present study focused on dyadic interactions; therefore it is unclear if 
results will generalize to group interactions.  The majority of the findings are 
expected to replicate in groups, such was the design of the experiment; to scale up to 
group contexts.  However, as noted, we might expect LSM findings to differ based on 
the increased cognitive load of monitoring discourse from multiple group members.  
Future research will address this limitation in chapter 3. 
2.4.2. Conclusion 
In expanding previous findings on language and trust, computer text analysis 
supports the role of positivity (H1), a social focus rather than task focus (H2 and H3), 
and reducing a feeling of distance (H4) in the development of online trust for dyadic 
interactions. The use of computer text analysis expands the large body of research of 
how trust is formed online. Much of the research suggests that trust takes a long time 
to develop online and will be built on dispositional, rather than situational cues, early 
in the interaction.  However, individuals appear to use language (the only situational 
cue available) to form trust beliefs and intentions, as well as to base actual trust 
behaviour on. It is striking that such ideas on how communication might garner trust, 
as speculated by previous authors, has been translated into quantifiable word 
frequencies. Future research should continue to explore links between language and 
trust in group online interactions to determine the role of language as measured in this 
way in the larger body of research on online group dynamics. 
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3. Chapter 3: Language Basis of Trust in Online Group Interactions 
The experiment described in the last Chapter established a relationship 
between specific language categories and trust in dyads. The study presented in this 
Chapter aimed to expand this focus to consider this relationship in online groups. The 
experiment in this chapter studies 40 groups, with the language contained within 
group discussions used to predict subsequent trust behaviour and group 
trustworthiness ratings. In addition, individual’s beliefs about their group’s level of 
trustworthiness was manipulated using a priming method.  This aimed to further 
validate the language hypothesised to be important to trust online by observing 
language differences in groups were members were primed to either believe other 
group members were high or low in trustworthiness.  Positive emotion word use was 
found to reliably relate to trust as a predictor of trust and as an outcome of primed 
high trust. 
The study in the previous chapter examined individual word categories and 
LSM as relating to trust in online dyadic interactions. In line with the main focus of 
the thesis this start point is now extended to group online interactions in a parallel 
paradigm. Up to now, it has been predicted that both individual word categories and 
LSM would relate to trust.  However ,only individual word categories emerged as 
relating to trust in the previous study. The lack of LSM effect was explained by low 
demands on individuals cognitive processing.  In dyads, individuals need only attend 
to one partner, leading to individual word categories being primary in informing 
individual’s trust.  Conversely, in groups, it was speculated that this might not be the 
case, and LSM, which is processed unconsciously, was proposed to take a more 
significant role in the relationship to trust. 
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3.1. Trust formation in online groups 
Conventional wisdom holds that trust is essential for cooperation between 
individuals and individuals within a group (Cook, Levi, & Hardin, 2009).  Trust is 
essential to the loose couplings of individuals that allow online groups to function, but 
it is the tight coupling (dense relations built over repeated face to face interactions) 
that is often said to be the necessary ingredient for trust to develop (Wilson et al., 
2006). This represents a critical paradox for trust formation in online groups, which is 
to say that the nature of online groups makes trust both necessary and difficult to 
form. Despite this potential difficulty, research has shown that trust development is 
still possible, and there is good evidence to suggest that it is through specific 
communication styles that trust formation is facilitated. A number of researchers have 
examined communication behaviours ad hoc (e.g., Cramton, 2001) and post hoc (e.g., 
Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998) to discover that online groups are able to achieve 
trust via strategies such as message explicitness and acknowledging each other’s 
messages. The most systematic examination of the role of communication in the 
development of group trust has come from Walther and Bunz (2005). They showed 
that implementing specific rules on formal communication procedures, like overtly 
acknowledge reading one another’s messages, systematically induced trust. Hence, in 
online groups, adaptive communication styles exist as one means by which a lack of 
trust can be overcome. 
Potential barriers to trust are general restrictions of computer mediated 
communication, rather than specific difficulties in group communication.  Hence, this 
suggests that the language behaviours, which facilitated trust in dyadic online 
interactions (as in Chapter 2), would similarly facilitate trust in group online 
interactions. That is, affective words (positive and negative emotion) would predict 
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trust through communicating support (or a lack of support in the case of negative 
emotion) (Gibson & Manuel, 2003); personal pronoun use would predict trust through 
communicating a focus on the persons within the interaction (Pennebaker, 2012); 
cognitive mechanism words would negatively predict trust through communicating a 
dishonest demeanor (Van Swol, Braun, & Kolb, 2013), or strong task focus (Chapter 
2); and, perceptual processes words would communicate trust via substituting a lack 
of explicit perceptual cues, which help facilitate trust in online interactions, with 
perceptual words (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Swaab, Kern, Diermeier & Medvec, 
2009).  
H1: Positive emotion, personal pronoun, and perceptual processes words will 
positively predict trust beliefs, intentions and behaviour, whilst negative 
emotion and cognitive processes words will negatively predict trust beliefs, 
intentions and behaviour. 
Study 1 failed to find any support for the importance of linguistic style 
matching (LSM) in trust development within dyads. However, there are a number of 
reasons to believe that LSM might emerge as a predictor of trust in group interactions.  
Firstly, as previously discussed, LSM has been shown to predict both group cohesion 
and group performance in online group interactions (Gonzalez, Hancock, & 
Pennebaker, 2010); each of these social outcomes have frequently been associated 
with trust (Dirks, 1999; Furumo & Pearson, 2006).  Therefore, we might expect LSM 
to also have effects on trust itself in online group interactions where the experimental 
design explicitly positions trust as a dependent variable.  Secondly, it is proposed that 
LSM plays an important role in trust formation as it allows information to be 
processed unconsciously. As noted in the previous Chapter, this may be important 
when there are multiple speakers, as processing the word categories used by each 
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member places a high cognitive load on the person. Relying on subconscious cues 
provides one way to address this. 
H2: LSM will positively predict trust beliefs, trust intention, and trust 
behaviour. 
Figure 3.1 shows a summary of the conceptual model testing Hypothesis 1 and 
2 in the present study. The model was identical to the model in the previous chapter 
but for one detail.  That is to say that, language variables (positioned as holding causal 
relationships to trust beliefs, intentions and behaviour) were of the group the 
individual interacted with, as opposed to an individual partner. 
3.2. Priming trust in online groups 
Research into the relationship between language and social dynamics have 
frequently positioned language as a causal factor of social dynamics, as well as a 
potential outcome of social dynamics. However, few studies have directly 
manipulated language or social dynamics to investigate the direction of the effect 
between the two variables. As such, inferences regarding the direction of effects have 
remained speculative. For example, Fischer, McDonnell, and Orasanu (2007), in their 
discussion of direction of effects between positive emotion expression and team 
performance, suggested that expressions of positive emotion likely facilitated greater 
performance through demonstrating support and mitigating the negative effects of 
disagreements.  At the same time, they speculate that higher performance itself likely 
induced a more positive social climate. Other researchers, specifically in trust 
research, have grappled with the direction of effects between communication and 
trust. Correlational, rather than causal, relationships between communication and trust 
have been established using ad hoc (e.g., Cramton, 2001) and post hoc (e.g., 




Figure 3.1 Schematic representation of a conceptual model linking the language of a 
group to an individual’s trust beliefs, trust intentions and trust behaviour. 
relationship between language (as studied by computer text analysis) operates in both 
directions also, with language effecting trust and trust effecting language. However, 
this is unclear at present and is thus included in the design of the current study.  
Zand (1972) was one of a few to explore how varying levels of initial trust 
might causally relate to communication styles. He notes evidence from 
psychotherapy, which shows that trust is a crucial initial factor to facilitate effective 
subsequent communication.  That is, trust increased emotional stability and decreased 
defensiveness in communication, thus demonstrating the role of trust in effecting 
communication style. Building on this, he primed groups to be either high or low on 
trust and found that high trust group members communicated more openness and 
feelings, and also clarified problems and goals; more so than group members primed 
in the low trust condition. Hence, there is evidence to suggest that trust shapes the 
language behaviour of individuals in interaction in such a way that may further 
increase trust.   
The present study is novel because it systematically manipulated trust to 
examine its effects on communication in online groups. With the exception of Zand’s 
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(1972) study, research has not since directly manipulated trust to observe its effect on 
language.  Nor has such a research design been applied to online communication, or 
using contemporary measures of language (as opposed to trained observers). 
However, there is evidence to suggest that communication, as measured by computer 
text analysis, can be altered via implementing manipulations prior to an interaction. 
For example, Taylor, Dando, Ormerod, Ball, Jenkins, Sandham, and Menacere 
(2013), showed that when participants are given the instruction to act as a disruptive 
insider in online group interactions, the individual’s subsequent linguistic style (in 
terms of pronoun, emotion word, and cognitive complex language use) altered 
significantly as compared to coworkers with no insider instruction. This research 
supports the possibility that a pre-interaction manipulation of trust could produce 
variation in one’s language behavior.  Hence, the possibility to manipulate trust in 
order to observe its effects on language. 
The present study introduced high or low trust primes to each participant prior 
to any group interaction via a simulated trust game. That is to say that, individuals 
interacted with a computer they believed to be a participant, who behaved either 
trustworthy or not, with the aim to effect the participants subsequent communication 
style in the survival game (used in the previous study). Previous research has shown 
this to be a validated way to influence trust, creating predictable trust behaviour, as 
well as reliable neural responses (King-Casas, Tomlin, Anen, Camerer, Quartz and 
Montague (2005). Therefore, it was hypothesized that increases or decreases in trust, 
brought about by the trust prime, could effect individual’s language behavior.  




H3: Greater positive emotion, personal pronoun and perceptual words, and 
fewer negative emotion and cognitive mechanism words will be observed 
in the high trust prime condition as compared to the low trust prime 
condition. 
H4: Greater LSM will be observed in the high trust prime condition as 
compared to the low trust prime condition. 
Figure 3.2 shows the conceptual model testing Hypothesis 3 and 4. This model 
explored the possibility of a causal path from trust to language. Ego, the reverse of the 
causal path explored in the conceptual model for Hypotheses 1 to 2 and model in the 
previous chapter.  As in previous models, trust propensity is modeled to affect trust 
prior to participant’s interaction in the study. 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Participants 
Participants were 196 undergraduate students, postgraduate students and 
university staff recruited from three UK Universities in the North West of England.  
Sixty-eight participants were male and 128 participants were female.  The average age 
of the sample was 21.62 years (SD = 5.77; Range 18 – 59 yrs). Participants were 
recruited from different disciplines, year groups and university societies.  Participants 
took part in the study voluntarily or for course credits.     
3.3.2. Materials 
Pre-experiment measure.  Prior to the main task, participants were asked to 
complete a short questionnaire that collected information on their trust propensity, 
availability and demographics. Consistent with Chapter 2, trust propensity was 
measured using five trust items taken from Costa and McCrea’s scale (1992).  To 




Figure 3.2 Schematic representation of a conceptual model linking primed trust to the 
individual’s language use. 
items were embedded with 20 items measuring self-reported levels of extraversion 
and conscientiousness. These items were taken from the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999). 
Participants provided details of their availability as days of the week and times 
to assist scheduling participant groups. Days of the week rather than specific dates 
were used to reduce the opportunity for groups of friends to sign up to the same slots.  
Finally, demographic details were collected relating to participants’ university 
college, discipline, year cohort and where they had heard about the study.  This was to 
further mitigate the risk of scheduling groups with members who had pre-existing 
relationships. 
Trust prime game.  Based on the repeat trial trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & 
McCabe, 1995; see Chapter 2 for a description), a software programme was 
developed to prime low and high trust in participants.  Put simply, participants were 
informed that they would interact with another participant from their group (who was 
in fact a pre-scripted computer programme) online to play the trust game in which one 
of the participants would be assigned the role of ‘sender’ and the other the role of 
‘receiver’. In reality, the participant was always assigned the role of ‘sender’. A text 
box space was available for participants to assign how many points they would like to 
send to the other participant.  Each time the participant sent points, they were 
presented with a message that read “waiting for participant to respond.” A few 
minutes later (the exact time varied between exchange rounds to mimic a real 
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interaction), the participant received a message from the receiver that was either 
trustworthy or untrustworthy.   
When the participant was in the low trust condition, they were given the 
response that the receiver had returned 20% of what they had received.  When the 
participant was in the high trust condition, they were given the response that the 
receiver had returned 50% of what they had received. For all participants, the program 
reported information to the participant under a few simple response templates.  These 
included how much the participant had themselves sent, the tripled total their partner 
had received, the percentage and exact amount of points returned and finally the 
accumulative total of points the participant had.  These figures were reported to the 
participant at the end of each round.  After the final round the program also displayed 
a message informing participants that this part of the experiment had concluded. 
Computer mediated communication (CMC).  Participants conversed using 
text on CMC through the program ‘Campfire’ (https://campfirenow.com), which had 
video and audio messaging disabled.  The messenger programme allowed 4 to 6 
participants, plus a researcher administrator, to interact in a conference chat window.  
The software allowed for multiple conference rooms, each with a unique web 
addresses, so that group members could only access their own groups discussions. 
The software automatically saved transcripts of group interactions.  
The survival game.  To stimulate conversation and generate language that 
could be used for analysis, the survival game used in Chapter 2 was used again here 
(Brett & Thomson, 2008). An online form (Google Drive) allowed participants to 
access survival game instructions and submit rank position and rank order responses 
for each item.  The game rule that both parties must rank items in the same position to 
gain credit was altered to the group context as follows.  First, all group members had 
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to rank an item in the same position to gain credit, as opposed to just two participants.  
Second, the amount of points for correctly ranked items increased by 5 times so that 
the distribution of points to be gained per person was comparable to the study in 
Chapter 2.  Hence, the point structure was as follows; 25 points for the most important 
item correctly ranked, 25 points for the least important item correctly ranked and 5 
points per item for the remaining items if ranked in the correct order.  As in chapter 2, 
points were to be transferred into raffle tokens for a prize draw. 
Post-interaction trust game. An adapted version of the trust game (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) was used to measure trust behaviour from individual 
participants towards the group.  Each participant was assigned 10 points.  An 
individual could submit any proportion of these points into a ‘group pot’.  Any points 
submitted would be tripled in value.  Afterwards the total number of points in the 
group pot would be divided between all players. The description of the game made it 
clear that all group members were given the same decision, and each would decide 
how many points to submit to the group pot independently. Therefore the game 
created a scenario in which individuals submitting higher amounts of points would 
make personal gain only if other group members similarly contributed high amounts 
of points.  Hence, the amount of points contributed could be used as a behavioural 
metric of trust, in that submitting greater amounts of points is profitable only if other 
group members act trustworthy, and similarly submit a greater amount of points. 
Post-experiment measure. Participant’s trust beliefs and trust intentions 
towards the rest of the group was measured using items from Mayer and Davis’ 
(1999) trust scales. Items were adapted to the experimental context, for example 
Mayer and Davis’ item; “top management has a strong sense of justice” was adapted 
to “the group I interacted with has a strong sense of justice”.  Six items measured 
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beliefs about the group’s ability (e.g., “The group I interacted with are skilled’ α = 
.86), 5 items measured beliefs about the group’s benevolence (e.g., “The group I 
interacted with are concerned with others welfare” (α = .81),, 6 items measured 
beliefs about the group’s integrity (e.g., “The group I interacted with sticks to their 
word” α = .78), and 4 items measured trust intentions toward the group (e.g., “I would 
feel comfortable giving the group complete responsibility”, α = .67),.  Responses to 
all trust belief and intention measures were made on a 5-point likert scale that ranged 
from “Strongly disagree” (1) to “Strongly agree” (5).   
3.3.3. Design  
Participants propensity to trust was a control variable.  To test hypothesis 1 
and 2, the dependent variables were trust beliefs (ability, integrity and benevolence), 
trust intentions and trust behavior. The independent variables were the six language 
categories (cognitive mechanism words, pronouns, positive emotion words, negative 
emotion words, perceptual processes words), which were calculated at the mean 
group level whilst controlling for the individual’s contribution to each score (H1).  
Similarly, a second independent variable was group LSM minus the individual’s 
contribution (H2).  This approach was chosen to ensure that group variables were 
positioned as perceptions of group language without being confounded by the 
individual’s contribution. For example, consider a situation where an individual’s 
language style is characterised by high positive emotion, but their group’s average 
style is of low positive emotion.  In such circumstances the group language score, 
minus the individuals contribution, is the most accurate representation of the 
individual group member’s experience.   
To test hypothesis 3 and 4, trust prime was the independent variable, with two 
levels of high and low trust.  The dependent variables were the six language 
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categories (H3) and an individual’s Linguistic Style Matching (LSM) (H4).  This 
approach was chosen to best describe the effect of the prime on individual group 
member’s language style, as opposed to aggregating LSM to the group level. This 
approach also increased statistical power by avoiding unnecessary aggregation. 
3.3.4. Procedure 
A study advert was posted to an internal online recruitment website which 
allowed first year psychology students at Lancaster University to participate in the 
study for partial course credit.  Other students and staff members, from any discipline 
at Lancaster University, could also use the website to sign up to participate in return 
for compensation of £3.50. Those interested in taking part were directed to an online 
information sheet and consent form and from here, the pre-test questionnaire. Once 
completion of the pre-test questionnaire and consent form, participants were informed 
that they would be contacted within two weeks via email with details of their testing 
slot.     
Participants were allocated to one of 40 groups of 6 group members. Groups 
were created with attention to participant’s college, discipline, year group and where 
they had heard about the study.  Those who gave similar responses to these items 
were allocated to different groups.  Participants were emailed with a web address, 
testing time and alias name to be used to access the online chat room where the study 
would take place.  Alias names were nonsense words followed by an initial (e.g., Cas 
M).  They were also emailed a link to the online Survival Game.   
Participants were told that they could review the game, but that they should 
not complete the form until they were with other participants in their group (i.e., 
during testing time). Access to the survival game was allowed to reduce the time 
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participants spent reading instructions during the group interaction.  All participants 
could accept or decline invitations via email.  
On the day of study, participants were given until 3 minutes past the arrival 
time before being excluded from the study.  Once all participants had arrived, or 3 
minutes had passed, the study would proceed with a minimum of 4 group members. 
Attending participants were invited to play the trust prime game (i.e., the prime).  
They were instructed that they would be paired with a random fellow group member 
to play the trust prime game in a separate website window, and that they would be 
directed back to the group chat window on completion. If a group contained an odd 
number of participants (e.g. five members) they were informed that one group 
member would be selected (at random) to be paired with a person from another online 
group taking place simultaneously.    
Once all participants had completed the prime, they played the survival game.  
In the group chat window, participants were provided with the link to the survival 
game and advised to keep this link open while discussing with the group.  From this 
moment participants were given 20 minutes to complete the task.  The researcher 
reminded the group, via the group chat window, when 5 minutes remained.  At 20 
minutes, the experimenter required participants to stop discussing the task and submit 
their responses, however complete or incomplete these may be.  The researcher then 
asked the participants to wait while their group score was calculated.  One minute 
passed before the researcher informed the group that they had earned 10 raffle tokens 
each.   
The researcher informed participants that they would play one final game.  
They were instructed that from this moment onwards they would not have any further 
communication with other group members.  Participants were then directed to the 
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trust game followed by the post-interaction questionnaire.  Participants completed the 
trust game and trust belief and intention measures.  Once participants had completed 
these, they received a written debrief.  
3.3.5. Analysis 
To test hypothesis one and two, i.e. the effect of group language on individual 
group member trust, group minus individual contribution scores were calculated for 
individual word categories and LSM.  The individual word category scores were 
calculated by simply taking, per group member, the average of the rest of the group’s 
individual word category use, e.g. in a four person group, to calculate positive 
emotion, the language score used to predict group member 1’s trust, was the average 
of group member’s 2,3 and 4’s positive emotion word use. 
To calculate LSM scores, an adapted method from previous group research 
was used (Gonzales et al., 2010).  Each group member’s function word use was 
compared with the overall percentage of the remaining group members.  This resulted 
in a separate LSM score per group member, which reflected the extent to which an 
individual’s language style matched their group.  LSM was then calculated using the 
following formula.  The article category, in a group of four, is used as an example 
here: 
articles1 = 1 − (|article1 − articleG|/(article1 + article + 0.0001)) 
articles2 = 1 − (|article2 − articleG|/(article2 + article + 0.0001)) 
articles3 = 1 − (|article3 − articleG|/(article3 + article + 0.0001)) 
articles4 = 1 − (|article4 − articleG|/(article4 + article + 0.0001)) 
Where articleN is the percentage of articles used by an individual group 
member as a proportion of their total word count. ArticleG is the percentage of 
articles used by the remaining group members as a proportion of their word count. 
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The addition of .0001 in the denominator is used to prevent division by zero.  Recall 
that there are nine separate dimensions of function words that make up the overall 
LSM score. Comparable calculations were made for each function-word category, for 
each group member.  Resulting in an LSM score per participant by taking the average 
of all categories.  As with individual word categories, to test hypothesis 2, the group 
LSM minus individual’s contribution scores were calculated by simply taking, per 
group member, the average of the rest of the group’s LSM scores. 
To test hypothesis 3, i.e. the effect of the prime on individual word category 
language use, each individual word category was measured by simply taking the 
proportion of words used in each category as a percentage of an individual group 
member’s overall word use. To test hypothesis 4, i.e. the effect of the prime on LSM, 
LSM was calculated as described above per participant, however the final stage of 
analysis was omitted, i.e. individual LSM scores were not averaged across the rest of 
the group. 
Hypotheses in the present study, and group studies in the remaining chapters 
of the thesis, were tested using linear mixed effects models. Data from the study in the 
present and remaining chapters had two random within factors, these were individual 
participant trust propensity (or just individual participant identity in Chapter 6) and 
group membership.  Since each participant  can only belong to one group, the 
grouping factors of individual or individual trust propensity and group membership 
are said to be nested.  
In the studies in Chapters 4 and 5, language measurements came from a single 
group of participants who interacted in repeat interactions across various phases of 
group development. Therefore language scores are a within participant factor. These 
measures cannot be considered independent because they were collected per 
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participant. This phenomenon, known as pseudoreplication, is common in 
neuroscience experiments and leads to the use of repeated measures (rm) ANOVAs 
(Magezi, 2015).  However, rm ANOVAs require various additional assumptions 
about covariance (see Maxwell and Delaney, 2004; Nimon, 2012). Corrective 
procedures do exist if these assumption are violated, however these can lead to further 
problems with missing data which either must be excluded or imputed. In contrast to 
rm ANOVA’s, linear mixed effects models can accommodate missing data and do not 
depend on limiting covariance assumptions. 
As mentioned, in the group studies in the present thesis, data is often nested 
and group membership and language variables are often a within participant factor.  
In addition, missing data is a common occurrence where experimental groups are 
asked to return to an online meeting place up to three times across up to 7 days.  
Missing data is also an issue in studying real world online groups, where participants 
might naturally cease to exist in the group at various phases (see Chapter 6). 
Therefore, for the reasons outlined above, linear mixed effects models offered the best 
analysis for studying groups in the remainder of the thesis. 
Despite the utility of linear mixed effects models one limitation must be noted.  
Using a different method to previous similar studies meant that the effect size was 
unknowable a prior.  Therefore, a power calculation was not appropriate.  Sample size 
was instead chosen based on similar language studies using groups (Gonzales et al., 
2010; Taylor et al., 2013).  Therefore a feasible target for the number of groups 
studied was chosen at approximately 20 groups per experimental condition. 
3.4. Results 
Table 3.1 gives the means and standard deviations for trust and language 




Table 3.1 Means and standard deviations for trust and language variables 
 M SD 
Trust Propensity 16.57 3.08 
Ability Beliefs 20.15 .4.27  
Integrity Beliefs 20.52 3.76 
Benevolence Beliefs 16 .59 3.50 
Trust Intentions 11.54 3.38 
Trust Behaviour 5.67 3.38 
Positive Emotion 6.27 3.09 
Negative Emotion 0.97 1.02 
Personal Pronoun 7.43 2.76 
Cognitive processes 18.87 4.22 
Perceptual Processes 3.67 3.67 
LSM 0.81 0.09 
 Note: Missing values on trust belief and trust intention scales reflected participants failing to submit survey answers. 18 failed to 
complete (or incorrectly completed) the trust game. Trust propensity: N = 193. Ability beliefs, integrity beliefs and benevolence 
beliefs: N = 191. Trust intentions: N = 190. Trust behaviour: N = 178. All language variables: N = 196. 
pronouns were used most frequently.  Likewise, negative emotion word production 
was sparse; on average participants used less than one negative emotion word during 
the task. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 were tested using a series of linear mixed effects models—
one per language variable—that tested for the effect of language on trust and 
controlled for the random effects of group and individual trust propensity, as well as 




Table 3.2 Results from individual language category linear mixed effects models 











Positive Emotion 0.20 0.30* 0.26* 0.12 0.21* 
Negative Emotion 0.88 -0.44 -0.49 0.44 0.26 
Personal Pronoun -0.84** -0.64** -0.66** -0.47** -0.55** 
Cognitive Processes -0.22 0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.10 
Perceptual Processes 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.28 
LSM 11.35 3.16 3.94 1.30 1.94 
Note. *p<.10 **p<.05 
positively predicted trust behaviour (β = .21, SE = .14, df = 176, t = 1.53, p = .07, one-
tailed tests), benevolence beliefs (β = .26, SE = .16, df = 53.86, t = 1.64, p = .06, one-
tailed test), and integrity beliefs (β = .30, SE = .19, df = 64.69, t = 1.60, p =.06, one-
tailed test). However, personal pronoun use negatively predicted ability beliefs (β = -
.84, SE = .29, df = 96.2, t = -2.91, p = .001, two-tailed test), integrity beliefs (β = -.65, 
SE = .25, df = 100.26, t = -2.56, p = .01, two-tailed test), benevolence beliefs (β = -
.66, SE = .22, df = 81.37, t = -2.95, p = .001, two-tailed test), trust intentions (β = -.47, 
SE = .20, df = 66.25, t = -2.32, p =.02, two-tailed test) and trust behavior (β = -0.55, 
SE = .20, df = 176 , t = -2.81, p = .01, two-tailed test). LSM did not predict any trust 
variables.  These results offer partial support for Hypothesis 1 and fail to support 
Hypothesis 2. 
A second series of linear mixed effects models tested hypothesis 3 and 4.  
Table 3.3 gives the results of these models. Six models in total were tested, comparing 
















Trust Prime 1.06** -0.01 -0.40 -0.88 0.07 -0.01 
 Note. *p<.10 **p<.05 
personal pronoun, cognitive mechanism, perceptual processes word use and linguistic 
style matching. Each model controlled for group and individual random effects as in 
the first series of models. The results showed that the trust prime predicted positive 
emotion word use (β = 1.06, SE = 0.51, df = 42.8, t = 2.09, p = 0.02, one-tailed test), 
such that the high trust prime lead to greater positive emotion word use.  The trust 
prime did not significantly predict any of the other language variables.  Thus offering 
partial support for Hypothesis 3 and no support for hypothesis 4. 
3.5. Discussion 
The current study aimed to extend the findings from Chapter 2 to a group 
context, and further test this by examining if the language that emanates from trust, is 
the same as that which gives rise to it. At the group level, there was little evidence 
that language variables (other than positive emotion words), which related to trust in 
dyads, operate similarly for groups. Similarly, the results show support for the link of 
positive emotion words with trust, showing that this word category is generally used 
more when people are primed to have trusting attitudes towards others.  
3.5.1. Individual word categories 
It was striking that the positive emotion effect as an outcome and predictor of 
trust was the only individual word category relating to trust in the direction predicted. 
This suggested that individual word categories are not of equivalent importance for 
individual group members trust towards their group. This is perhaps unsurprising as, 
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as stated in chapter 2, positive emotion words had the most direct support for its 
relationship with trust in past research.  Whereas the hypotheses regarding other 
language categories were formulated due to there indirect relationships with trust via 
their effect on constructs thought to relate to trust online, i.e. perceptual process 
words relationship to environmental cues, which was thought to reduce the feeling of 
geographical distance online (Swaab et al., 2009). However, it is not obvious why this 
process of making some word categories more relevant to trust than others happens in 
groups but not in dyads. 
As stated in chapter 2, the challenge of forming trust in groups, as compared 
to dyads, might be the increase in cognitive load owing to the need to monitor more 
sources (group members) for trust relevant information. This was speculated to 
impact the relationship between LSM and trust. However, based on the present 
findings, the same process might have impacted the relationship between individual 
word categories and trust. That is to say that, greater cognitive load meant that 
individuals could process fewer trust relevant language categories. Resulting in 
individual’s focusing on certain language cues over others in forming trust 
judgements.  
3.5.2. Linguistic style matching 
The experimental hypotheses were not supported with regard to the 
relationship between LSM and trust. Following the results from the previous chapter, 
it was suggested that LSM held no relationship to trust because of the nature of the 
dyadic interaction. That is to say that, individuals were presumably under less 
cognitive load in processing language, relative to processing language in a group 
context, hence individuals favored processing individual word categories, as opposed 
to holistic language variables such as linguistic style matching. Further, it was 
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proposed that in a group situation, cognitive load would be greater and people may 
rely more on LSM for, unconsciously, deciding whether or not to trust another person. 
The results of this study do not support that explanation, however, suggesting that 
variance in cognitive load does not account for why LSM was not used as a trust 
signal in the dyadic interactions. 
The absence of an effect of LSM was surprising given the positive association 
LSM has with social dynamics such as cooperation, cohesion and performance. These 
constructs are frequently associated with trust, and LSM has been associated with 
positive social functioning in dyads, face-to-face groups, and online groups (Gonzalez 
et al., 2010; Richardson et al., 2014; Swaab et al., 2011; Taylor & Thomas, 2008). 
Lastly, prominent theories of human mimicry, such as communication 
accommodation theory (Coupland & Giles, 1998), state that a central function of 
language mimicry, or accommodation, itself is to signal trust. It is therefore useful to 
consider why the present results are counter to the empirical evidence and theory.  
Traditional theories of mimicry have tendered to favour interpretations that 
mimicry engenders positive social outcomes. Ireland (2011), however, noted that 
LSM has been associated with negative, as well as positive, social outcomes.  For 
example, LSM has been shown to lead to impasse in negotiations in competitive 
experimental contexts (Ireland & Henderson, 2014). She therefore proposed that LSM 
reflects engagement in the most salient feature of the interaction, which might not 
necessarily translate into positive social outcomes. This explains how LSM results in 
very different outcomes when comparing an interaction where the interlocutors 
primary aim was to find common ground (Taylor & Thomas, 2008) compared to 
defeating one another within a negotiation (Ireland & Henderson, 2014). Ireland’s 
hypothesis implies that LSM in the present study reflected engagement in the task, 
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given that the interaction was entirely task focused. This could explain why LSM, in 
this context, communicated nothing about the trustworthiness of the group. The 
implication of this is that LSM might still relate to trust, but only at a group phase 
where LSM would reflect engagement in the relationship, rather than the task itself. 
This possibility is tested in the next Chapter. 
3.5.3. Language outcomes of trust 
By priming individuals to expect either high or low trustworthy behaviour in 
the survival game, the current study found that positive emotion words not only lead 
to more trust, but also result from primed trustworthiness expectations. This finding is 
consistent with Zand’s (1972) feedback model whereby more disclosure and less 
defensive communication resulted from previously established trust among group 
members.  Such communication styles might then engendered further trust, and so on. 
Similarly, Ireland et al. (2011) proposed a bidirectional relationship between language 
style matching and relationship engagement, with each reciprocally increasing one 
another. By explicitly testing each direction in a single study, and finding effects for 
each direction with regard to positive emotion word use and trust, the present research 
is novel in providing evidence for a reciprocal relationship between language and 
trust.  The bi-directional nature of the findings provides further support for language 
as a useful measure of trust, both retrospectively and as a predictor of future trust. 
That is to say that, finding positive emotion in an interaction would indicate the 
willingness of participants to trust in the present, owing to previous interactions, and 
the likelihood of continued trust in the relationship in the future. 
Demonstrating that a trust prime can influence a group member’s language 
style has interesting theoretical implications. Priming trust presumably leads to 
altering an individual’s internal state of trust. Previous research has speculated and 
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found evidence for the existence of a ‘trust module’, which can be activated via 
priming, and demonstrate reliable neural responses (King-Casas et al., 2005). The 
present findings are novel in evidencing that influencing an internal trust state, or trust 
module, produces observable changes in an individual’s language behaviour. This is 
in line with numerous findings by Pennebaker and colleagues, which have indicated 
that phenomena, at the internal state level, can be revealed via expressions in 
language use (see Pennebaker, 2012).  For example, people experiencing depressed 
episodes are found to use more negative emotion words and personal pronouns (Rude, 
Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004).  
The dominant model of trust formation has positioned an individual’s trust 
intention as the central trust facet, which is informed by trust beliefs and results in 
various forms of trust behaviour, such as risk taking (Mayer et al., 1995). The present 
findings suggest a potential additional facet of trust to the traditional trust model, 
which is trust intentions expressed in language.  Such a component would appear to 
result from an internal state of trust (as primed in the present study), and occur before 
necessarily observing any trust behaviour.  Given that language has also been shown 
to influence trust behaviour, this facet of trust, which could be described as a 
manifestation of a trust intention in language, is arguably a critical component in trust 
formation. The present study offers insights into how individual trust intentions might 
be transformed into trust at the interactional level.  That is to say that, it is through 
specific language behavior that allows individual trust intentions to be 
transformational at the collective group level. 
3.5.4. Limitations and future research 
The design of the present study shed light on the direction of effects between 
language and trust. It is argued that both trust can predict language behaviour and 
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language can predict trust. Studying the relationship between language behaviour and 
other social outcomes, research has suggested that the temporal order of ‘language 
before outcome variable’ favours an interpretation that language engendered the 
social outcome (Richardson et al., 2014).  This interpretation is relevant to the present 
findings, as opposed to interpreting the results such that the relationship between trust 
and language operated entirely at the level of trust predicting language behaviour.  In 
addition, the present analysis controlled for possible independent factors, such as trust 
propensity and the trust prime, which may have effected both language and trust 
outcome. Nevertheless, the possibility of another independent factor, such as an 
individual’s decision to cooperate, accounting for variance in both language and trust, 
could not be ruled out entirely. Directly manipulating language variables, and 
observing the effect on trust offers a means to shed further light on the precise nature 
of the relationship between trust and language.   
The generalizability of the present findings to other contexts is limited. There 
are good reasons to believe that context, such as task focused versus relational 
focused contexts, might interact with language in its relationship with trust. 
Communication scholars argue that meaning derived from communication is not 
possible without a processing of the context in which the communicative act occurred 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987). Similarly, research from trust repair indicates that the 
same communication act can have varying effects on rebuilding trust, depending on 
the context of the initial trust breach (Kim, Cooper, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2013). The 
present findings were observed within the context of an entirely task orientated 
discussion.  
As discussed above, the lack of LSM effect on trust could be owing to the task 
focused nature of the interaction. In addition, the positive emotion effect could be 
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dependent on the task focused nature of the interaction.  Positive emotion word use 
has been proposed as useful to trust in mitigating task disagreements and showing 
support as groups move towards a common goal.  Each function of positive emotion 
could be absent during interactions where task goals are less salient, and therefore the 
need for disagreement mitigation and mutual support is less present.  Indeed, it is 
noteworthy that the relationship between positive emotion and trust in previous 
research has always existed in task-orientated interactions (Fischer et al., 2007; 
Javenpaa et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 2006). Therefore, manipulating context is a 
critical future research endeavor for exploring both the relationship of LSM and 
positive emotion with trust. 
A final limitation of the present study was the lack of a manipulation check of 
the trust prime. That is to say that, trust was not measured directly following the 
prime.  Therefore it was not certain that the prime had the desired effect on 
participant’s trust. A manipulation check was not conducted because directly 
questioning a participant’s trust toward the group, prior to any interaction, may have 
induced unwanted demand characteristics. In future research, a manipulation check 
might be conducted by creating a condition with an independent group of participants 
where the effectiveness of the trust prime could be tested in isolation of the main 
hypotheses tests. 
3.5.5. Conclusion 
It was concluded that positive emotion is an important language variable 
related to trust in online groups.  It was proposed that increased numbers of 
participants, i.e. a group relative to a dyad (Chapter 2), made processing various 
language categories as signals to trust more difficult. Put simply, cognitive load 
increased.  It was speculated that this resulted in group members selecting fewer 
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language categories to guide their trust.  A novel trust prime also shed light on how 
language might be an outcome of trust. Whereby positive emotion words were used 
more in group members primed with high trustworthiness, compared to low 
trustworthiness.  
The null effect of LSM in relating to trust was accounted for within the 
framework of Ireland’s (2011) engagement theory.  This would suggest that the 
context of the interaction, task focus, might render the role of LSM irrelevant to trust, 
given that engagement in task activities communicates neither high or low 
interpersonal trustworthiness. However, in more relational focused phases of 
interactions, it was speculated that LSM might come into play.  Manipulating the 
context of online group interactions was proposed as the best way to further 
understand the relationship between positive emotion, LSM, and online trust.  
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4. Chapter 4: Language Style Matching and Positive Emotion as Predictors of 
Trust in Online Groups: The Importance of Phase of Group Development 
In the previous study we considered the relationship between positive emotion 
and LSM and trust in a one-time interaction. However, many online groups will meet 
over repeat interactions (Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 2006) and will move through 
distinct phases of development, for example from relational to task phases (Arrow, 
Poole, Henry, Wheelan, & Moreland, 2004).  This has important implications for 
understanding the language mechanisms that underlie trust formation, as phase of 
interaction might interact with language to produce varying effects on trust. For 
example, positive emotion words might not have universal positive effects on trust, 
rather positive emotion might facilitate trust more or less depending on the phase of 
interaction when it occurs. In this Chapter, models of phase development are 
considered to enrich our understanding of the roles of LSM and positive emotion in 
online trust.  A study is then presented that aimed to induce contextual variation 
through manipulating three distinct phases of group development; these were 
relational activity, task activity, and problem resolution phases.  Analysis revealed 
LSM was critical to trust formation in the early relational focused phase; and that only 
in groups who did not establish high LSM in the early relational focused phase, did 
positive emotion emerge to facilitate trust formation in the latter, more task focused 
phases.  
In research on ‘trust repair,’ there is evidence to suggest that the relationships 
between different communication acts and trust is moderated by context.  This body 
of research considers the mechanisms by which individuals or groups can repair trust 
once it has been broken.  A central finding is that the nature of the trust breach (i.e., 
the context) moderates the effectiveness of the repair strategy (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & 
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Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). For example, Kim et al. (2013) 
showed that an apology is effective for repairing trust following an act of 
incompetence (e.g., committing an accounting related transgression due to 
negligence), but that denying responsibility for a wrong-doing is more effective 
following a demonstration of low integrity (e.g., deliberately committing an 
accounting related transgression) (Kim, Cooper, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2013).  Hence, the 
language used to facilitate trust repair will be less or more effective depending on the 
context (nature of transgression) in which it occurs. Similarly, the language used to 
facilitate trust formation might be less or more effective depending on the context in 
which it occurs. 
Direct support of this notion comes from Swaab, Maddux, and Sinaceur’s 
(2011) study of online dyadic negotiations. They found that individuals gained greater 
trust from their counterparts when instructed to mimic their counterpart’s language 
early in the interaction.  The same was not true of individuals who were instructed to 
mimic language at the end of the interaction, who received less trust from their 
counterpart’s. The research illustrates how variance in communication—mimicking or 
not mimicking in this instance—has varying effects on trust depending on the context 
(phase of interaction) in which it occurs.  
In summary, the first two studies of this thesis focused on trust formation in a 
single phase of interaction that was task orientated.  This nature of the phase might 
explain why positive emotion, but not LSM, consistently underlies trust formation. 
However, research has not explicitly tested the possibility of the positive effect of 
positive emotion words on trust being moderated by context. Therefore, examining 
the relative effects of positive emotion on trust, in contexts beyond those that are task 
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focused, might reveal different effects.  A non-directional hypothesis with regard to 
the effects of positive emotion on trust was proposed: 
H1: The effect of positive emotion on trust variables will be different 
depending on which phase of the interaction the positive emotion is observed. 
Unlike positive emotion word use, the role of LSM on social functioning has 
been tested in varying phases of interaction. Whilst the common view is that LSM 
facilitates positive social functioning by communicating harmony in the way two or 
more individuals are experiencing the world (Niederhoff & Pennebaker, 2002). A 
more recent position has been that LSM may also predict negative social outcomes in 
certain situations, for example, Ireland and Henderson (2014) found that LSM 
positively predicted impasse in lab-based negotiations. They explained this effect as 
when individuals enter into interactions with proself (egoistic) motives, LSM reflects 
increased focus on the antagonistic and selfish aspects of the interaction, such as 
opposing goals. According to the authors conclusions, social engagement mediates 
the relationships between LSM and both its positive and negative correlates. Put more 
simply, the more engaged a person is in a conversation, the more that his underlying 
positive or negative attitude towards another is likely to manifest itself in behaviour. 
As an explanation, this shows how LSM reflects or leads to	  impasse, or  resolution, in 
negotiations where the primary goal of negotiators is either to defeat their partner 
(Ireland and Henderson, 2014), or establish a relationship (Ireland et al., 2011; Taylor 
& Thomas, 2008). The engagement hypothesis suggests that as an individual’s goals, 
motivations, and focus change; so too may the nature of the effects for LSM on social 
outcomes.  
Based on the above research, it was hypothesised that when groups interact in 
a task focused phase (such as in studies one and two) LSM will reflect engagement in 
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the task, but not necessarily the relationship, and so not facilitate trust formation.  
However, when groups interact in a relational focused phase, LSM will reflect 
engagement in the groups relational needs, and so: 
H2: LSM, specifically in a relational activity phase, will positively predict 
trust variables. 
4.1. Context as Group Phase Development 
Context, with regard to group online interactions, may be characterised by the 
phase of group development that the group is in at any one point. Crucial to the 
present study was to induce phases which were not entirely task orientated, as LSM 
might be moderated by a task/ relational distinction, and positive emotion has only 
ever been tested in task. The present study, then, attempted to guide groups through 
typical phases of development.  There is much debate surrounding which phases 
consistently emerge in groups. Nevertheless, three phases that are commonly 
identified in the group literature are a relational phase, a task phase, and a resolution 
phase (Poole, 1981; Poole & Roth, 1989; Hirokawa, 1990; Orlitzky & Hirokawa, 
2001).  
A relational phase is characterised by group members attempting to manage 
interpersonal relationships and identify acceptable interaction behaviour; whilst 
suspending discussion of the task (Mann, Gibbard, & Hartman, 1967; Poole & Roth, 
1989). A task phase is characterised by group members directing their behaviours 
towards successful completion of the problem, or task, at hand (Arrow et al., 2004).  
Poole and Roth (1989) describe this phase as a task activity phase, which is 
dominated by activities dedicated towards managing the task, where group 
communication becomes more goal orientated.  This is akin to Tuckman’s (1965) 
work stage, where task orientation is high and ideas regarding the task are exchanged. 
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For groups working with a time constraint, groups will enter a resolution phase as the 
deadline looms closer (Arrow et al., 2004). In the resolution phase, group members 
consider the actions of others in order to converge the entire group to agree on the 
outcome (Bales & Strodtbeck, 1951).  
These established phases of group development, replicated for the present 
study, create enough contextual variation to test our hypotheses.  That is to say that, 
compared to the studies in the previous two chapters, the phases create an additional 
two phases to test the effects of positive emotion on trust (relational and problem 
resolution). While the relational phase allows a test for the hypothesis that LSM will 
facilitate trust, where it has previously failed to in task focused discussions.  
Figure 4.1 shows a summary of the conceptual model tested in the present 
study. The model builds on the models in the previous two chapters by including the 
effect of group phase in the relationship between language and trust. In addition, 
language variables of interest are specified to LSM and positive emotion. As in the 
previous models, key causal paths from language variables to each node of Mayer et 
al.’s (1995) situational trust variables were tested. Trust propensity is modeled to 
effect trust prior to participant’s interaction in the study. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
Participants were 103 students who made up 20 groups of 4 to 6 people.  
Participants were from UK University in the North West of England.  Participants 
were invited to a three-part online study.  Participants who failed to attend a meeting 
were restricted from attending subsequent meetings.  Thus, 103 participants attended 
the first online meeting, 98 participants attended the second meeting, and 96 




Figure 4.1 Schematic representation of a conceptual model linking the language of a 
group to an individual’s trust beliefs, trust intentions and trust behaviour including 
the effect of phase of group development. 
participants.  Twenty-two participants were male and 81 participants were female. 
The average age of the sample was 19.67 years (SD = 2.08; Range = 18 – 28 yrs). 
Participants took part in the study for course credits or for a cash payment of £10.   
4.2.2. Materials  
Hidden Profile Task. An adapted version of the hidden profile paradigm 
(Stasser & Stewart, 1992) was used as the main problem solving group task.  In its 
original form, the hidden profile paradigm involves groups of people trying to solve a 
murder mystery puzzle (namely who committed the crime) using information that is 
provided to them by the experimenter. The pattern of information distribution is 
biased, such that some information is available to all participants (common 
information) and some information is available only to individual members of the 
group (unique information).  The common information favours a suboptimal decision, 
as it lacks ‘critical evidence’ that relates to evidence against the perpetrator and 
exonerating evidence for other suspects.  The critical evidence reveals the correct 
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solution to the mystery, and is only contained within the ‘unique information’.  
Consequently, the correct solution is more likely to be discovered as more individuals 
share their unique information.   
The current study used an adapted version of the hidden profile task.  As with 
the original task, the current task centered on a fictitious murder with a number of 
characters as potential suspects. The information distributed to participants related to 
witness statements, suspect statements and maps.  In total, 18 pieces of information 
were ‘unique’ (i.e., available only to an individual group member), and one piece of 
information was ‘common’ and made available to all group members.  Fourteen to 18 
pieces of unique information were used in the task, depending upon the group size 
(e.g., in a group of 6 each group member would receive 3 pieces of unique 
information each).  Of these, eight pieces of information contained critical evidence 
about characters within the murder mystery story.  The distribution of information 
ensured that each group member received between 1 and 2 pieces of this critical 
information.  The remaining pieces of material contained non-critical evidence about 
the characters. The single piece of common information existed in the form of a news 
report outlining the mystery itself, but did not contain any critical or non-critical 
evidence about characters.  The single piece of common information served to give all 
participants the same “back-story” to the mystery.   
The current task diverged from the original hidden profile task in the amount 
of common information available. Unlike the original task, the amount of common 
information did not match the amount of unique information. By adapting the task so 
that all but one piece of information was unique, the task became more 
interdependent.  The task was also made more risky by providing an individual, self, 
incentive to succeed.  In the original hidden profile task, participants are incentivised 
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to reach the correct group decision, which is to say that that the group agrees and 
submits a single group solution.  However, in the present study, participants submitted 
solutions independently, and anonymously.  This gave participants the opportunity to 
submit an answer conforming or deviating from the solution discussed by the group.  
Participants were incentivised to provide the correct solution with a £25 prize, which 
was split between the participants who provided the correct solution.  Hence, there 
was greater individual gain if fewer group members provided the correct solution.  
Therefore, in addition to the incentive to share information for the strategic group 
benefit, there was an incentive to withhold information if it was believed that other 
group members were using other’s information for their own gain (i.e., to optimise the 
chances of fewer people reporting the correct solution).  The game structure avoids 
determining participants to automatically trust (as there is a potential greater reward 
for monovalent behaviour), whilst maintaining an incentive to trust, and work 
collectively (as an individuals information alone is insufficient to solve the problem).  
Successful completion of the task required participants to identify the primary 
suspect (the character who committed the murder), secondary suspect (one of two 
characters who had substantial evidence against them) and a piece of exonerating 
evidence for the secondary suspect (one of three pieces of evidence for each 
secondary suspect).  To achieve this, the task was dependent on two processes; group 
members disclosing their own valuable information and group members relying on 
other’s information to be genuine.  These types of processes have been respectively 
referred to as ‘disclosure’ and ‘reliance’ behaviours in the trust literature (Gillespie, 
2003). In sum, the extent to which groups are proficient in honestly disclosing 
information and relying on others information is proportional to the difficulty in 
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submitting the correct solution.  Simply put, the task was operationalised such that 
more trust equaled higher performance. 
Pre-experiment measure.  Participants’ propensity to trust was measured 
through an online questionnaire. All items were responded to on a 5-point likert scale 
that ranged from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). Trust propensity was 
measured using five items taken from Costa and McCrea (1992).  An example of an 
item is, ‘I suspect hidden motives in others’ (reverse scored).  To reduce participant’s 
attention to the fact that the research was interested in trust, these items were 
embedded with 20 items measuring self-reported levels of extraversion and 
conscientiousness. These items were taken from the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999).  As in the 
study in the previous chapter, demographic and availability information was also 
taken at this stage in order to assist group selection. 
Post-experiment measure. Trust beliefs and trust intentions were measured by 
using items from Mayer and Davis’ (1999) trust scales. Items were adapted to the 
experimental context, for example Mayer and Davis’ item; “top management has a 
strong sense of justice” was adapted to “the group I interacted with has a strong sense 
of justice”.  Trust toward the group was measured rather than trust toward individuals, 
as all communication and behaviour was directed towards the group (i.e., text 
communication and sharing information was received by all group members). Six 
items measured beliefs about the group’s ability (e.g., ‘The group I interacted with are 
skilled’), 5 items measured beliefs about the group’s benevolence (e.g., ‘The group I 
interacted with are concerned with others welfare’), 6 items measured beliefs about 
the group’s integrity (e.g., ‘The group I interacted with sticks to their word’), and 4 
items measured trust intentions toward the group (e.g., ‘I would feel comfortable 
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giving the group complete responsibility’). All items were embedded in an online 
questionnaire, per meeting.  
In addition, following the final meeting, the online questionnaire held three 
items asking participants to provide their solution to the murder mystery.  These were 
‘Who is the primary suspect?’, ‘Who is the secondary suspect?’, and ‘What is the 
exonerating evidence surrounding the secondary suspect?’. 
4.2.3. Design  
Independent Variables. Positive emotion words and LSM were the two 
independent variables.  Both were calculated at the mean group level whilst 
controlling for the individual’s contribution to each score.  This was achieved by 
using the same formula as in chapter 3.  
Moderating Variable.  Phase of group development acted as a moderator 
variable.  Phase of group development had three levels; relational activity phase, task 
activity phase, and resolution phase.   
Dependent Variables. Dependent variables were beliefs regarding the groups’ 
trustworthiness, individual’s trust intentions towards the group, and behavioural trust. 
Trust beliefs and trust intention were measured three times, once following each 
meeting. The behavioural trust measure was operationalized as an individual’s 
performance score, which was calculated using the following formula:    
 Performance = PS*.5 + SS*.25 + SSE*.25  
Where PS is the primary suspect, SS is the secondary suspect, and SSE is the 
secondary suspects exonerating evidence. Each variable is scored as a binary measure, 
0 or 1 (incorrect or correct). Whilst performance could be scored by simply adding the 
three scores together, secondary suspect and exonerating evidence were weighted less 
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due to the partial dependencies between them (i.e., correctly identifying SS made 
correctly identifying SSE more likely).  Participants could thus score zero to one. 
4.2.4. Procedure 
A study advert was circulated to potential participants by contacting various 
university departments and society administration staff.  The advert was also posted 
on an online study system for first year psychology students, participating for course 
credit.  Those interested in taking part were asked to contact the researcher via email, 
at which point they were sent an information sheet and consent form; the latter of 
which was to be returned to the researcher prior to the start of the study. Once the 
consent form was returned, participants were emailed a web link to an online form, 
which provided access to the main study materials.  The first set of materials asked 
participants to state their availability to take part in the online chat and to complete 
the pre-interaction questionnaire that measured their trust propensity, age, gender, 
first language and where they had heard about the study.  
Participants were sorted into groups of 6.  Each group was scheduled to meet 
at intervals at least 24 hours apart over a period of not longer than 5 days. Per time 
slot, groups were created with attention to participant’s college, department, year 
group and where they had heard about the study.  Those who gave similar responses 
to these items were sorted into separate groups.  This was important to mitigate the 
risk of scheduling groups with members who had pre-existing relationships.  
Participants were then invited, via email, to participate at the three meeting times 
selected for their particular group.  A web link and alias name, to access the online 
chat room, was provided.  Alias names consisted of a three letter nonsense word 
followed by an initial, e.g. Ada J.  This was important to ensure that the same 
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participant could be identified through each stage of the interaction, whilst ensuring 
their actual identity remained confidential.  
Participants attended three, thirty minute, group chat meetings, where they 
interacted using computer mediated communication via the group chat software 
‘campfire’ (https://campfirenow.com/).  No face-to-face communication was 
permitted, and so microphone and video chat were disabled.  Participants 
communicated in a group chat window where their instant messages were identifiable 
to their alias names.  Participants were able to communicate with the researcher via a 
private chat window.  Participants were only able to log in and communicate during 
designated study times; the group chat windows were disabled outside of these times.  
The first group chat session was a relational activity phase. Participants were 
provided with the single piece of common information, the news article.  This was to 
give participants an idea of the task they would be asked to undertake in subsequent 
meetings.  Participants were given a brief description of what to expect from the 
remaining two meetings, including the concept of ‘unique’ information, and how 
prize money would be distributed.  Participants were instructed that the first session 
was an ‘ice breaker’, and that investigating the mystery would not begin until the 
following meetings.  They were informed that they could use the rest of the session to 
get to know one another, discuss personal strengths and weaknesses that might relate 
to the task, and discuss ideas regarding the best way to function as a team.   
During the relational activity phase, it was expected that most groups would 
speculate about the task and allude to the possibility of group members not sharing all 
the information in an attempt to personally gain more prize money.  Groups who did 
not discuss these issues were prompted to do so at the half way point of the meeting.  
The prompts consisted of short statements about relational aspects of the task (e.g., 
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only members who provide the correct solution will receive a share of the £25 prize 
money), followed by a suggestion to discuss this further (e.g., If you anticipate any 
problems with the way prize money is distributed then now is the time to discuss with 
your group).  This eliminated unwanted variance which might have arose if some 
groups, but not others, had fully understood the special prize structure, which made 
the task ‘risky’. The researcher gave a 5 minute warning before ending the first, and 
subsequent, meetings. At the end of the session participants were instructed to follow 
a link to complete an online post interaction survey items that measured trust beliefs 
and trust intentions.  Finally, participants were reminded of their next meeting time. 
Following the relational activity phase, participants were emailed their unique 
information.  Participants were instructed that they could read this information either 
before or during the next meeting.  At the beginning of the task activity phase 
participants were reminded of the interdependent nature of the task by making clear 
that each participant had different information relating to the murder mystery.  They 
were also reminded of the risky nature of the task in 3 distinct ways.  Instructions read 
that participants could share as much or as little of their information as they wished to 
do so; that solutions would be submitted individually and may differ from the general 
consensus of the group; and that the £25 prize would only be split between the 
participants who provided the correct solution. Finally, participants were instructed 
that their goal was to identify the perpetrator, a second suspect, and the exonerating 
evidence surrounding the second suspect.  Groups had 30 minutes to engage in this 
‘task activity’ phase before the researcher ended the session and instructed 
participants to follow a link to complete the online post interaction survey.  
Participants were again reminded of their next meeting time. 
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At the beginning of the problem resolution phase participants were given 
similar instructions to those given in the task activity phase.  The only difference in 
instructions was that participants were reminded that they had only thirty minutes to 
complete the task.  At the end of the problem resolution phase, participants were 
asked to submit their solution and were provided with a link to the online post 
interaction survey.  Unlike at the end of the previous 2 meetings, the online form 
contained questions regarding the solution to the murder mystery in addition to the 
other measures. After participants submitted their post interaction survey responses 
they were directed to an online debrief sheet, which concluded the study. 
4.3. Results  
Table 4.1 shows means and standard deviations for questionnaire trust 
measures, including participant’s beliefs about the groups ability, benevolence and 
integrity, as well as participant’s reported trust intentions towards the group.  This is 
reported at each of the three phases of group development.   Whilst each variable was 
relatively consistent across each phase of group development, positive emotion was 
markedly higher in the relational phase compared to the subsequent task and 
resolution phases. 
4.3.1. Hypothesis testing 
To test each hypothesis all models, including post hoc analyses, entered group 
and trust propensity as random effects (as in the study in Chapter 3). Positive emotion 
was the single predictor variable of each trust belief variable, and trust intention 
measure, in a series of models designed to test hypothesis 1.  Positive emotion did not 
predict ability (β = .08, p = .62), integrity (β =.06, p = .73), benevolence (β = .06, p = 
.67) or trust intention (β = .04, p = .77).  Each trust variable was subject to a positive 
emotion by phase of group development interaction, however no interaction terms 
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Table 4.1 Means and standard deviations for trust measures and language variables 
across phases of group development. 
 Pre-Interaction Relational Task Resolution 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Trust propensity 16.13 3.32 - - - - - - 
Ability beliefs - - 20.55 3.19 20.69 3.67 21.07 3.63 
Integrity beliefs - - 21.75 3.19 21.17 3.72 21.7 4.17 
Benevolence beliefs - - 17.28 3.39 16.75 3.01 16.7 3.81 
Trust Intention - - 12.42 2.94 12.43 3.23 12.45 3.36 
Trust Behaviour - - - - - - 0.44 0.36 
LSM - - 0.79 0.12 0.82 0.10 0.82 0.10 
Positive Emotion - - 7.99 4.27 2.08 1.53 2.30 1.46 
Note: There were 3 cases of missing responses at the relational activity phase, and 2 cases at the task 
activity phase.  Additional decrease in N between the relational activity and task activity phases 
reflected participant drop out (e.g., groups of 6 decreasing to groups of 4).  Trust propensity: N = 103. 
Ability beliefs, integrity beliefs, benevolence beliefs and trust intentions: N = 100 (relational), N = 96 
(task), N = 96 (resolution). Trust behaviour: N = 96. LSM and positive emotion: N = 103 (relational), N 
= 98 (task), N = 96 (resolution). 
were significant. Positive emotion at the relational, task, and resolution phase were 
predictor variables of trust behaviour as a function of performance. Positive emotion 
at the relational, task, and resolution phase in either the relational (β = -.02, p = .26), 
task (β = -.05, p = .33), or resolution phase (β = .04, p = .46) did not predict trust 
behaviour. 
LSM was the single predictor variable of each trust belief variable, and trust 
intention measure, in a series of models designed to test hypothesis 2.  LSM did not 
predict ability (β = 1.04, p = 0.82), integrity (β = 1.81, p = .70), benevolence (β = 
1.70, p = .69) or trust intention (β = 1.90, p = .64).  Each trust variable was subject to 
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a LSM by phase of group development interaction, however no interaction terms were 
significant. LSM at the relational, task, and resolution phase were predictor variables 
of trust behaviour as a function of performance.  LSM in the relational phase 
significantly predicted trust behaviour (β = 1.12, p = .03), with an increase in LSM 
predicting an increase in trust behaviour. LSM was not a significant predictor at the 
task (β = .27, p = .66) or resolution phase (β = -.70, p = .48).  
In studies 1 and 2, positive emotion emerged as a significant predictor of trust, 
while LSM did not. However, the opposite was found in the present study.  Trust 
(trust behaviour) was not predicted by positive emotion but was predicted by LSM in 
the relational phase.  One possible explanation for this difference is that LSM 
‘replaced’ positive emotion as a signal to trust. That is to say that, first, LSM in the 
relational phase had context dependent effects which meant that LSM was judged as 
a more reliable signal to trust than positive emotion; second, that once trust had been 
established in the early relational phase; positive emotion in the subsequent task 
phases did not ‘add’ anything to group members trust decision, which had already 
been made in the prior relational phase.   In accordance with this, we might expect 
that groups who do not establish high LSM at the relational phase will rely on positive 
emotion at later phases to predict trust behaviour.  
To test for this possibility, an LME model was examined in which two 
interaction terms were created between LSM at the relational activity phase and 
positive emotion in the task phase, and between LSM at the relational activity phase 
and positive emotion in the problem resolution phase, and entered as predictors of 
trust behaviour as well as with their main effects.  As before, group and trust 
propensity were entered as random effects. The results showed partial support for the 
proposal. Specifically, the interaction between LSM at the relational activity phase 
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and positive emotion at the problem resolution phase approached significance, β = -
1.35, p = .08 (one-tailed test), while the interaction between LSM at the relational 
activity phase and positive emotion at the task phase was non-significant. 
The nature of the LSM at relational activity phase and positive emotion at the 
problem resolution phase interaction was explored by splitting the group members 
into ‘High LSM relational’ (n=23) and ‘Low LSM relational’ (n=25).  This was done 
by using the upper and lower quartile range of LSM scores in the relational activity 
phase. Next, two models examined the relative effects of positive emotion on trust 
behaviour in high and low LSM groups.  The results, as presented in Table 4.2, show 
that for groups with low LSM, positive emotion was a significant predictor of trust 
behaviour in the problem resolution phase. 
4.4. Discussion 
4.4.1. Linguistic style matching 
The current study showed the importance of context (specifically, group phase 
development) in moderating the effects of language behaviour on trust. However, this 
effect was specific to trust behaviour, and not the beliefs or intentions that, in part, 
give rise to this behaviour. The results showed that LSM related to an increase in trust  
behaviour when it is developed in the relational phase of group development, but not 
when it occurs at other phases. The results also showed that when LSM is not used at 
this phase, a group might rely on positive emotion, in subsequent phases, to guide 
their trust behaviour. That is, positive emotion seems to be a proxy for LSM when the 
latter is absent.  
The present findings demonstrated the value of LSM in shaping trust 
behaviours when an individual’s focus is on relational aspects of group dynamics.   
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Table 4.2 Effect of positive emotion on trust behaviour for groups with high or low 
LSM in the relational activity phase.  
 Trust behaviour 
 Group phase B SE df t P 
       
Positive emotion (Low LSM) Relational -0.03 0.03 25.00 -1.12 0.27 
Task 0.17 0.12 25.00 1.31 0.20 
Resolution 0.32 0.13 25.00 2.61 0.02 
       
Positive emotion (High 
LSM) 
Relational 0.03 0.69 21.31 0.37 0.72 
Task 0.00 0.14 22.17 0.03 0.98 
Resolution -0.08 0.10 22.46 -0.80 0.43 
 
This is consistent with research in hostage negotiation (Taylor & Thomas, 2008) and 
speed dating (Ireland et al., 2011), which show LSM to have positive effects in what 
may arguably be said to be ‘relational interactions’. According to Ireland et al. (2011), 
the specificity of LSM effects to relational contexts is due to a process of engagement. 
Ireland’s engagement hypothesis (Ireland, 2011; Ireland & Henderson, 2014) 
proposes that LSM reflects social engagement, such that when a group show high 
LSM at the relational phase they are demonstrating their commitment to develop 
quality relationships. Communicating engagement in the relational aspects of the 
interaction demonstrates a willingness to form attachments, and concern and care for 
the group’s needs, which transpire into the belief that the other person can be trusted 
(McAllister, 1995; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). This also could explain why 
LSM at the task or resolution phase is ineffective at generating trust.  
Put simply, if engagement (as indicated by LSM) has its positive effect on 
trust because it shows caring for the group, then LSM in either the task or resolution 
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phases will not lead to the same beliefs as the behaviours here will be task-focused 
and not necessarily indicative of care and concern. In such circumstances, 
engagement cannot be perceived as trustworthy because it is ambiguous as to whether 
increased task engagement is for the benefit of the group or for the self.  It is 
noteworthy that in studies one and two, when the interaction was exclusively task 
orientated, LSM was similarly a null predictor of trust.  Therefore, it is argued that a 
distinction between relational activities and task activities moderates the role of LSM 
in trust formation. 
The interpretation of the LSM effect on trust was that a positive effect was 
observed because LSM reflected engagement in the relational needs of the group.  
However, a second interpretation could be proposed. Swaab et al. (2011) similarly 
found that linguistic mimicry in the earliest phase of the interaction had the largest 
effect on trust relative to other phases.  The authors argue that the early temporal 
position accounted for the findings.  Swaab et al. (2011) proposed that the beginning 
of an interaction is the most critical time for people to develop trust.  This work offers 
an alternative interpretation of the present findings.   
Swaab’s temporal order explanation is a plausible one. However, evidence 
from the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that it may not explain the context 
dependent effects in relation to LSM.  That is to say that, in the previous studies, each 
contained an online task orientated interaction, followed by a trust decision.  LSM in 
the initial interaction did not predict subsequent trust.  This suggests the nature of the 
interaction is more important than its temporal position to a trust judgment, as early 
LSM in a task phase did not predict trust.  That is not to say that the temporal position 
of LSM is irrelevant, it is logical to presume that the sooner groups establish trust the 
sooner groups can experience the benefits of trust.  Thus, it is acknowledged that in 
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the present study the effect of LSM on trust in the relational phase may have been 
exaggerated by the temporal position in which the relational activity phase was 
completed.  Future research might explicitly test for this by reversing the order of 
group phase development, i.e. a task phase proceeding a relational phase, or by 
considering groups which exist exclusively in a relational phase, where one would 
expect LSM to hold a relationship to trust throughout the entire interaction (see 
Chapter 6). 
4.4.2. Relevance and reliability  
In contrast to LSM, the results show that positive emotion has minimal impact 
on trust within the group, unless it occurs in the absence of LSM, in task focused 
phases. This goes against research that shows positive emotion characterising trusting 
groups universally (Crisp & Jarvenpaa, 2013; Gibson & Manuel, 2003; see also 
Chapter 2; Chapter 3) and requires explanation.  The following section proposes that 
this may be accounted for with trust and communication theory, these were trust 
reliability (Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001) and language relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986).  
Trust reliability relates to the genuineness of signs that communicate trust. For 
example, a sign of benevolent intent may be an altruistic act, which can be easily 
observed and regarded with some confidence as genuine trustworthiness. However, 
there will be some situations in which trustworthiness signs are less observable and 
need to be inferred through whatever actions are available. In most cases, these signs 
will be interpreted correctly. However, when there is the possibility of ‘opportunists’ 
who ‘mimic’ trust-warranting properties, the individual may be duped into believing 
an act signals trustworthiness when in fact it does not. According to Bacharach and 
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Gambetta (2001) the trustor must therefore always ask themselves if the observed 
behaviour is a reliable sign of the trust-warranting property.   
LSM and positive emotion were two possible trust signals in the current study. 
During the relational activity phase, LSM appeared as a more reliable trust signal than 
positive emotion, as evidenced by the positive and null effects on trust respectively.  
Niederhoffer and Pennebaker (2003) state that the production and processing of 
function words, which are the basis of LSM, is subconscious, while the production 
and processing of content words, such as positive emotion words, is conscious.  
Therefore, it may be argued that LSM is the unconscious product of engagement in 
the relational needs of the group, whereas positive emotion words are consciously 
produced illustrations of support.   This distinction between unconscious and 
conscious processing might underlie why, in this particular phase, LSM was 
considered a more reliable trust signal than positive emotion.  That is to say that, 
positive emotion, produced consciously, could be interpreted by trustors as the result 
of ‘opportunists’ who are mimicking trustworthy signals.  Whereas LSM, produced 
subconsciously, is less likely to be interpreted as a ‘strategy’ being used by 
opportunists, and rather as genuine engagement and thus genuine trustworthiness. 
The emergence of engagement, or lack of engagement, in the relational 
activity phase (as indicated by LSM) moderated the effects of positive emotion at 
latter phases. In these later phases, positive emotion emerges as a stronger predictor of 
trust than LSM, as it signals support and rapport (if regarded as genuine and not 
opportunistic). As stated earlier, LSM in the task or resolution phase indicates 
engagement in the task and thus manifest as less relational (benevolent) focused. This 
distinction between an ambiguous and less ambiguous trust signal might underlie 
why, in the task phases, positive emotion became the most reliable trust signal.  
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Sperber and Wilson (1986), in relevance theory, discuss how individuals 
constantly seek to understand communication through a search for the relevance of 
utterances. This is cognitively demanding, thus, a path of least effort is always taken 
to interpret meaning from communication. As part of this corollary, it is proposed that 
processing stops once expectations of relevance are satisfied.  In the present study, a 
significant part of the relevant information, which individuals were presumably 
motivated to process given the risk within the task, was trust-warranting properties.  It 
follows that once an expectation is met with regard to this type of communication, 
further trust-warranting properties were not necessarily processed.  Relevance theory 
would suggest that in the absence of a reliable trust signal at the relational activity 
phase (i.e., groups with low LSM) groups continued to process trust relevant 
communication in the latter phases.  This helps explain the positive emotion effect 
exclusively in the latter phases of interaction for those groups with low LSM in the 
early relational phase.  Put another way, positive emotion word use as a reliable trust 
signal in task phases appears irrelevant to group trust if sufficient trust warranting 
properties had already been processed. 
In sum, evidence from the first three studies develop a theoretical model of the 
link between language (LSM & Positive emotion) and trust driven by reliability and 
relevance; henceforth The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory. 
4.4.3. Limitations and future research 
The challenge to the present study was to induce three distinct contexts, 
ensuring that group communication remained relevant to the group phase imposed by 
the study design.  In this regard, there was mixed success.  The design manipulated 
the relational activity phase such that there was no task material to discuss; therefore 
communication remained exclusively relational orientated.  However, the task activity 
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and problem resolution phase may have been less exclusive in communication topic.  
Firstly, there were no explicit restrictions to prevent communication outside the topic 
of solving the problem or resolving the problem in the task activity and problem 
resolution phases respectively.  Secondly, the proximity of the task activity phase to 
the other two phases permitted the possibility of relational communication spilling 
over into the task activity phase, and problem solving continuing into the resolution 
phase. Although this is likely true of real world online groups, that phases are neither 
entirely relational or entirely task focused, experimental control over ensuring three 
entirely distinct phases was nevertheless limited.  
An alternative conceptualisation of the three distinct phases into two phases of 
group development, task and relational, might be more fitting to the findings. Such a 
conceptualisation would be in accordance with the observation that statistically 
significant effects were observed between the relational and the other two phases, i.e. 
LSM was a significantly related to trust in the relational phase but not in either the 
task or problem resolution phase.  In addition, trends were observed with positive 
effects of positive emotion words on trust in the low LSM groups in both the task and 
problem resolution phases, although only in the problem resolution phase did this 
effect reach significance.  Nevertheless, future research might consider the 
moderating role of group phase at the broader levels of relational orientation 
compared to task orientation. 
The current study failed to find any effects of positive emotion and LSM on 
trust beliefs and intentions.  This was surprising given that these language measures 
related to trust behaviour, to which beliefs and intentions are closely related (Mayer et 
al., 1995). One possible explanation for these findings is that the trust belief and trust 
intention scales measured the wrong type of trust suited to the trust behaviour 
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measures. Trust beliefs were measured in relation to the groups’ ability, integrity and 
benevolence. However, the engagement hypothesis (Ireland et al., 2011) suggests that 
trust as defined by cognitive and affective processes might be more appropriate. 
Cognition-based trust refers to expectations about individual’s or group’s 
competencies and responsibilities; and affect-based trust refers to expectations about 
the extent to which the individual or group expresses care and concern for the welfare 
of the trustor (McAllister, 1995). Based on the findings reported here, together with 
Ireland’s engagement hypothesis, we may argue that LSM and positive emotion 
influences a form of affect-based trust, but not cognition-based trust.  As stated, the 
relevance of LSM, reflecting engagement, in a relational phase is that it acts as a 
reliable trust signal for engagement in the relational needs of the group; intuitively, 
such a signal is based on care and concern for the group (affective based trust), as 
opposed to communicating reliability (cognitive based trust). 
Similarly trust intentions were measured in relation to reliance on another 
(Mayer & Davis, 1999). However, the trust behaviour (performance on the group 
task) relied on intentions of disclosure, as well as reliance (Gillespie, 2003). Trust 
behaviour was performance on the task, which required groups to disclose 
information honestly and openly, to encourage mutual sharing of information.  This 
was critical to success on the task. Such behaviour, in addition to an individual’s 
willingness to rely on others information, was the proxy to our behavioural trust 
measure. Hence, the value of utilizing a trust intention measure that accounts for 
disclosure, as well as reliance, intentions.  
The direction of effects between language and trust are not conclusive, as is 
the case in most communication research (Richardson, Taylor, Snook, Conchie, & 
Bennell, 2014). Whilst some position language mechanisms as a predictor of social 
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outcomes (Pickering and Garrod, 2004), others contend that individual goals cause 
changes in language behaviour (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 
2008).  A third possibility is that language and social outcomes are bidirectionally 
linked.  Niederhoffer and Pennebaker (2002) suspected that LSM and engagement 
reciprocally increased to facilitate positive relationship outcomes in their dyadic 
relationship studies.  In a similar way, language mechanisms such as LSM and 
positive emotion might reciprocally increase with trust to facilitate greater 
performance.  Whilst the study in Chapter 3 shed light on the direction of effects 
between language and trust by manipulating trust itself, future research might 
consider directly manipulating language to further understanding of the direction of 
effects between the two. 
4.4.4. Conclusion 
Communication theorists have long emphasised the role of context in 
establishing meaning of utterances. The present study is the first to take up this 
proposition in the domain of how context might shape the impact of specific language 
styles on trust within online groups.  Specifically, it showed that LSM is important in 
relational phases of group development, whereas positive emotion (in the absence of 
previous high LSM in a relational phase) is important in task and resolution phases of 
group development. This was accounted for in a novel theoretical framework 
explaining the link between language and trust in online groups, called The Relevant 
and Reliable Language Theory. The exact trust components through which trust 
behaviour is impacted was unclear, given that none of the psychometric measures 
related to language. It was speculated that affective trust measures and disclosure trust 
intention measures could be better suited to tap the exact trust components through 
which language effects trust. An open question regarding whether language effects 
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trust, trust effects language, or the relationship is bidirectional persisted.  This is an 
area for future research.  
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5. Chapter 5: Disrupting Two Language Paths to Trust in Online Groups 
The study in the present chapter will test the assumptions of the theoretical 
framework, The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory, to offer further support for 
the context dependent role of LSM and positive emotion to trust development.  In 
addition, the study will make headway in disentangling the causal role of language in 
trust formation from the role of language reflecting trust.  Specifically, the study will 
manipulate the language of a group to see its effects on trust.  Constructing groups 
containing a single confederate will do this. The confederate will implement phase 
dependent manipulations on each language variable.  That is to say that, LSM and 
positive emotion will be disrupted during the phases were said language is thought to 
be most crucial to trust development according to the assumptions of The Relevant 
and Reliable Language Theory (LSM in the relational phase and positive emotion in 
the task phase).  Forty-four groups were studied.  A confederate was successful in 
disrupting LSM and positive emotion during the planned phases. Effects of disruption 
confirmed the importance of LSM in a relational phase, and positive emotion in a task 
phase, for trust formation. 
5.1. From Language to Trust 
Trust theory, and empirical findings, have demonstrated that the relationship 
between trust warranting properties (such as demonstrations of benevolence) and 
trust, flow from the former to the latter (see chapter 1).  However, when language is 
the ‘trust warranting property’ in question – the direction of the relationship between 
language and social outcomes, including trust, is more difficult to ‘pin down’. 
One perspective professors the importance of language in shaping social 
dynamics. First, within communication literature it is generally accepted that positive 
social dynamics emanate from communication styles such as mimicry, including 
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increased liking, rapport, communication efficiency and relationship stability 
(Chartrand & Van Baaren, 2009; Giles & Coupland, 1991; Ireland & Pennebaker, 
2010; Ireland, Slatcher, Eastwick, Scissors, Finkel & Pennebaker, 2011; Pickering & 
Garrod, 2006).  Second, there is much evidence implicating the positive social 
dynamics emanating form positive language, including team performance and trust 
(Crisp & Jarvenpaa, 2013; Fischer, McDonnell, & Orasanu, 2007; Wilson, Straus, & 
McEvily, 2006).   
One study that directly examined causality through direct manipulation of 
language suggests that language leads to social outcomes (Swaab, Maddux, & 
Sinaceur, 2011). In this study, participant instructions were manipulated such that 
individuals actively mimicked the interlocutor’s language characteristics.  The result 
was greater gain in a negotiation task and increased trust when mimicry occurred in 
the early phase of the interaction.  Hence demonstrating support for the idea that 
language – at least in part – plays a causal role in trust formation. 
On the other hand, researchers have acknowledged both directions of effects. 
For example, Fischer et al. (2007), in their analysis of computer simulated search and 
rescue missions, acknowledged that positive emotion word use could have been the 
result of task success or one of the prerequisites for successful performance. The 
authors note the fact that providing encouragement was a response to failure as well 
as success. Such findings illuminate the possibility of language and social outcomes 
linked in a bidirectional fashion. For example, language variables such as LSM and 
positive emotion might reciprocally increase to facilitate positive relationship 
outcomes (Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002).  
Clearly, the classic view that trust warranting properties lead to trust is 
complicated when language is the trust warranting property in question. Therefore, an 
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interesting extension of previous findings in the present thesis was to determine the 
effect of a direct manipulation of language on trust.  If, by systematically 
manipulating LSM in an initial relational phase and positive emotion in a subsequent 
task phase, direct effects on trust are observed, this will provide direct support for a 
causal link between language and trust.  If, on the other hand, a manipulation does not 
effect trust; the limit of the current language measure could be found at the level of 
being useful to reflect trust, without existing as a metric which can produce 
systematic effects on trust when language is altered at will. 
5.2. Manipulating language 
The first challenge of the present study was to devise a strategy to manipulate 
language. Tausczik and Pennebaker (2013) noted that group research has historically 
manipulated inputs to a group (e.g., group composition), rather than communication 
itself, for the reason that is has been experimentally difficult to directly manipulate 
group communication.  However, some attempts at manipulating language have been 
made. Research has shown that by implanting a confederate, or by giving an incognito 
participant instruction to use certain language with increased frequency (i.e. positive 
affect language), communication can be systematically changed (Swaab et al., 2011; 
Van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & Van Knippenberg, 2003).   
Confederate or participant instruction techniques to manipulate language rely 
on human’s to consciously alter their language use. This is difficult to implement in 
the context of LSM, as increasing language on this measure would require a 
participant to attend to, and produce, nine categories of function words on an 
utterance-by-utterance bases. This is made more complex when studying groups 
because a confederate or participant would be required to attend to and replicate such 
words from multiple group members.  
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Tausczik and Pennebaker (2013) note that attempts to increase certain 
communication styles often have the opposite effect, and in fact disrupt a group’s 
natural language dynamics. The implication of these findings was that disrupting 
language behaviour, rather than facilitating it, could be a more viable means to 
manipulate language, i.e. by an individual deliberately reducing, rather than 
increasing, production of certain word categories.  At a practical level, this would be 
easier to implement successfully as an individual could use the same strategy (i.e. 
reducing word production) for multiple group interactions, rarther than attending to 
the unique linguistic style per group. In addition, a disruption technique would 
produce the same desired experimental conditions as if a confederate had facilitated 
certain language behaviours, that is; a high or low language behaviour group, e.g. a 
high LSM group (control) and low LSM group (disruption).  
Research suggests that linguistic matching effects occur largely at the level of 
adjacent utterances (Branigan, Pickering, Stewart, & McLean, 2000). Studies using 
specifically LSM as the metric for matching have supported this view (Richardson et 
al., 2014; Taylor & Thomas, 2008).  In the present study, a confederate would reduce 
their production of function words, in turn reducing the opportunities for group 
member’s to match linguistic style in adjacent utterances. Thus, the disruption would 
theoretically create a ‘stutter’ in the natural turn-by-turn matching process; thereby 
negatively impacting group level LSM. 
Group level positive emotion would be disrupted by the confederate lowering 
his production of positive emotion words in group discussions. This strategy was 
informed by research exploring antecedents of online positive emotion expressions. 
Kramer (2012) found that on the social network ‘facebook’, individuals’ positive 
emotion expressions, through status updates, primed positive emotion expressions 
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amongst users in people’s social network.  Crucially, contagion of emotion words was 
‘valance’ specific (i.e., greater negative emotion increased negative emotion, but did 
not decrease positive emotion).  Similarly, Hancock, Gee, Ciaccio, and Lin (2008) 
found evidence for valence specific emotion contagion. After inducing a sad state, 
they found that participants increased their production of negative emotion words but 
there was no effect on participant’s use of positive emotion words. These studies 
suggest that in order to decrease positive emotion word use, manipulations should rest 
specifically on positive emotion language changes, not affective language changes per 
se.  Hence, the above research led to a hypothesis that a disruption of the language 
behaviours LSM and positive emotion could be successful. 
H1: In a condition designed to lower LSM; LSM will be lower than a control 
condition.  In a condition designed to lower positive emotion; positive emotion 
will be lower than in a control condition. 
The results of Study 3 showed that different language categories were 
important to trust at different phases of group development.  This lead to the 
theoretical framework The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory, which would 
suggest that, firstly; greater levels of LSM affected trust when it was present in a 
relational phase and secondly; greater levels of positive emotion affected trust in a 
task-orientated phase, but only when LSM had been low in an earlier relational 
orientated phase.  Therefore this could be tested by disrupting LSM in a relational 
phase, and positive emotion in a task phase, which would represent a ‘strong 
disruption,’ such that the disruption that would have the most detrimental effect on 
trust. In contrast, a ‘weak disruption’ (which was not confounded by number of 
disruptions to a group per se) would be one in which LSM is disrupted in the task 
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phase, and positive emotion is disrupted in the relational phase. Hence the following 
hypothesis. 
H2: Disruption condition (strong versus weak) will affect trust behaviour such 
that the strong disruption condition will produce lower trust behaviour than the 
weak disruption condition.  Phase dependent effects of LSM, and positive 
emotion will be responsible for the effect. 
5.3. Trust beliefs and intentions 
In the previous study, language failed to have a significant effect on any of the 
trust belief or intention measures. In line with engagement theory (Ireland, 2011), it 
was suggested that this might be due to these measures being taken at the wrong level. 
That is, beliefs were measured in relation to the qualities of ability, integrity and 
benevolence, whereas a more appropriate approach may have been to measure them at 
the cognitive and affective level (McAllister, 1995). Moreover, intentions were 
measured in relation to reliance, with no regard for intentions to disclose.   This is a 
problem because, as discussed in Chapter 4, LSM was thought to impact affective 
trust, by showing care for the group in a relational stage, and affective trust has been 
shown to predict disclosure intentions more closely than reliance intentions (McEvily 
& Tortoriello, 2011). 
To address this in the current study, trust beliefs were measured using 
McAllister’s (1995) affective trust scale, which was contained within the affective 
and cognitive trust beliefs scale. Trust intentions were also changed to measure both 
reliance and disclosure (Gillespie, 2003).  Given the reasons previously stated 
affective trust and disclosure intention scales, contained within each measure, were 
the main variables of interest.  
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The present study aimed to test the role of trust beliefs and trust intentions as 
mediators in the relationship between language variables and trust behaviour. As 
previously stated, LSM was said to effect trust via a path of affective trust.  Hence, 
there were reasons to believe that measures of ‘affective based trust’ would emerge as 
stronger mediators of any language effects on trust than ‘cognitive based measures’.  
Our measures of trust beliefs were divided into affective and cognitive; hence it was 
predicted that the affective trust belief measure would be a significant mediator. 
Whilst our trust intention measures was divided into reliance and disclosure 
intentions; only the latter is said to be predicted by affective trust beliefs; hence it was 
predicted that disclosure intentions would be a second significant mediator. Based on 
the above reasoning the following hypothesis was proposed. 
H3: Affective trust beliefs and disclosure intentions will mediate the effect of 
manipulation and phase dependent language variables on trust behaviour; such 
that the effect of the strong disruption, and the resulting effects on LSM and 
positive emotion, will be decreased affective trust beliefs and decreased trust 
disclosure intentions. 
Figure 5.1 shows the conceptual model tested in the present study. The model 
builds on the model in the previous chapter. As in the previous model, language is 
thought to affect trust variables differently depending on the phase of the interaction 
in which it occurs. However, rather than naturally occurring language, manipulated 
high and low levels of LSM and positive emotion are represented and positioned to 
hold causal paths to trust beliefs, intentions and behaviour. Affective trust beliefs and 
disclosure trust intentions are represented in bold, while cognitive trust beliefs and 
reliance trust intentions are italicized. This was to represent stronger causal paths 





Figure 5.1 Schematic representation of a conceptual model linking the experimentally 
manipulated language of a group to an individual’s trust beliefs, trust intentions and 
trust behaviour including the effect of phase of group development. 
variables. As in previous models trust propensity is modeled to affect trust prior to 
participants interaction in the study. 
5.4. Method 
5.4.1. Participants  
Participants were 167 students who made up 44 groups of 3 to 5 genuine 
participants (each group included a confederate).  Participants were from a UK 
University in the North West of England.  Participants were invited to an online two-
part study.  Participant drop out meant that while 167 participants started the study, 
155 participants completed both meetings, group size never dropped below 3 genuine 
participants (plus a confederate). Fifty-nine participants were male and 108 were 
female. The average age of the sample was 20.24 years (SD = 2.81; Range = 18 – 38 
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yrs). Participants were recruited from different disciplines and year groups.  
Participants took part in the study for course credits or for a cash payment of £7.50.   
5.4.2. Materials 
Hidden Profile Task.  The hidden profile paradigm, as outlined in Chapter 4, 
was used in the current study. Two adaptions were introduced in the current study. 
First, the task was completed over 2, instead of 3, 30-minute meetings.  This was done 
by merging the task phase and resolution phase from chapter 4 into a single phase.  
Therefore distinguishing the interaction based on relational and task, which as the 
interpretation of the study in chapter 4 suggested, was the crucial contextual factor. 
Second, key characters names and details were changed to mitigate the risk of 
participants having heard the solution details from friends who had completed the 
previous study. 
A 5 minute interaction, following the task phase, was permitted for groups to reach a 
conclusion. The confederate did not disrupt this interaction, nor was languagefrom 
this phase entered into the final analysis.  Given that the present study contained one 
less meeting to interact, compared to the study in chapter 4, the additional 5 minutes 
was to ensure groups reached a conclusion. 
Pre-experiment measure. Trust propensity was measured as in the previous 
studies from the thesis using the 5 items (α =.73) taken from the Costa and McCrea 
(1992) in a pre-interaction survey and disguised in items from the IPIP (Goldberg, 
1999). 
Post-experiment measure. Participants’ trust beliefs towards their group was 
measured using seven items adapted from McAllister’s (1998) cognition and affect-
based trust scales. An example cognition-based trust item was “I see no reason to 
doubt the groups competence and preparation for the task” (α =.84). An example 
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affect-based trust item was “We have a sharing relationship. We can freely share our 
ideas, feelings, and hopes” (α =.86). All trust belief items were responded to on a 7-
point likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  
Trust intentions were measured using ten items from Gillespie’s (2003) 
reliance and disclosure scales. An example reliance item was “Rely on your group’s 
task-related skills and abilities” (α =.89). An example disclosure item was “Share 
your personal feelings with your group” (α = .80). All trust intention items were 
responded to on a 7-point likert scale that ranged from not at all willing (1) to 
completely willing (7). All items were adapted to the experimental context, for 
example the disclosure intention item “share your personal feelings with your leader” 
was adapted to “share your personal feelings with your group”.   
5.4.3. Design 
Independent variables. The disruption manipulation, LSM and positive 
emotion word use were predictor variables of trust behavior.  Disruption manipulation 
was a single, dichotomous, between group variable; 22 groups were in the strong 
disruption condition, and 22 groups were in the weak disruption condition.  As in 
chapter 3 and 4, LSM and positive emotion were continuous variables measured at the 
mean group level, and controlling for the individual’s contribution to each score.  
Language variables were measured at both the relational phase and task phase.  Phase 
of interaction therefore formed a within group factor.  Trust belief, and trust intention 
measures were within participant measures taken following the relational phase, and 
once again following the task phase.  
Dependent Variables.  The dependent variable was behavioural trust.  
Behavioural trust was operationalized as an individuals’ performance score, which 
was calculated using the following forumula: 
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Perforamnce = PS + SS + SSE / 3 
Where PS is the primary suspect, SS is the secondary suspect, and SSE is the 
secondary suspects exonerating evidence. Each variable is scored as a binary measure 
(incorrect or correct). This formulation differed slightly from that used in chapter 4, 
which weighted SS and SSE less, because identifying SS was believed to make 
identifying SSE more likely.  In the present study, all variables were weighted 
equally. This was implemented as participants had one less meeting to interact, 
making task completion more difficult.  Hence, the formula above, which produced a 
higher performance average, was favoured in the present study.  
5.4.4. Procedure  
Confederate disruption training and procedure. The aim of the LSM 
disruption training was to devise a workable method for the confederate to reduce his 
production of function words.  The first practical consideration related to the high 
frequency of function words; function words make up an estimated 50% of naturally 
occurring speech across 9 main subcategories of word types (Rochan, Saffran, Berndt, 
& Schwartz, 2000).  In natural speech, function words are also produced none 
consciously (Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002).  Therefore, realistic parameters had 
to be set regarding the number of categories a confederate could consciously attend to 
and reduce in their text chat.  Second, it was important that the confederate’s text chat 
maintained grammatical integrity, so that utterances made sense. Finally, some 
function words are produced at a higher frequency than others, thus suggesting that 
these may be easier to target and thus reduce.  To inform which function word 
categories occurred at high and low frequencies, data from the study in Chapter 4, 
was reviewed. As can be seen in Table 5.1, some function words occurred at a much 
higher frequency than others.  
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Table 5.1 Means and standard deviations for production of function words per person 
during the study in Chapter 4 
Function Words M SD 
Auxiliary Verbs 11.34 3.28 
Personal Pronouns 10.54 3.28 
Prepositions 9.78 3.27 
Indefinite pronouns 6.83 2.75 
Conjunctions 6.34 2.64 
Articles 6.24 2.70 
Common adverbs 5.84  2.49  
Quantifiers 2.67 2.13 
Negations 2.51 1.55 
 
Personal pronouns were function words placed as high priority for disruption. 
First, they were one of the most frequently used words in the previous study. Second, 
sentences expelling personal pronouns still made sense, (e.g., “I think the evidence is 
unclear’ becomes ‘think the evidence is unclear’). Third, personal pronoun use is 
something accessible to conscious awareness such that a confederate may become 
aware of their use and subsequently reduce their occurrence.  
Next to be targeted were auxiliary verbs, indefinite pronouns and Articles. 
Auxiliary verbs occurred with the highest frequency in the previous Study and often 
co-occurred with indefinite pronouns (e.g, ‘it is’ and ‘that is’).  Articles, while 
occurring with less frequency, are relatively easy to identify and control within 
conversation.  
Negations, quantifiers, prepositions, common adverbs and conjunctions were 
not targeted during the online interactions. Removing common adverbs, prepositions 
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and to a lesser extent, conjunctions, affects the grammatical integrity of sentences to 
too greater an extent.  And negations and quantifiers occur infrequently during 
interactions.  
The aim of the positive emotion disruption was to devise a workable method 
for the confederate to reduce his production of positive emotion words.  As LIWC 
provides a dictionary of words that fall under the positive emotion word category, this 
provided material for the basis of the disruption. Given that most words were 
intuitively of positive affect, such as words like ‘good’ and ‘excellent’, it was 
expected that a simple instruction for the confederate to avoid positive affect language 
would be sufficient to lower the language behaviour. 
The confederate practiced disruption by creating sentences in reaction to 
excerpts from past study transcripts of groups discussing the murder mystery task.  
Excerpts contained 4 to 5 lines of text from various group members; on exposure to 
this, the confederate was tasked with creating a language style disruption sentence, 
which maintained topic relevance.  The confederate practiced disrupting LSM and 
positive emotion. With practice the confederate was competent at implementing each 
strategy to disrupt LSM or positive emotion.   
Using the above information and rational, a ‘word crib sheet’ was created of 
the specific word categories to be avoided. A ‘phrase crib sheet’ was also created, 
which listed typical phrases that arose during the relational and task phases in the 
previous study. Typical phrases were tailored for use by the confederate by either 
removing function words or positive emotion words from the expression. 
A protocol was created to ensure that, while altering style, the confederate 
maintained consistent content of utterances wherever possible.  This was particularly 
relevant to relational issues, where variance in the confederate’s disclosure of 
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personal biography or personality traits might introduce unwanted variance to 
perceived trustworthiness.  Therefore the confederate was given a consistent profile of 
generic strengths, weaknesses and previous experiences. These could easily be 
expressed in either disruption condition.  For example, “I’m a great problem solver” 
became “One of my strengths is problem solving” (positive emotion disruption) or 
“One strength, great problem solver” (LSM disruption). A similar strategy was 
implemented for the confederate disclosing task information.  The confederate was 
given consistent information regarding the mystery, none of which actually contained 
any ‘critical information’, as to not affect the success of the group.  The confederate 
always disclosed all of their information. For other parts of the task, the confederate 
maintained a passive and agreeable role, and reacted to decisions and followed 
discussion topics nominated by others.   
Study Procedure. A study advert was circulated to potential participants 
around Lancaster University.  The advert was circulated by contacting various 
university departments and society administration staff.  The advert was also posted 
on an online study system for first year psychology students, participating for course 
credit.  In addition, a research associate staffed an advertising stand in various 
locations on the university campus; in addition to the available advertising materials, 
participants could learn about the study and ask questions directly to the research 
associate before stating an interest in taking part.  Those interested in taking part were 
contacted via email.  Participants were then directed to a web portal, which provided 
the participant information sheet, and consent form, once participants had read the 
participant information sheet and signed the consent form they were asked to 
complete a pre-interaction questionnaire.   
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Participants were sorted into groups of 5.  This was done strategically to avoid 
participants who knew one another signing up together. Specifically, groups 
comprised participants who signed up at different times, from different colleges / 
courses, and who stated different responses to the question “where did you hear about 
this study?” Participants were then invited, via email, to participate at the two meeting 
times selected for their particular group.   
The procedure for participants during trials remained the same as in the study 
in chapter 4.  Researcher instructions and prompts were replicated.  The prize money 
incentive was again £25. Finally, participants were debriefed following the post 
interaction questionnaire as before. The only difference was that participants attended 
two instead of three meetings.   
5.5. Results  
Table 5.2 shows means and standard deviations for all trust measures at both 
phases of group development. The descriptive statistics indicate that psychometric 
trust measure scores were consistent across the relational and task phases. 
5.5.1. Hypothesis testing.  
To test hypothesis 1, two mixed ANOVA’s were carried out. The results 
showed a significant disruption by phase interaction effect on LSM, F1,84 =67.40, p < 
.001, and Positive emotion, F1,84 =35.26, p < .001.  Table 5.3 shows low LSM in two 
phases where LSM was disrupted (Strong disruption condition, relational phase & 
weak disruption condition, task phase) and low positive emotion in the two phases 
where positive emotion was disrupted (Strong disruption condition, task phase & 





Table 5.2 Means and standard deviations for trust measures in each phase. 
 Pre-Interaction Relational Task 
 M  SD M SD M SD 
Trust propensity 16.25 3.23 - - - - 
Affective trust - - 15.09 5.27 15.08 5.33 
Cognitive trust - - 14.90 3.63 14.17 4.21 
Disclosure intention - - 19.47 6.29 19.28 6.04 
Reliance intention - - 23.28 5.70 22.54 6.23 
Trust behaviour - - - - 0.40 0.18 
Note: There were 4 cases of missing responses at the relational activity phase. Decrease in N between 
the relational activity and task activity phase reflected participant drop out (e.g., groups of 6 decreasing 
to groups of 4).  Trust propensity: N = 167. Affective trust, cognitive trust, disclosure intentions and 
reliance intentions: N = 163 (relational), N = 155 (task). Trust behaviour: N = 155.  
 
Table 5.3 Means and standard deviations for LSM and positive emotion in each phase 
and each experimental condition. 
 Relational Task 
 M SD M SD 
Strong disruption LSM 0.71 0.06 0.83 0.05 
Weak disruption LSM 0.81 0.05 0.75 0.04 
Strong disruption positive emotion 8.76 2.16 2.02 0.81 
Weak disruption positive emotion 6.00 1.50 2.88 0.77 
 Note: LSM and positive emotion: N = 167 (relational), N = 155 (task). 
To test Hypothesis 2, a LME model with disruption condition, LSM, positive 
emotion and phase as fixed effects (plus their interaction terms) was modelled. 
Individual trust propensity and group level random effects were entered as in chapters 
3 and 4. Parameter estimates indicated significant main and interaction effects of 
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disruption condition (β = -5.49, p = 0.04, two-tailed); the disruption condition 
interacting with LSM with positive emotion (β = -1.00, p = 0.02, two-tailed); as well 
as its lower order disruption condition with LSM (β = 6.98, p = 0.04, two-tailed) and 
disruption condition with positive emotion interactions (β = 0.78, p = 0.03, two-
tailed).  The interactions suggest that the disruption condition effected trust behaviour 
via LSM and positive emotion. Least square means indicated lower trust behaivour in 
the strong disruption condition as compared to the weak disruption condition, 
supporting Hypothesis 2, results are reported in Table 5.4. 
Next, the significant interaction between disruption condition, LSM and 
positive emotion, which predicted trust behaviour, was explored.  To do so, two LME 
models tested relationships between predictor variables and trust behaviour at each 
level of the disruption condition.  LSM, positive emotion and phase were predictor 
variables and random effects were entered as before.  It was expected that in the weak 
disruption condition, LSM, positive emotion, and phase would interact to predict trust 
behaviour (as in the study in chapter 4), however this effect will have been absent in 
the strong disruption condition, thus explaining lower trust behaviour.  There was 
partial support for this, as the LSM, positive emotion and phase interaction was a 
none significant predictor for the strong disruption condition; whilst the same 
interaction approached significance for the weak disruption condition (β = 1.45, p = 
0.06, one-tailed). 
Lower order significant main effects of LSM (β = 6.57, p = 0.01, one-tailed) 
and positive emotion (β = 0.78, p < 0.01, one-tailed) on trust behaviour, subsumed by 













Strong 0.25 0.10 243 2.58 0.06 0.45 <0.01 
Weak 0.34 0.08 170 4.29 0.18 0.49 <0.001 
 
The effects presumably operated such that LSM positively predicted trust 
behaviour in the relational phase, and positive emotion positively predicted trust 
behaviour in the task phase. This can be assumed given that in this weak disruption 
condition; high LSM was prevented in the task phase, and high positive emotion was 
prevented in the relational phase.  
Hypothesis 3 proposed that language, interacting with disruption condition 
and Phase, impacted trust behaviour via affective based trust beliefs or disclosure trust 
intention but not cognitive based trust beliefs or reliance intention.  A series of models 
explored this possibility, each entered random effects as before. The first model tested 
which trust beliefs and / or intentions predicted trust behaviour.  Trust beliefs 
(affective and cognitive) and intentions (disclosure and reliance) interacting with 
phase were modelled as predictors of trust behaviour. Affective trust interacting with 
phase was the only predictor of trust behaviour that approached significance (β = -
0.07, p = 0.03, one-tailed). 
Next, a model tested if LSM, positive emotion, phase and disruption condition 
would interact to predict affective trust. A four way significant interaction indicated 
that LSM and positive emotion were affecting affective trust in different ways at 




Finally, a model including affective trust interacting with phase, and the 
original predictors from testing hypothesis 2 (disruption condition, LSM, Postive 
emotion), was modelled to predict trust behaviour.  Random effects were added as 
before. As in the original model which tested hypothesis 2, LSM, condition and 
positive emotion interacted to predict trust behaviour (β = -1.05, p = 0.02, two-tailed).  
In addition the affective trust and phase interaction significantly predicted trust 
behaviour (β =-0.05, p = 0.04).  Thus, the models offered some support for indirect 
effects of disruption and language variables on trust beahvour, via affective trust 
beleifs. 
5.6. Discussion 
The current study aimed to manipulate language to provide further evidence 
for the group phase dependent effect of LSM and Positive emotion on trust behaviour 
in line with The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory. The results indicated that 
group language variables could be manipulated via a strategy of confederate 
disruption.  A novel strategy, which placed a single confederate in each group who 
strategically moderated their own language style, was successful in lowering LSM 
and positive emotion. The results also showed support for a causal relationship 
between language and trust behaviour. The manipulation produced less trust 
behaviour in the strong disruption condition compared to the weak disruption 
condition.  Finally, evidence was found that LSM in the relational phase may have 
influenced trust behaviour via an indirect effect of individual’s affective based trust 
beliefs. 
The present study demonstrated the value of disruption to manipulate group 
language variables. Previous work has demonstrated the value of positive language 
manipulations (e.g., through strategic verbal and none verbal mimicry [Swaab et al., 
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2011;Van Swol, 2003]), however, in group contexts such positive manipulations were 
said to be difficult to induce (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2013), thus the present strategy 
offers an alternative language manipulation.   
It is noteworthy that a single confederate in a group of up to 5 genuine 
participants was able to influence group language and group trust.  The success of the 
positive emotion manipulation supported the role of contagion (Kramer, 2012) as a 
powerful process in which a norm of positive emotion word use is established.  
Similarly, the LSM manipulation suggested that misalignment could have strong 
negative effects on LSM.  Felps, Mitchell and Byington (2006) described ‘bad apple’ 
behavior, whereby one individual in a group produces negative interpersonal 
behaviours, which were found to consume ‘inordinate’ time, psychological resources, 
and emotional energy in groups.  Then, it is perhaps then unsurprising that a single 
individual’s language style can hold group wide effects.  In conclusion, disruption via 
a single confederate altering his language style is offered as a useful and effective tool 
for manipulating language. 
It is argued that the reason for lower levels of trust observed in the strong 
disruption condition was due to the absence of the reliable and relevant processes, 
which were proposed to underlie trust formation in online groups.  That is to say that, 
an absence of LSM in the relational phase communicated an absence of engagement 
in the relational needs of the group.  Therefore, less willingness to form attachments 
and less caring was communicated.  The strong disruption also created an absence of 
positive emotion in the task phase.  This absence occurred at a time when participants 
presumably were still searching for trust relevant information, given that their 
expectations of trust were not met in the relational phase, due to the LSM disruption.  
Hence, group members experienced a lack of perceived support at the task phase, and 
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the latent path to trust, via positive emotion word use, was not possible.  In essence, 
the opposite of the positive effects of relational LSM and task positive emotion 
(shown in chapter 4) are found when each process is disrupted.  It follows that if 
language was merely a reflection of trust, such effects would not be observed.  
However, this was not the case in the present findings, thus offering support for the 
argument that trust formation occurs via the causal role of relevant and reliable 
language processes. 
Evidence was found for affective trust acting as a mediating variable between 
language and trust behaviour. This supported the theoretical position that affective 
trust may underlie trust formation specifically built on language mechanisms.  LSM 
effects are proposed to rest on communicating engagement in the relational needs of 
the group, whilst positive emotion in the task phase communicates group support.  
Intuitively, it follows that such effects would impact affective trust, which McAllister 
(1995) stated emerge through attachments and caring actions. In line with Ajzen’s 
(1988) principle of comparability, affective trust may be at the same level of 
specificity to our language effects.  That is, the language mechanisms that affect trust 
are most closely conceptualized by the individual as reflecting ‘affective trust’, as self 
reported by participants.  Suggesting that other measures such as cognitive based 
trust, disclosure intention, or reliance intention are not at the same level of specificity 
to the language effects. In online contexts, such as in virtual groups, with relational 
and task phases, affective trust is offered as a possible mechanism through which 
language communicates trust.   
The role of affective trust provides evidence for the ‘engagement’ 
interpretation of LSM effects, addressing the counter ‘temporal order’ interpretation 
proposed by Swaab et al. (2011).  The temporal order interpretation proposed that 
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early mimicry effects on trust behaviour are owing to its early temporal position 
which colours the rest of the interaction with trust; and did not discriminate between 
this trust being cognitive or affective based. Conversely, the engagement 
interpretation proposed that mimicry (LSM) effects on trust behaviour are owing to 
demonstrating engagement in the relational needs of the group; and so would 
influence only affective based trust. Hence, the indirect effect of affective trust, and 
lack of indirect effect of cognitive based trust, provided evidence for the latter 
interpretation. 
5.6.1. Limitations and future research  
One limitation of the present study exists in the difficulty of interpreting a 
four-way interaction. Whilst the interaction, and lower order interactions of the four 
way interaction, supported hypotheses and were interpreted as such, a study by 
Halford, Baker, McCredden & Bain (2005) found that human interpretation of a four 
way interaction, relative to a three way interaction, significantly increases in error. 
The same study suggested that a four-way interaction is at the limit of even an 
experienced researcher's processing ability, and therefore a note of caution is 
necessary with regard to the interpretation in the present study. 
While it was shown that language affected trust, it is unclear to what extent 
this effect was reciprocal; i.e. to what extent trust, in turn, affected language.  The 
study in chapter 3, by utilizing a trust prime, demonstrated that the relationship 
between language and trust could operate this way.  Although it was not the aim of 
the present study, to test for reciprocal effects between language and trust, future 
research might extend the present findings to investigate this.  
The generalizability of the results to different group compositions is not 
certain.  Firstly, the current study showed how language functions in a relatively 
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stable group that meets over a short period of time.  However, it is unclear how trust 
functions for groups whose internal structure changes (e.g. group members joining 
and leaving the group).  Felps et al. (2006) found that shared group experiences, as 
well as group members leaving and entering groups affected trust.  Replication of the 
present findings in groups of a less stable composition would be useful. 
Finally, the present research considered groups where task and relational 
orientation made up equal parts of the group’s life cycle.  However, it is possible 
some online groups persist as either task dominated or relational dominated.  In line 
with the present Relevant and Reliable Language Theory, language mechanisms that 
predict trust would be expected to replicate.  That is to say that, positive emotion or 
LSM would become more heavily weighted in determining the level of trust in a 
group depending on whether the group was more task or relational orientated, 
respectively.   
5.6.2. Conclusion 
The present study offered a novel means to extend the findings that LSM and 
positive emotion have phase dependent effects on trust via disruption of those 
language processes themselves. A causal relationship to trust emanating from LSM in 
a relational phase, and positive emotion in a task phase was found.  In addition, the 
results implicated that it is through affective trust through which these particular 
language mechanisms influence trust behaviours. Further evidence is provided for 
The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory underlying trust formation for online 
groups; shedding further light on how trust formation occurs in online domains.   
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6. Chapter 6. Using Language to Measure Trust in a Criminal Virtual 
Community 
Research thus far has considered the relationship between language and trust 
for online groups in laboratory-based experiments. Significant relationships have been 
established, namely that reliable and relevant language, in the form of either LSM or 
positive emotion word use, facilitate and reflect trust formation in online groups.  
Such relationships have not yet been explored in naturally occurring online groups.  
Similarly, nor have these relationships been explored in ‘criminal’ online groups (a 
research area where the language trust link is thought to be particularly applicable). 
The present study sought to establish the extent to which previous findings can be 
generalized to online group interactions, outside of the laboratory setting.  
6.1. Overview of Virtual Communities 
One type of online group interaction is participation in online communities; 
also known as virtual communities, or VC’s.  VC’s are large groups of internet uses 
who share common interests or resources (Preece & Maloney-Krichmar, 2003). VC’s 
communicate largely through message boards, sometimes called forums or online 
discussion boards, where subtopics are created, and then commented upon and 
discussed by group members; subtopics and comments are visible to all group 
members (Holtz, Kronberger, & Wagner, 2012). VC’s are different to virtual teams in 
that they consist of a larger volume of group members, in addition they emerge 
naturally as people are attracted to the community by a common interest or hobby, 
whereas virtual teams are usually centered around a task orientated, organizational, 
goal (Ridings, Gefen, & Arinze, 2002).  Given the differences of virtual teams to 
virtual communities, there is further need to consider how the present theory of how 
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trust and language are related in online groups transfers to this type of online group 
communication. 
6.2. Trust Matters in Virtual Communities 
There are good reasons to believe that trust is important to the functioning of 
virtual communities.  Indirect evidence for this comes for the fact that there are 
numerous similarities between virtual teams and virtual communities, and the 
importance of trust in virtual teams has been extensively documented (for review, see 
Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 2004).  Virtual community members do not previously 
know each other, lack face-to-face contact, and are dispersed by space and time 
(Riding et al., 2002). As stated by Wilson, Straus, and McEvily (2006), it is these 
qualities in virtual teams which make trust both difficult to achieve and important.  
However, VC’s also differ to virtual teams. Interaction in VC’s is between a larger 
volume of group members, and there are less explicit rules compared to virtual teams, 
which usually have a prescribed structure in line with wider organizational culture 
(Riding et al., 2002).  These qualities of VC’s might make the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior and deception more likely, as has been exemplified in a 
number of high profile breaches of trust in virtual communities (see Birchmeier, 
Joinson, & Dietz-Uhler, 2005; Joinson & Dietz-Uhler, 2002). Hence, there is 
evidence to suggest that the importance of trust in the functioning of VC’s is, at the 
very least, equal to that in virtual teams.  
There is also direct empirical evidence to support the importance of trust in 
VC’s.  Riding et al. (2002) found that individual’s trust propensity and perceived 
ability, benevolence and integrity, predicted engagement, i.e. the desire to exchange 
and get information from the VC. The authors noted that in VC’s, a ‘special kind of 
trust’ between an individual and a large community sometimes emerges, which 
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eventually leads to positive outcomes to the community as a whole.  Hence, there is 
evidence to suggest that the functioning of VC’s is – at least in part – dependent upon 
group member’s trust in the community. 
6.3. Trust Matters in Criminal Groups 
In organized crime literature it has become a truism to say that what holds 
organized criminals together is trust (Von Lampe & Johansen, 2004).  Trust becomes 
critical in criminal interaction because many of the institutional safe guards designed 
to compensate for the consequences of deceit and betrayal, are unavailable for group 
members operating illegally.  Also, with the threat of law enforcement intervention 
and criminal sanctions, the consequences of disloyal behavior are likely to be more 
severe than those to be expected in the legal sphere of society, hence there is greater 
risk and greater trust required for criminals to operate (McCarthy, Hagan, & Cohen, 
1998). Researches have argued that this is especially true of criminal groups that exist 
online due to the additional risks of opportunistic behaviour that comes with online 
interactions in general (Benjamin, & Chen, 2012; Wilson et al. 2006). Hence, it is 
proposed that in the criminal online discussions analysed in the present study, the role 
of trust is at least no less important than in non-criminal groups previously studied, 
and indeed could be a more salient construct. 
6.4. Language Matters in Virtual Communities 
Language analysis appears as a useful tool to reveal social dynamics in VC’s. 
For example, language analysis has been used to determine which individuals in VC’s 
could be considered ‘non-leaders’, as revealed by their tendency to mimic others 
(Jones, Cotterill, Dewdney, Muir & Joinson, 2014). It has also been found that virtual 
community size and density predicts language similarity (Huffaker, 2011). Finally, 
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research has shown that harassment in virtual communities might be characterized by 
elevated use of pronouns in messages (Yin, Xue, Hong, Davison, Kontostathis, & 
Edwards, 2009). The various findings relating to language in VC’s is perhaps 
unsurprising; given that, in the absence of non-verbal communication, language is the 
main currency of interaction. It is reasonable to expect, and has thus far been 
supported, that language plays a critical role in the social dynamics of these online 
communities. Therefore it is also reasonable to expect, given that trust is an important 
construct in VC’s, that language will also play a critical role in determining the level 
of trust in such groups. 
6.5. The Present Study 
The present study sought a criminal VC, with varying levels of trust occurring 
over the group’s life cycle, as subject matter for a natural experiment to examine how 
the language behaviors within the group might change as the level of trust fluctuates.  
The present study acquired such data from the UK police.   The VC was a group of 
credit card fraudsters, which had been attacked by UK police at a specific time.  The 
attack, which made group members aware that the UK police had access to the 
group’s discussions and confidential information, was thought to undermine group 
trust. Given the role of language and trust in VC’s, which hypothetically operate in a 
similar way to trust in virtual teams, a number of predictions with regard to how the 
group’s language would change, in reaction to the trust disruption, were made. 
Therefore the present study examined the ebb and flow of trust, and the language that 





Authors have considered salient possible trust disruptions specific to VC’s.  
For example, Riding et al. (2002) lists two salient risks to trust in VC’s.  Firstly, that 
one’s personal details, such as email and IP address, could be revealed to third parties 
without consent.  Secondly, that ‘opportunistic individuals’ within the group, could be 
operating under a covert identity. In the case of the VC used for the analysis in the 
present study, it was known that the disruption ot trust both a) revealed the insecurity 
of personal details and b) highlighted the possibility of UK police operating as covert 
group members.  Thus, exemplifying both the common trust breaches detailed by 
Riding et al. (2002).  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the efforts of UK police 
in the present group studied constituted a ‘classic’ VC trust disruption and 
successfully reduced trust. 
The first research question was; would the language behavior of group 
members significantly change, in the short term, following a trust disruption? It was 
hypothesized that trust will be lower in the phase following the attack to the present 
VC.  Therefore, it is expected that language indicators of trust, such as LSM and 
positive emotion, will be lower as compared to phases prior to the disruption. Hence: 
H1: Language behaviors, which facilitate and reflect trust (i.e. LSM and 
positive emotion), will be lower in the short term following the disruption to 
trust. 
The second research question was, would there be a long-term effect of the 
disruption to trust, and would this be reflected in the language of the group? Groups 
are able to continue to exist for long durations following a trust disruption via 
utilizing mechanisms of  ‘trust repair’ (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). However, it is 
unclear what this ‘repaired’ level of trust looks like conceptually. For example, Dirks, 
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Lewicki and Zaheer, (2009) (and later, in a similar review; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010) 
proposed three possible interpretations of ‘repaired trust’; one possibility is that trust 
might be repaired to an acceptable level; however, negative visible signs of the 
previous disruption persist.  Alternatively, trust might be ‘restored’ rather than 
repaired, where the group bears no visible signs of damage.  Finally, repaired trust 
might be qualitatively different to ‘pristine’ trust. That is to say that, trust that has 
been repaired in some way might be more durable, vigilant, wise and less susceptible 
to further disruption.   
None of the studies in either Dirks et al. (2009) or Kramer and Lewicki’s 
(2010) recent reviews included a measure of pre-violation, post-violation, and post-
repair trust levels. However, by operationalising a long-term pre-repair phase, distinct 
from the violation phase and long term post-violation phase; the present research was 
novel in being able to examine the precise and relative state of ‘repaired trust’. The 
level of trust in this phase would be compared to the long-term pre-violation phase, 
via language measures, to determine if repaired trust is less than, equal to, or greater 
than pre-violation trust levels. Thus, a non-directional hypothesis was proposed; that 
trust levels in the long-term post violation phase would be different to those in the 
long-term pre-violation phase. 
H2: Trust levels in the long-term post-violation phase would differ to those in 
the long-term pre-violation phase. 
The third research question asked was, does language behavior function to 
recover trust following the effect of a disruption? Following a trust disruption trust 
must be restored to an acceptable level for individuals to continue to interact; 
otherwise the relationship is likely terminated (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). 
Therefore, the result of violated trust, if the relationship is not terminated, is the need 
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to repair trust (Kim et al., 2009). There is evidence to suggest that this repair process 
occurs through the language behaviors of the parties involved. For instance, numerous 
authors have considered explicit language mechanisms of trust repair, such as 
transgressors apologizing for trust violations, denying them, or making promises to 
influence future expectations (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, 
Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006).  However, the 
consideration of language as a mechanism to repair trust has not yet been extended to 
language style. 
There is evidence to suggest that language style, that is to say how information 
is communicated in addition to what is communicated, could be important in trust 
repair. For example, the affective valence of language has been proposed to affect 
trust repair. Dirks et al. (2009) argued that restoring positive exchanges is the primary 
goal of trust repair, proposing that one important facet in repairing trust is the 
targeting of affective damage itself.  Similarly, Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) 
proposed that managing emotions is as important as managing cognitions in repairing 
trust.  Based on Weiner’s (1986) causal attribution theory, the authors argue that 
reducing emotions such as anger and fear may enable higher perceived levels of 
trustworthiness and trust following a violation. It follows that inciting a positive 
language style could be one way to achieve the emotional foundations necessary to 
repair trust, however such a claim has yet to be empirically tested. 
Next, there is evidence to suggest that demonstrating renewed commitment to 
the group might repair trust. For example Heider (1958) stated that following an 
organizational level failure; trust repairing procedures per se are not sufficient to 
repair trust.  Instead, these mechanisms must be implemented voluntarily by the 
organization, and must imply that the company is intrinsically committed to acting in 
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a new way.  Similarly, Gillespie and Dietz (2009) suggested that companies 
themselves must make new, positive, commitments; in order to repair trust above and 
beyond simple good-willed statements.  In accordance with this, given that LSM 
reflects engagement (Ireland, 2011), increased LSM could communicate the renewed 
commitment that seems to be important to repairing trust.  
In conclusion, the research suggests that in repairing trust, it is not only the 
content of what is communicated which affects the success of repair efforts, but also 
how it is communicated.  Given that positive emotion and LSM are two ways in 
which the ‘how’ of communication varies, it would be expected that an increase in 
each of these variables would facilitate trust repair in the group analysed in the 
present study.  
H3: Following the effect of disruption in the short term (the lowest trust phase 
as indicated by language), LSM and Positive emotion will increase in order to 
facilitate trust repair. 
The final research question asked, which language behaviors best measure 
changes to trust in the VC? As previously discussed, one way that VC’s vary from 
virtual teams, is the content of their focus.  That is to say that, while virtual teams 
tend to be organizational, and focused on completion of a task, VC’s tend to be 
emergent, and focused on discussion of shared hobbies and interests (Riding et al., 
2002).  In this respect, VC’s could be considered as being more relational focused, 
rather than task focused.  
As has been previously argued, the relationship between LSM and trust, and 
positive emotion and trust, is dependent on their relevance and reliability in a given 
context.  That is to say that, in contexts where relational aspects of group dynamics 
are salient; LSM, is a more reliable cue to trust by demonstrating engagement in 
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relational group needs.  Whilst in task phases, LSM is not a reliable cue to trust, 
reflecting engagement in the task rather than group members, and so positive emotion 
word use emerges as a reliable cue to trust, providing it is relevant.  That is to say 
that, providing the group has not established high trust in a previous relational phase. 
In line with this theoretical framework, LSM, rather than positive emotion, should be 
the reliable cue to trust in the present VC data due to the relational nature of the 
interaction.  
H4: LSM will reflect changes in group trust more so than positive emotion 
word use. 
Figure 6.1 shows the conceptual model tested in the present study. The model 
builds on the model from the study in the previous chapter as the relationship between 
trust and language, in a relational phase, is thought to rest entirely on the language 
variable LSM.  Whilst the previous model demonstrated the causal path from 
language to trust, the final model is supplementary in also representing the causal path 
from trust to LSM. The model also depicts the absence of a relationship between trust 
and positive emotion given the relational context of the interaction. 
6.7. Method 
6.7.1. Participants. 
Participants were users of an online message board discussing the topic of 
credit card fraud. Users participated under fictitious alias names; therefore there was 
no socio-demographic information available about users. While there was no 
information on the individual users, it was possible to characterize the social group 
organizing and using the forum by taking into account background information such 




Figure 6.1 Schematic representation of a conceptual model linking the varying levels 
of high and low trust and the language of the group in an entirely relational 
interaction. 
Introductory pages revealed that the topic of the message board was ‘carding’, 
and users self identified as ‘carders’. ‘Carding’ is slang for credit card fraud, and 
‘carders’ are active or aspiring credit card fraudsters (Peretti, 2008).  In a press 
interview with the serious organised crime agency (SOCA), SOCA described the site 
as facilitating the commission of fraud and related criminal offences.  SOCA went on 
to state that under UK law an offence of fraud might be punished with imprisonment 
of 10 years (Brewster, 2013).  Hence, participants in the present study were, by UK 
law, serious criminals; 540 users made up the group.  
6.7.2. Materials. 
Website content. Cpro.su is a website designed to facilitate credit card fraud. 
UK police initiated a period of disruption designed to undermine trust in the website’s 
organizers and users.  The specific dates and times, accurate to one hour, of this 
disruption period was made available for the purposes of the present research. The 
message board was suitable material for the present study as language behaviors 
before, during, and following disruption could be analyzed. 
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Message board. Contained within the website was a public discussion forum, 
or message board (Holtz et al., 2012).  The message board ‘rules’ as defined by 
website organizers, were detailed on the first page.  The forum prohibited the 
disclosure of sensitive information, such as credit card details.  The forum also 
prohibited advertising any services, or initiating any transactions (other areas of the 
website could facilitate this behaviour).  Hence, the message board was related to the 
running of the website, the state of the carding black market, success stories and other 
issues in carding outside of carding commerce itself.  
Internet message boards are typically organised into specific thematic sections 
with subsections (Holtz et al., 2012). In the present study the thematic section 
analysed was called ‘English speaking carders’ and the subsection was called ‘general 
discussion’. The message board had been active since December 2009, and to the 
authors knowledge is still active today. The present analysis took a subsection of the 
message board’s content lasting 13 months and 21 days. 
The message board followed the typical tree-like structure described by Holtz 
et al. (2012).  Users could start a discussion by creating a new ‘thread’, with a ‘starter 
posting’. Other users could reply to the starter posting or to other users’ comments. 
These messages are called posts. There were 176 threads in the present sample. 
Text extraction. Extract.pl was a perl script designed to convert html files into 
individual text files. The program converted html threads into a text file containing 
date, user, post, and thread topic. One issue with text extraction in general, is the 
decision regarding how to deal with quotes from earlier posts (Holtz et al., 2012). 
Keeping quotes can bias the word count. This was a particularly salient issue in the 
present study where word count is entered as part of the formulation of the language 
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variables.  Therefore, extract.pl was designed to exclude quotes when converting html 
data to text files. 
6.7.3. Procedure 
Data extraction. A cpro.su user account was created, which permitted access 
to the websites message boards. The first step was to export the content of the website 
to text processing software, this is particularly relevant given that forums may 
suddenly go offline for various reasons (Holtz et al., 2012).  Given the criminal nature 
of the data in the present study, this was a particularly salient risk.  Indeed, having 
gained ethical clearance to begin the study, the forum transitioned between active and 
inactive on numerous occasions, being inactive for several months.  However, it was 
possible to export the entire message board, during a 3-day window when the site was 
active. HTML files were saved by hand direct from the online website. Extract.pl then 
converted HTML files to text files. 
Data restructure. The data was restructured into the relevant phases for 
analysis. Text files were divided into folders containing posts exclusive to the 
particular phase parameters.  Phase parameters were based on the time stamp of each 
individual post. A single topic thread sometimes contained posts within 2 phases. In 
such circumstances, the posts were divided into their respective phases, and the topic 
thread was coded as part A and part B, with part A existing in the earlier group phase 
and part B in the later group phase. At this stage an inclusion criteria was also 
defined. Inclusion criteria were thread topics that contained three or more posts, by 
two or more individual users.  Any discussion that consisted of less than this was 




Independent variable. Phase of group development was the independent 
variable with 7 levels. Phases were defined to reflect varying levels of trust, so that 
planned comparisons of language could be made between phases. A disruption phase 
was defined using information from UK police. This was the phase which, accurate to 
one hour, the research team was aware that the website had been disrupted by UK 
police. The disruption phase lasted 9 days and 4 hours. Phases surrounding the critical 
disruption were defined as follows; immediate before and after phases, these were the 
10 days before and immediately after the disruption phase; short term before and after 
phases, these were the 10 days before and after the immediate phases; and long term 
before and after phases, these contained posts from 6 months before and after the 
short term phases.  10 day periods were used to mirror the duration of the disruption 
period, thus keeping all phases (outside of the long term phases) basically consistent 
in duration. 
This ‘ripple effect’ design structure allowed the sequential effects following 
the disruption, to be assessed in the immediate, short and long term.  With regard to 
phases defined before the disruption, the design structure allowed for the post 
disruption phases to be compared to what was ‘typical’ of the group’s language in the 
immediate, short, and long term history of the groups life cycle. Phases are detailed in 
Table 6.1. 
Dependent variables. Dependent variables were LSM and positive emotion 
word use.  Each language variables was taken at the individual user level, as opposed 
to the group level. Thus, LSM measured an individual’s language similarity to their 
group in a single thread topic.  Positive emotion word use measured the individual’s 
use of positive emotion words as a proportion of their total word count, in a single   
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Table 6.1 Phases of group’s life cycle. Phase	  Code	   Phase	  Name	   Thread	  N	   Group	  Member	  N	   Duration	  	  1.1	   Long-­‐term	  Pre-­‐disruption	   73	   299	   6	  Months	  1.2	   Short-­‐term	  Pre-­‐disruption	   7	   29	   10	  Days	  1.3	   Immediate	  Pre-­‐disruption	   4	   19	   10	  Days	  	   	   	   	   	  2	   Disruption	   7	   35	   9	  Days,	  4	  Hours	  	   	   	   	   	  3.1	   Immediate	  Post-­‐disruption	   4	   24	   10	  Days	  3.2	   Short-­‐term	  Post-­‐disruption	   5	   26	   10	  Days	  3.3	   Long-­‐term	  Post-­‐disruption	   76	   300	   6	  Months	  
 
thread topic.  The same formula to calculate an individual’s LSM in chapter 3 was 
used in the present study.  As in previous chapters, this formulation provided greater 
statistical power, as opposed to unnecessarily aggregating scores across groups. 
Statistical models. Linear mixed effects models (LME) tested the effect of 
group phase (1.1 through to 3.3, see table 6.1) on group language (LSM and Positive 
emotion). Two distinct models predicted LSM and positive emotion.  Phase 
constituted a single fixed factor. Language behaviour was expected to vary randomly 
between threads and between individual users; hence thread and user ID were entered 
as random factors.  Within the models, planned comparisons tested hypotheses 1 
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through to 3, comparing: pre-disruption phases with the single highest impacted post 
disruption phase (hypothesis 1); the long term pre-disruption phase with long term 
post disruption phase (hypothesis 2); and the single highest impacted post disruption 
phase with subsequent phase or phases (hypothesis 3). 
6.7.5. Ethics 
It has been argued in fields of sociology, psychology, and medicine that 
communication in internet forums is private and should not be used for scientific 
analysis without the informed consent of the users (Holtz et al., 2012). However, one 
of the main functions of such public forums is to inform non-members about the 
organizations’ agenda and goals and to attract new members. Usually, anyone can 
read the postings in these forums. In cpro.su, any member of the public could sign up 
for a free user account and access the entire content of message boards.  Arguably, 
this justifies the consideration of communication within such forums as ‘public 
behavior’ (Herring, 1996). Therefore analysing such content might be considered a 
‘low risk’ ethical concern. 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that users of such public forums might 
at least be annoyed by the possibility of their postings being analyzed in scientific 
research (King, 1996).  For this reason, alias names were not published in the present 
research.  Furthermore, literal quotes from the message board were avoided because 
the respective postings could be found easily with search engines. Finally, dates and 
times of each phase were not detailed; this was as much to protect the privacy of 
users, as it was to keep the times of the UK police disruption secret.  Overall, the 
present research contained as little potentially identifying information about 
individual users as necessary.  
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Finally, the research was reviewed and granted clearance by two separate 
ethics committees; Lancaster University research ethics committee, and Ministry of 
Defense research ethics committee.  In conclusion, the research could be considered 
ethically sound. 
6.8. Results 
The ANOVA summary indicated that the overall LME model approached 
significance for phase predicting LSM, F (6, 219.15) = 1.81, p = .10, two-tailed test).  
However, the LME model for phase predicting positive emotion was none significant. 
Significant effects of phase predicting LSM were found specifically on the immediate 
pre-disruption phase (1.3) and long term post disruption phase (3.3) (see Table 6.2 for 
summary).  LSM in each phase is illustrated in Figure 6.2 and illustrates the highest 
LSM scores in the immediate pre-disruption phase (1.3), and LSM gradually 
decreasing following this phase into the disruption phase (2), immediate post-
disruption phase (3.1) and short-term post-disruption phase (3.2). 
Hypothesis 1 was tested by comparing the short-term post disruption phase, which 
was the single highest impacted post disruption phase as reflected by the lowest mean 
LSM score, with all pre-disruption phases (i.e. phase 3.2 with 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). 
Hypothesis 2 was assessed by comparing the two long-term phases (i.e. phase 
1.1 with 3.3). Hypothesis 3 was assessed by comparing the short-term post disruption 
phase, which as stated was the single highest impacted post disruption phase, with the 
subsequent phase, which was the long-term disruption phase (i.e. phase 3.2 with. 3.3). 
Multiple t-tests with a corrected alpha (5 comparisons; p-value cut off =0.01) tested 
each effect.  The comparison results are reported in table 6.3. 
The long-term effect of disruption was an increase in LSM, as demonstrated  
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Table 6.2 Summary of LME model; phase of group interaction predicting LSM. 
 Estimate Std. Error df t P 
Phase1.2 0.02 0.05 281.62 0.40 0.69 
Phase1.3 0.21 0.08 203.16 2.67 0.01 
Phase2 0.04 0.05 218.51 0.82 0.41 
Phase3.1 -0.01 0.07 202.90 -0.14 0.89 
Phase3.2 -0.05 0.06 218.19 -0.88 0.38 
Phase3.3 0.04 0.02 200.46 1.67 0.10 
Note. Phase 1.1 was used as the intercept in the LME. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Effect of phase of group interaction on LSM. 
 
by comparison A, however this difference only approached significance.  The short-
term effect of disruption was a decrease in LSM, as demonstrated by comparisons B 
through to D, however only comparison D reached significance.  There was evidence  
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Table 6.3 Hypothesis 1 through to 3; planned comparison results. 




A 1.1 vs. 3.3 34.99 2.00 0.05 0.44 0.47 
B 1.1 vs. 3.2 1333.26 -1.52 0.13 0.44 0.36 
C 1.2 vs. 3.2 63.08 2.24 0.03 0.48 0.36 
D 1.3 vs. 3.2 43.92 4.59 <0.01 0.66 0.36 
E 3.2 vs. 3.3 34.64 -2.52 0.02 0.36 0.47 
 
for a trust repair effect as demonstrated by comparison E, however this also only 
approached significance. 
6.9. Discussion 
Trust was proposed to be a critical component in the functioning of criminal 
online virtual communities. It was hypothesized that certain levels of trust would exist 
at various stages of the group’s life cycle, and that these levels of trust would be 
reflected in the language use of the VC’s group members. Hypotheses were only 
partially supported as most effects only approached significance. Nethertheless, LSM 
was lower following disruption, increased following the lowest trust phase (indicating 
trust repair), and was greater in the long term following the disruption as compared to 
the long term level prior to disruption. The lack of effects with regard to the positive 
emotion language was in line with the prediction that in relational focused 
interactions, LSM is a reliable and relevant signal to trust, whilst positive emotion, in 
this context, is less reliable and relevant. 
The crucial contextual factor proposed to facilitate the effect of LSM on trust, 
was the relational phase in which LSM occurs. However, alternative interpretations 
  
143 
have been proposed. It has been suggested that ‘early temporal phase’, in the 
interaction, is the crucial contextual variable in explaining the effect of LSM on trust 
(Swaab, Maddux, & Sinaceur, 2011). Studies in chapters 2 through to 5 have grappled 
with disentangling these two interpretations. The present findings provide support for 
the ‘relational context interpretation’ by demonstrating that LSM reflected changes in 
trust throughout the group’s entire life cycle, regardless of temporal position. Hence, 
it is argued that LSM, crucially in relational focused interactions, is a reliable and 
relevant trust signal irrespective of temporal position in the group’s life cycles. 
There was evidence to suggest that the trust disruption had the negative effect 
on trust predicted, as revealed by a decrease in LSM in the immediate and short term 
post disruption phases. It is interesting that trust was lowest in the short-term post 
disruption phase, rather than the immediate post disruption phase. However, graphing 
the results indicated that LSM progressively decline from disruption phase; to 
immediate post disruption phase; to short-term post disruption phase, as opposed to an 
abrupt shift in trust. Relevant to this finding is McKnight, Cummings and Chervany’s 
(1998) distinction between fragile and robust trust.  The authors stated that 
interactional history accumulates over time, along with information about individuals, 
which is transmitted to other people, and which builds individual’s reputations.  Until 
this point, trust might be described as fragile, however if the process is allowed to 
occur, the authors claim it is harder for a negative event to significantly reduce a high 
level of trust. Group members in the present study had a long interactional history 
(more than 12 months), which might have created a level of robustness, which 
prevented an abrupt decline in trust.  The lifespan of an online group prior to a trust 
disruption is likely an important characteristic when considering how trust declines 
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following disruption.  Future research could utilize language analysis to study this 
further.  
The present results suggested that the level of trust in the long-term repaired 
state was equal to or greater than ‘pristine’ trust, i.e. greater than the level of trust 
prior to any disruption. Dirks et al. (2009) and Kramer and Lewicki’s (2010) had 
proposed the possibility of such an effect previously. This suggested that for online 
groups, following a trust disruption, only a greater level of trust ‘will do’ if the group 
is to survive a disruption. This might be especially true of criminal groups, where 
trust has been said to be more critical to the survival of online groups than none 
criminal online groups (Von Lampe & Johansen, 2004).  
There was support for the role of language style repairing trust; specifically, 
that an increase in LSM may have facilitated trust repair. Whilst Tomlinson and 
Mayer (2009) proposed that language styles, such as anger and fear, could have a 
negative effect on trust repair, the present findings were novel in demonstrating, 
positively, that a language style such as high LSM can facilitate trust repair.  
The exact mechanism by which LSM acts to repair trust can be speculated 
upon. In line with the role of LSM in the relevant and reliable language theory; LSM, 
in a relational phase, communicates engagement in the relational needs of the group.  
Following a disruption to trust, Heider (1958) and Gillespie and Dietz (2009) stated 
that ‘renewed commitment’ to the group was the crucial group need for trust to be 
repaired.  Hence, LSM might repair trust via communicating engagement in the 
activity of renewing group member’s commitment to the group.  
It has been difficult to disentangle the direction of effects between trust and 
language in previous studies. This was less of a limitation in the present study because 
the research aimed to demonstrate how language can be a useful measure for changes 
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in trust; regardless of whether varying levels of trust caused changes in language, or 
varying language caused changes in trust. Nevertheless, the various findings from the 
present study arguably supported each possible direction of effects. Specifically, the 
drop in trust following a disruption suggested that the disruption to trust caused 
changes in language (LSM). On the other hand, increased LSM over the long term 
following the disruption suggested that language might have caused a workable level 
of trust for the group to continue to exist. Thus, the findings add further evidence to 
the role of language as a cause and consequence of online group trust. 
6.9.1. Applications and implications 
The findings suggest applications for how to measure trust and how to disrupt 
trust in online groups. Automated text analysis is proposed as a remote way to 
measure trust in online groups. This is useful for scenarios where a measure of trust is 
important but must remain covert, as direct measures of trust (i.e. psychometric and 
behavioural trust measures) become unavailable. The only previous language measure 
of trust, proposed as a possible remote measure, utilized time consuming qualitative 
methods using human observers to rate ‘positive emotion’ (Crisp & Jarvenpaa, 2013). 
Hence, the present measure builds on past attempts by increasing efficiency, as well 
as accuracy; given that the automated measure doesn’t rely on human judgments, 
which are liable to produce errors.  
The present findings also inform the issue of how law enforcements should 
effectively disrupt criminal online groups. The present strategy, by UK police, was to 
undermine trust via implicating the existence of covert, malicious agents; as well as 
implicating the insecurity of personal information. According to the present findings, 
the success of this strategy, as measured by disruption to group trust, was mixed. The 
results would suggest that such a method is useful to undermine trust in the short 
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term, but in the long term might in fact make the group’s level of trust greater, and 
therefore more resilient to further disruptions. The present research would suggest 
that determining the aims of disruption, i.e. to disrupt trust in the short or long term, is 
therefore crucial, before initiating disruptive efforts. 
6.9.2. Limitations and future research 
An alternative interpretation to the present findings with regard to language 
style facilitating trust repair exists.  It is possible that the increase in LSM may have 
been conflated with the longer-term effect of trust repair following trust disruption.  
That is to say that, given that the phase defined as the ‘trust repair phase’ fell on the 
same phase as the ‘long term post disruption phase’, it is difficult to disentangle 
whether what was observed was the long term effects of repaired trust, or the short 
term process of trust repair itself.  
A second limitation of the present study is that the state of trust inferred at 
each phase was somewhat speculative. The findings infer states of trust given the 
knowledge regarding the timings of trust disruptions, and ‘typical’ effects following 
disruptions. That is to say that, trust is typically lowered, repaired, and stabilized 
following a disruption (Dirks et al., 2009). This meant that lower trust following the 
disruption, increased trust via a mechanism of trust repair, and the group establishing 
a new level of trust in the long term; was never directly measured. The nature of the 
study, using retrospective data from a criminal VC, meant that a more objective 
measure of trust, i.e. psychometric or behavioural measures, at each phase was 
impossible.  Implementing such measures in future quasi-field experiments could 




The present study extended the findings form previous studies in this thesis to 
measure trust in a real world online group.  This is a novel approach to measuring 
trust and one that appears useful, especially in settings where conventional measures 
of trust are unsuitable, such as criminal VCs. In line with the theory that language 
variables that reflect trust are dependent on being relevant and reliable within the 
context of the interaction, LSM was the critical language variable that appeared to 
reflect changes in trust.  Whilst positive emotion was useless; an important future 
research question concerns the role of LSM and positive emotion as measures of trust 
in real world online groups that contain task as well as relational orientated 
interactions.  As a measure of trust, with close attention to context, automated text 
analysis offers a promising tool to assess the impact of law enforcement disruptions.   
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7. Chapter 7. General Discussion 
7.1. Experiment and Theory Summary 
This thesis aimed to establish a language measure of trust. The various 
language behaviours that were thought to relate to trust, with sparse prior research in 
this area, was vast. Hence, hypotheses were created paying attention to 
communication and trust research. This process resulted in ideas of how language 
behaviour might relate to trust with regard to language at the individual word level 
(positive emotion, negative emotion, personal pronouns, cognitive processes words 
and perceptual processes words) and interactive level (LSM). In Chapters 2 and 3, 
these variables were the central language behaviours investigated and related to trust. 
It was concluded that of the language behaviours studied, positive emotion words 
only were reliably related to trust.  That is to say that, an increase in positive emotion 
word use related to an increase in trust for both dyads and group online interactions. 
In addition to these findings, at this stage, questions regarding the direction of 
effects between language and trust were beginning to be addressed.  This would 
inform theory of how language and trust interact with one another. On the one hand, 
the dominant theory of interpersonal trust (Mayer et al., 1995) suggested that 
language causally relates to trust, as discussed in Chapter 1.  The theory states that 
trust is based on trustworthiness perceptions, first, which inform beliefs, intentions, 
and behaviour. Hence, in online contexts, where language is the salient 
communication channel and there is no prior interactional history, language is the 
primary means by which trust perceptions are arrived at, and thus causally relate to 
trust. On the other hand, Pennebaker’s (2012) recent research tradition in 
communication has demonstrated how analyzing language at the individual word 
level reveals internal states. This perspective spoke to the present research, given that 
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trust, once gleaned from trustworthiness perceptions, exists as an intention, i.e. an 
internal state. Hence, it is possible that such an intention might reveal itself in 
identifiable language styles. Evidence for this view was found in the study in chapter 
3, with greater positive emotion word use in those primed to believe their group was 
high in trustworthiness, as compared to those primed to believe their group was low in 
trustworthiness.  Hence, the first two studies demonstrated how language affects trust, 
and how trust, at the same time, affects language. 
From the studies in Chapters 2 and 3, it was clear that positive emotion would 
form a part of the trust measure.  In addition, LSM was nominated as a variable to 
continue to investigate, given that the variable had been grounded in a multitude of 
empirical findings demonstrating its links to behaviours where trust has been shown 
to be a prerequisite (e.g. peaceful hostage negotiation outcome [Taylor & Thomas, 
2008] and online dating success [Ireland et al., 2011]). It was speculated that the 
limited, task focused, context of interactions in the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 could 
have moderated the potential positive effects of LSM on trust. 
Ireland’s (Ireland, 2011; Ireland & Henderson, 2014) social engagement 
theory, which stated that LSM reflects engagement in the most salient feature of the 
interaction, offered an explanation as to how context might moderate the relationship 
between LSM and trust. That is to say that, engagement in an entirely task orientated 
interaction (Chapters 2 and 3) would not necessarily communicate anything about the 
relationship itself, and so did not relate to trust in the first two studies. Hence, in 
Chapter 4, a study tested what the effect of LSM on trust would be if participants 
were first encouraged to establish a relationship (something which trust is critical to 
[Mayer et al., 1995]) prior to a task focused interaction. This was an intuitive design 
given that task and relational phases are typical of group phase development anyway 
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(Poole & Roth, 1989). The design would also facilitate testing the effect of positive 
emotion on trust in a wider context than just task focused interactions; hence testing 
the robustness of the previous findings on positive emotion from Chapters 2 and 3. 
The results of the study in Chapter 4 found that LSM was significantly related 
to trust when it occurred in the relational focused phase of the group’s life cycle. The 
initial analysis revealed that positive emotion, counter to previous findings, was not 
significantly related to trust across any phase of the interaction. This led to a post hoc 
analysis, which tested the effects of positive emotion on trust in task focused phases, 
for groups who had not experienced high levels of LSM in the relational focused 
phase. It was found that for such groups, positive emotion was significantly related to 
trust in the later task phase. Together, the results indicated that groups might form 
trust based on LSM in a relational phase; however, failing to achieve this, positive 
emotion might be used to facilitate trust in later, task focused, phases.  
The findings led to a theory of language and trust which became the 
cornerstone of the thesis; this was The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory.  The 
theoretical framework is a collection of three quasi-independent mini-theories, joined 
by an overarching logic. Firstly, in line with Sperber and Wilson (1986), who state 
that relevance is central to the processing of any communication, the theory proposed 
that only relevant language is used to inform trust decisions. It therefore implies that 
once a group have already established trust, further language behaviours will not be 
processed to inform trust decisions.  This formed the explanation for why positive 
emotion in task phases was not related to trust in groups that had already established 
trust (via LSM) in the relational phase, but did for those groups who had not 
established trust in this phase (Chapter 4), or had not had the opportunity to in the 
absence of a relational phase (Chapters 2 and 3).   
  
151 
Secondly, Bacharach and Gambetta’s (2001) theory of ‘reliable’ trust signals, 
which states that trust signals that are most difficult to ‘mimic’ by ‘opportunists’ are 
the ones that people use to make trust judgements, explained why LSM might be 
chosen instead of positive emotion to inform trustworthiness perceptions.  This was 
because the unconscious nature of LSM, might be more difficult to manipulate by 
opportunists than consciously produced positive emotion words. Thus explaining 
why, when two signals communicating trust are present (i.e. LSM and positive 
emotion in a relational phase), individuals might use LSM, over positive emotion, to 
inform trust decisions.   
Lastly, Ireland’s (Ireland, 2011; Ireland & Henderson, 2014) social 
engagement theory suggested that LSM would not always be considered a trust signal.  
That is to say that, in instances where LSM reflected engagement in the task, this 
would not necessarily inform trust judgements, as it communicates little about the 
individuals relationship to the group, only ones engagement in the task.  That is to say 
that, in such instances LSM might become irrelevant to trust. Thus explaining why 
LSM was not related to trust in task orientated interactions (Chapters 2,3, 4, and later 
5). The Relevant and Reliable Language theory assimilated findings from studies in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4; and was tested and supported in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In Chapter 5 a single confederate in groups of 4 to 6 people was able to 
manipulate language such that LSM or positive emotion could be reduced in a 
specific phase of the group interaction. It was hypothesised that the most disruptive 
manipulation to trust possible was to disrupt LSM in a relational phase, followed by 
positive emotion in a task phase, this formed the ‘strong disruption’ condition. Half 
the groups in the study were subject to this condition. The other half were subject to a 
control condition whereby the manipulations were implemented in the reverse order, 
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i.e. positive emotion was disrupted in the relational phase and LSM was disrupted in 
the subsequent task phase, this formed the ‘weak disruption’ condition. The results 
illustrated that groups in the strong disruption typically displayed less trust behaviour 
than those in the weak disruption condition. Further analysis supported the role of 
LSM and positive emotion functioning as the Relevant and Reliable Language Theory 
would predict to facilitate trust formation in the weak disruption condition.  That is to 
say that, there was evidence to suggest that allowing groups to produce high LSM in 
the relational phase, and high positive emotion in the task phase facilitated trust. 
The final study in Chapter 6 aimed to examine the link between language and 
trust in real world online groups. The study analysed transcripts from interactions 
between group members engaged in a credit card fraud virtual community. 
Knowledge of a disruption to trust, which was implemented via a police intervention, 
created a natural experiment. Language behaviours across phases of the group’s 
development in relation to the disruption, when various states of high and low trust 
could be inferred, were analysed. Task orientated discussions (e.g. concerning credit 
card fraud tactics) were explicitly prohibited by the forum organisers; hence the group 
interactions were more relational than task focused. Therefore, in line with our 
theoretical framework it was predicted that LSM, more so than positive emotion word 
use, would reflect trust throughout the group’s life cycle. The results supported this, 
finding that LSM, but not positive emotion, ebbed and flowed in line with inferred 
levels of group trust. 
The study in chapter 6 demonstrated the utility of the newly developed 
language measure of trust. Lower levels of LSM were found in the short term, 
following disruption.  This suggested that the impact of a trust disruption was, as 
expected, lower trust and that this was reflected in language. It was also found that 
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LSM, in the long term prior to disruption, was less than the long term following 
disruptions, suggesting that the long term effects of disruption was greater trust.  This 
was interpreted in line with previous authors’ ideas (Dirks et al., 2009; Kramer & 
Lewicki, 2010) who had suggested that a state of repaired trust might be more robust 
than that required prior to trust disruption.  The study demonstrated how the new 
measure could be used to assess trust in real world online groups. In this case, 
providing evidence for the success of a police disruption in the short term, as well as 
its lack of success in the long term, with regard to disrupting trust.  
7.2. Implications 
It is argued that the most significant implication of the present thesis is the 
theoretical framework presented to explain the relationship between language and 
trust online. For this to be a significant implication, the theory must explain trust and 
language findings better than previous theories. Prior to The Relevant and Reliable 
Language Theory, no theory adequately explained the array of findings from the 
present thesis or previous work regarding the interplay between language and trust in 
online interactions. For example, although not explicitly stated as a theory, Swaab et 
al.’s (2011) interpretation of the role of language mimicry in trust online was that 
mimicry early in the interaction was the underlying mechanism by which mimicry 
influenced trust.  That is to say that, mimicry early in an interaction has positive 
effects on trust because it forms a positive early impression in the interaction. 
However, this was counter to findings in Chapters 2 and 3, which did not find that 
greater mimicry, LSM in this case, in an interaction prior to a trust decision related to 
trust.  A second interpretation of the relationship between language and trust was 
proposed by Crisp and Jarvenpaa (2013).  Their findings suggested that positive 
emotion was a universal characteristic of online groups with high trust. However, 
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such findings did not replicate in groups who existed in various phases of group 
development (Chapter 4 & 5), or in an entirely relational interaction (Chapter 6). In 
conclusion, The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory explains the intermittent 
emergence of positive emotion and mimicry (including LSM) relating to trust in a 
new framework that is able to encompass a wider array of findings than previous 
theories. 
The direction of effects debate between language and trust has reemerged 
throughout discussions of findings in this thesis. The language that was 
transformative in shaping trust (i.e. that which appeared to lead to trust), and that 
which reflected trust, was investigated throughout the studies in the thesis. It was 
found that the language that led to trust and the language that reflected trust was on 
the same language behaviours. Studies in Chapters 3 and 6 considered the language 
that reflects trust.  This was done so by considering language in interactions where a 
high or low level of trust could be estimated, i.e. following a trust prime or disruption 
to trust respectively. Results showed that in an entirely task interaction, positive 
emotion was the language behaviour that reflected trust (Chapter 3); and that in an 
entirely relational interaction, LSM was the language behaviour that reflected trust 
(Chapter 6). Interestingly, this mapped directly onto the context dependent findings 
for language that led to trust (in Chapters 2,3,4 and 5). That is to say that positive 
emotion in a task phase (following an absence of trust built on LSM in an earlier 
relational phase) both led to and reflected trust, whilst LSM in a relational phase also 
both led to and reflected trust. This implied a common, reciprocal, mechanism to the 
relationship between language and trust, i.e. a relationship whereby the same 
language behaviors that facilitate trust, in certain contexts, also reflected trust.   
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7.3. Applications  
Collectively, the studies indicate the best ways in which an investigator might 
both measure trust in an online group and, following from this, disrupt trust in an 
online group. Knowledge of the context dependent roles of LSM and positive emotion 
in trust formation should allow the investigator to estimate the level of trust amongst 
an online group. This can be determined by comparing language behaviour relative to 
another group, i.e. measurements of language behaviour can be used to estimate 
which groups have established the greater or lesser level of trust. Similarly, levels of 
trust can be estimated within the same group at different phases of group 
development, this was most clearly demonstrated in Chapter 6, where trust was 
measured across phases relative to a disruption. 
Specific decision paths can be taken to form such estimates of trust. First, the 
investigator must determine if the group completed a relational phase prior to a task 
phase. If so, LSM in this phase should be measured to determine the level of trust. 
Greater levels of LSM in this phase should be a reliable indicator of greater trust, 
regardless of language behaviour in subsequent task phases. However, if LSM is 
relatively low in the relational phase, further measurement of language behaviour in 
the task phase becomes critical. Here, positive emotion in the task phase should be 
measured to determine the level of trust. 
In the case that the group did not enter a relational phase, prior to task phase 
(i.e. the group exists exclusively in a relational or task phase) a different decision path 
will be taken. For those groups in exclusively a relational phase, LSM should be 
measured to determine the level of trust. For those groups in exclusively a task 
focused phase, positive emotion should be measured to determine the level of trust. In 
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all cases, language behaviours are positively related to trust, i.e. the greater the level 
of language behaviour (LSM or positive emotion) the greater the level of trust. 
Parallel decision paths can be taken in order to disrupt trust. However, the 
investigator will be limited by the phase in which he comes into contact with the 
group.  Disruption as early as possible should be implemented, i.e. if access were 
possible while the group is in an early relational phase, disrupting LSM would be the 
most effective trust disruption. For groups that persist in a relational phase, LSM 
should continue to be disrupted. For groups who exist in a task phase, either with 
prior relational phase or not, positive emotion should be disrupted. However, this 
might have limited success if the group has already established a high level of trust 
based on LSM in the relational phase. 
7.4. Limitations and future research  
The relationship between language and trust has been studied in this thesis 
largely with regard to how language helps facilitate trust, and which language 
behaviours reflect trust. However, the relationship between language and trust could 
also be studied with regard to trust disruption, decline and repair. In Chapter 6, first 
steps were taken in understanding these relationships by highlighting the role of 
language in trust decline and repair. However, such phenomena might become the 
focus of future research.  
With regard to trust repair, the relationship to language behaviours 
(specifically, language style as measured by computer text analysis) has largely been 
ignored. Those studies that have considered language behaviour in trust repair have 
done so at the level of content, e.g. the effects of apology or denial (see Kim et al. 
2013). Future research might consider how language style interacts with language 
content to affect the success of trust repair. For example, asking questions such as; 
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does an apology with positive emotion better repair trust than an apology with low 
positive emotion? This research would be useful to inform best practice in trust repair. 
A number of The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory predictions are yet 
to be tested. For instance, for groups who are entirely task focused over a long period 
of time, the theory would predict that positive emotion word use, rather than LSM, 
would relate to trust for the entire interaction.  The present research found this in a 
single interaction, but did not test this over repeat interactions. Also, for groups who 
enter a task phase prior to a relational phase, the theory would predict the reverse of 
the effects found in Chapter 4. That is to say that, positive emotion in the task phase 
would be the predictor of trust, and LSM would become an irrelevant predictor of 
trust in the latter relational phase, unless trust was not established in the initial task 
phase. The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory at least offers a framework, with 
predictions, to explore the relationship between language and trust in various make 
ups of groups beyond those studied in the present thesis. 
The role of context, i.e. phase of group development, is critical to the present 
measure of trust. However, at present the measure has no way to objectively 
determine which phase of development a group exists in at a given time. Instead, 
human judgements are relied upon to determine whether the context would be defined 
as relational or task. To increase the utility of the measure, computer text analysis 
could be used to determine when a group is in a relational or task phase. Such a 
measure could be established by correlating phase of interactions with language 
behaviours. This addition to the measure could be combined with the present 
language measure of trust. For instance, LSM could be multiplied by the extent to 
which a group discussion is relational focused. Similarly, positive emotion scores 
could be multiplied by the extent to which the group is task focused. This would 
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mitigate error in the measure owing to human error in judging the extent to which a 
phase of a group’s development is task or relational focused. 
Finally, a general limitation with regard to experimental design must also be 
noted. In the studies in Chapters 3 and 5 there was an absence of control conditions. 
For example, in the study in Chapter 3 a high trust prime condition and a low trust 
prime condition was induced but no ‘no prime’ trust condition. The effect of a low 
trust prime is only explored relative to it’s opposite, a high trust prime, and vice versa. 
Therefore the effect of the prime may have been exaggerated. The additional 
condition was not included due to limitations on the number of participants available. 
Similarly, in the study in Chapter 5, whilst two conditions were induced 
(strong disruption and weak disruption) there was no ‘no disruption’ condition. Again, 
this may have exaggerated the effects, as manipulations were compared to their 
opposite, rather than a control. As in the study in Chapter 3, the additional condition 
was not included due to limitations on the number of participants. 
7.5. Concluding remarks 
A theory of the relationship between language and trust in online interactions 
has been put forward based on empirical findings from four studies using student 
participant data, and one study using real world online interactions. The theory is 
called The Relevant and Reliable Language Theory. The theory rests on the language 
processes LSM and positive emotion word use, which by paying attention to the 
phase of group development in which they occur, can be used to measure trust (one of 
the main aims of the thesis). The theory also informs best practice for disrupting trust.  
The implications for trust theory were discussed. Firstly, it was concluded that 
relevance, the phase of the interaction that language behaviour occurs, and reliability, 
the likelihood that language behaviour is genuine and not being faked, are the critical 
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factors that influence when and how language behaviour is transformative or 
reflective in relation to trust. Secondly, the transformative and reflective nature of 
language behaviour to trust was implied via a two-directional relationship, whereby 
LSM in the relational phase and positive emotion in the task phase both reflect and 
transform trust for group members. Future directions were proposed. Firstly, it was 
suggested that the measure can be improved by assimilating a language measure of 
group phase development with the measure of trust, as to mitigate the risk of errors 
due to human judgements. Secondly, the reliability of the measure and theory should 
be tested on more variations of group dynamics, paying attention to variation in the 
nature and order of group phase development. Thirdly, application of the measure and 
theory to trust research beyond trust formation could be explored by considering trust 
repair. The theoretical framework and language measure offered are novel 
contributions to trust research and provide a foundation to further understand 
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